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ABSTRACT
POLL USE AND POLICY-MAKING IN THE WHITE HOUSE: 1993-2000
SEPTEMBER 2004
JEANNE S. ZAINO, B.A. UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jerome M. Mileur
In the later half of the twentieth century, political polling increased dramatically.
Increased reliance on polling has been particularly evident in the White House. Every
president since Franklin Delano Roosevelt has relied on polling and pollsters to assess
opinion on a variety of important issues. Despite this, there has been relatively little
examination as to how officials use this data and how it impacts policy and decision-
making. The dearth in research has given rise to a great deal of speculation. Some
scholars and journalists have suggested that officials pander to opinion. Others have
argued that polls are used to craft rhetoric and market favored policies. While still
others have concluded the data is not used at all. This study examines how officials
use survey data in policy and decision-making. It builds on the sociology of
knowledge application literature to both define and develop several models of use.
These models are then applied to several cases of decision and policy-making during
the Clinton administration (1992-2000), the most recent White House for which we
have a complete record. The case analysis shows that polls are used in a variety of
IV
ways, not only to pander and craft rhetoric, but also to set parameters, legitimize, and
develop an offensive strategy. The findings show that while polls are used in ways
that result in responsiveness to the majority will, they are also used in ways that do
not. Democratic officials not only act contrary to popular opinion, but polls aid in
this endeavor. These findings suggest that while polls do not consistently undermine
democratic government, neither do they necessarily facilitate it either. Consequently,
those seeking a larger voice for the public in democratic affairs are cautioned against
relying on polls as a primary linking mechanism.
v
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2001, former presidential press secretaries were invited to the
White House for an informal luncheon. During the meeting, President Bush solicited
input regarding whether the government should warn the public about vague,
unsubstantiated terrorist threats? The question prompted Clinton Press Secretary Dee
Dee Myers to ask, “what do the poll numbers say?” Bush responded with a line he
had perfected first as Governor of Texas and then as the Republican nominee for
president. “In this White House Dee Dee, we don’t poll on something as important as
national security.”
1
This was not the first time Bush attempted to distance himself from polling.
He began honing this message early in the 2000 presidential campaign. In
announcing his candidacy, for instance, he stated that as Governor, “I’ve learned to
lead. I don’t run polls to tell me what to think.”
While on the campaign trail, his pledge to “restore honor and integrity to the
Oval Office” by governing “based upon principle and not polls and focus groups”
1
Joshua Green, “The Other War Room: President Bush Doesn’t Believe in Polling - Just Ask His
Pollsters,” Washington Monthly, April 2002. Available:
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2001/0204.green.html (accessed April 4, 2000).
2
At a campaign stop in Kalamazoo, Michigan, for instance, Bush told an enthusiastic crowd that “a
responsible leader is someone who says clearly, ‘Here are my principles, here’s what I stand on
[someone who] makes decisions based upon principle, not based upon polls or focus groups.” Bush
was not, however, alone. He was just one of several candidates who attempted to distance himself
from polling. In announcing his candidacy, for instance, Democratic hopeful Bill Bradley noted, “I’m
more interested in leadership than polls and politics.” See Jeff Manza and Fay Lomax Cook, “Policy
Responsiveness to Public Opinion: The State of the Debate, July 2001, 17. Available:
http://www.northwestem.edu/IPR/publications/papers/wp0606.pdf (accessed February 19, 2002); John
F. Harris, “Clintonesque Balancing of Issues, Polls: Role of Politics Evident in Bush White House,”
Washington Post, June 24, 2001. Available: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A38341-
2201Jun23.html (accessed June 25, 2002).
1
became one of his most “reliable applause lines.”3 Similarly, he would often
challenge audiences to “ask my Texans whether I stand on principle or on polls and
focus groups.”
4
Bush also questioned the Clinton administration’s reliance on polls. During
an interview on NBC’s “Meet the Press” he told Tim Russert, “I’ve been, frankly,
amazed at the amount of polling that goes on to determine the behavior in the White
House.”
5 He expressed similar disenchantment during a televised debate with Vice
President A1 Gore. 6
I think you got (sic) to look at. . . whether or not one makes decisions
based on sound principles. Or whether or not you rely upon polls and
focus on how to decide what the course of action is. We’ve got too
much polling and focus groups going on in Washington today. 7
3
“Devil in the Details: George W, Poll Junkie,” American Prospect
,
June 17, 2002, 7. Available:
http://www.prospect.Org/print/vl3/l l/devil2.html (accessed July 3, 2002); Green, “The Other War
Room.”
4
“Devil in the Details,” 7.
5
“Devil in the Details” 7.
6
It may be tempting to attribute Bush’s anti-poll comments to the “elation strategy” whereby
candidates discount poll results and polls when they show them running behind. While the “elation
strategy” may account for anti-poll remarks by Republican Vice-Presidential candidate Henry Cabot
Lodge in 1960 and George Romney, who was running for the presidential nomination in 1968, it does
not fit in the case of Bush whose anti-poll comments did not cease even when the polls showed him in
the lead or after he won the presidency. In 1960, Lodge, for instance, said that polls were “passing
fads.” “In the future people are going to look back on these polls as one of the hallucinations which
the American people have been subjected to I don’t think the polls are here to stay.” Eight years
later and just days before withdrawing from the race, Romney criticized the polls for not reflecting his
strength in New Hampshire and Wisconsin. See Bernard C. Hennessy, Public Opinion, 2
nd
ed.
(Belmont, CA: Duxbury Press/Wadsworth, 1970), 83-4.
7
This rhetoric did not subside once Bush entered the White House. When reporters questioned him
about a drop in his approval ratings, he responded, “I don’t even know what polls you’re talking
about, nor do I care.” Later that year when speaking to steelworkers, he reiterated his pledge to govern
based on principle not polls. “We don’t stick our finger in the air trying to figure out which way the
wind is blowing. I do what I think is right for the American people. And we’ll let the political chips
fall where they may.” Maureen Dowd, “Addiction to Addition,” New York Times, April 3, 2002;
Francine Kiefer, “How the White House Uses (Gasp!) Polls,” Christian Science Monitor, June 15,
2001. Available: http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/2001/06/15/p2sl.htm (accessed October 2,
2001 ).
2
Public Ambivalence
One reason Bush’s comments resonated with the public during the 2000
campaign is that Americans have long expressed mixed feelings about polls, pollsters,
and politicians who rely on them. This is not surprising given that ambivalence is a
key characteristic of opinion. “Americans do,” as Everett Carrll Ladd writes, “have
mixed minds about many things,” from homosexuality and abortion to foreign policy,
the proper role and scope of government, and the nuclear freeze. 8 The same can be
said of attitudes towards polls and polling.
On the one hand, studies show that the public believes that “policymakers
should pay close attention to polls.”9 Researchers have also found that the majority
of Americans have generally positive attitudes towards polls, think that they are a
“good thing in our country,” that they “have value to the people,” and that the number
of polls conducted is “about right.” Most importantly, at least three recent surveys
show that “a strong majority believes polls ultimately serve the interests of the public
as a whole.”
10
At the same time, however, Americans are suspicious of polling. They see
polls as inaccurate, scientifically unsound, invalid, and easily manipulated.
1
1
They
8
Everett Carrll Ladd, The American Polity: The People and Their Government, 3
rd
ed. (New York:
Norton, 1989), 333-36, 350-52.
9
“Vox Populi: The Voice of the People: Expecting More Say A Study of American Public Attitudes
on the Role of the Public in Government Decisions” 20. Available: http://www.vox-
populi.org/digest/ems/ems_partl.html (accessed July 2, 2001).
10
For an overview of some of this data, see for instance “Vox Populi,” COPA, 20-21. In addition to
the COPA study, the write-up contains references to several previous polls on this issue by
organizations, such as Gallup, CBS News, Harris, Times/CNN, and Pew, taken between September
1996 and 2000/2001. See, also, more positive views expressed in the Kaiser/Public Perspective study
and summarized by Bill Mclnturff and Lori Weigel, “Servants of the People: Political Leadership and
the Public Voice,” Public Perspective, July/August 2001,32-35.
11 These findings are based on a study by Kaiser/Public Perspective, in conjunction with Princeton
Research Associates. The survey was conducted January 3-March 26, 2001 . The results are reported
in the July/August issue of Public Perspective. See for instance, Mollyann Brodie, Lisa Ferraro
3
also express doubt about the accuracy and validity of survey research, question the
reliability of sampling, and express little confidence in the ability of polls to represent
the majority. 12
As Table 1.1 shows, 64 percent of Americans say that polls accurately reflect
what the public is thinking only some of the time or not at all, compared with 33
percent of respondents who suggest that surveys reflect majority opinion most of the
time or just about always.
Table 1.1 : Percentage of Americans Who Say Polls Accurately Reflect
Opinion 11
Date Just About Most of Only Some Hardly Pollster/
—
Ajways the Time of the Time Ever Sponsor
3/26/01 5 28 53 H Princeton3
In your opinion, how often do public opinion polls accurately reflect what the public thinks... Just
about always, most of the time, only some of the times, hardly ever. Don’t Know/refused?
When asked why polls are not “the best way for officials to learn about what
the majority of people in our country think,” 21 percent of Americans said it is
because surveys suffer from problems of non-response bias and respondents are either
disinterested in or lack knowledge about the issues. While 27 percent of respondents
expressed concern about survey methods, and another 17 percent said polls results are
subject to manipulation. 14 Only a quarter of respondents said that polls are “the best
Parmelee, April Brackett, and Drew E. Altman, “Polling and Democracy: A Special Issue,” Public
Perspective, July/August 2001, 10-24.
12
See for instance, “Vox Populi,” COPA, 22 and the accompanying data cited by various other
organizations.
13
The responses do not add up to 100 percent because the “Don’t Know/refused” category was
excluded. For an overview, see Brodie et al., “Polling and Democracy.”
14 When the PSRA/Kaiser/PuWzc Perspective study asked “Why don’t you think public opinion polls
are the best way for officials to learn about what the majority of the people in our country think?,”
respondents answered in the following manner: nonresponse, disinterest and lack of knowledge limit
accuracy of polls (2 1 percent); structure of conducting polls limits accuracy (7 percent); concerns over
4
way for officials to learn about that the majority of people in our country think about
important issues.” This is compared with 46 percent of policy leaders and 52 percent
ofjournalists who view polls as the “best way” for officials to understand public
opinion. As Table 1.2 demonstrates, 43 percent of the public said that town hall
meetings are a better way to gauge opinion than surveys. While 15 percent suggest
officials should “talk to people who call, write, or email” and 1 3 percent said officials
should consult people “at shopping malls and on the street.” 15
Table 1.2: Percentage of the Public, Policy Leaders, and Media Who Say that
Polls Are the Best Wav to Learn About Public Opinion: 16
Polls People on People who Town/Hall
the street call meetings
Public 25 13 15 43 a
Policy Leaders 46 10 6 31 a
Media 52 8 3 25 a
a
Please tell me which one of the following [holding town hall meetings, conducting a public opmion
poll, talking to people at shopping malls and on the street, talking to people who call, write, or email
the official’s office] you think is the best way for officials to leam what the majority of people in our
country think about important issues?
methodology (20 percent); can be purposefully misleading, possible to manipulate (17 percent); Other
(27 percent). See Brodie et al., “Polling and Democracy,” 24.
The majority of Americans also state that officials should pay more attention to members of the
public who contact them directly, their conscience, their own knowledge, and policy experts than polls.
When asked, “Generally speaking when elected and government officials in Washington make
decisions about important issues, how much attention do you feel they should pay to . . . members of
the public who contact them about the issue (90 percent said a great deal or a fair amount); their
conscience or judgment, that is, what they think is the right thing to do (86 percent said a great deal or
a fair amount); their knowledge on the issue (91 percent said a great deal or a fair amount); policy
experts involved with the issue (87 percent said a great deal or a fair amount); public opinion polls (75
percent said a great deal or a fair amount); their campaign contributors (45 percent said a great deal or
a fair amount); lobbyists and special interest groups (44 percent said a great deal or a fair amount); and
what journalists say about the issue (42 percent said a great deal or a fair amount). The study also
compared this with how much attention the public, policy leaders, and journalists feel that government
officials actually do pay to these sources of knowledge. While 60 percent of the public said officials
pay a great deal or a fair amount of attention to public opinion polls, 86 percent of leaders and 92
percent ofjournalists said officials actually pay a great deal or a fair amount of attention to polls. See
Brodie et al., “Polling and Democracy,” 20-2 1
.
16
This poll was conducted in March 2001 . The percentages do not add up to 100 percent because
“Don’t Know/Refused” responses have been excluded. See Brodie et al., “Polling and Democracy,”
19.
5
In addition to their concerns about the ease with which opinion can be
manipulated, Americans also have negative views of pollsters and are suspicious of
officials who rely on them . 17 According to two recent studies, pollsters have a
“credibility” problem . 18 As Andrew Kohut, Director of the Pew Research Center for
the People and the Press notes, “pollsters have developed a reputation as
Machiavellian plotters whose job it is to think up ways to exploit the public .” 19
While a substantial majority of respondents say they want policymakers to
pay more attention to polls, at the same time they believe that the primary reason
most officials use polls is to further personal goals and desires . 20 As Evans Witt
writes, politicians are “caught in a conundrum. A politician who relies on polls is
seen as a spineless officeholder whose every move is dictated by the whims of public
opinion, not by adherence to ‘higher principles’ or the ‘greater good.’ But the public
also wants its elected officials to reflect its views... And how do the officials
determine the public’s views? By taking a poll !”21
These conflicting assessments should not, however, be seen as a reflection of
the fact that the public is fickle, erratic, or that their attitudes lack coherence. There is
a strong case to be made that the public’s ambivalence follows naturally from
17 See for instance, Green, “The Other War Room”; Brodie et al., “Polling and Democracy” which
reports the results of a Kaiser/Public Perspective survey on attitudes towards polling, pollsters, and
public opinion; Witt, “People Who Count: Polling in a New Century,” Public Perspective , July/August
2001,25-28.
18
Evans Witt also notes that “the public is increasingly skeptical of the industry’s ethics and output.”
Ibid., 25.
19
Green, “The Other War Room.”
20
See for instance, Brodie et al., “Polling and Democracy,” 14.
21
Witt, “People Who Count,” 28.
6
America’s ideological tradition, as well as recent political, social, and technological
developments. 22
The framers were of two minds when it came to the role of public opinion.
While they recognized that the will of the people is the only legitimate foundation of
a democracy, at the same time they distrusted the masses, worried about how easily
they could be manipulated, and expressed concern about the danger popular opinion
might pose to minority interests. Consequently, they went to extraordinary lengths to
construct a system that both insures popular sovereignty and guards against its
excesses. The struggle to maintain a balance between these two competing claims has
continued throughout American history. Americans today are beneficiaries of an
ideological tradition that neither completely embraces nor rejects the notion that the
public should have a substantial role in governmental decision-making.
Recent historical developments, including the advent and proliferation of
survey research, the promises made by its earliest proponents that polls would lead to
more responsiveness government, and the growing sense of Americans beginning in
the late twentieth century that their voices are not being reflected in policy-making
have all contributed to these conflicting assessments.
Denials of Use
The public’s ambivalence helps explain why Bush’s anti-poll message
resonated with so many Americans during the 2000 presidential election. It also
22
In speaking about the public’s conflicting attitudes toward “the proper role and scope of
contemporary government,” for instance, Ladd argues that the characteristic ambivalence “follows
naturally from the joining of legacies from America’s ideological past with some contemporary
developments.” The American Polity, 351.
7
explains why even in thel960s when political polling was still an infant endeavor,
presidents took steps to conceal their use of opinion data. 23
Kennedy, for instance, insisted Louis Harris’s survey data be locked in
Attorney General Robert Kennedy’s safe at the Department of Justice because he
viewed polling as a “political liability” that if publicized would open him up to
criticism.
24
Lyndon Johnson, who was known for flouting favorable poll results, also took
steps to conceal his use of polling. In 1966, for instance, he severed ties with pollster
Oliver Quayle because he held him accountable for unfortunate publicity about the
President’s interest in polling.”25
Nixon was “more intent on keeping his polling results confidential than either
of his predecessors. He not only centralized his polling operation but developed
strict guidelines for the distribution of data. Reminiscent of the Kennedy
administration, polls were stored in Chief of Staff H. R. Haldemann’s safe. He also
placed “an embargo on the distribution of polls” and “ordered [that they] not be
23
‘ Jacobs and Shapiro argue that during the 1960s, presidents attempted to conceal their reliance on
poll data in part because “they were intent on living up to the perceived expectation that responsible
presidents follow their own judgment in upholding the national good instead of ‘pandering’ to popular
sentiment.” They also suggest that “the insistence on secrecy” was driven by fear of the “political risk
of even appearing to use government funds for overtly partisan purposes.” “The Rise of Presidential
Polling: The Nixon White House in Historical Perspective,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 59, no. 2
(Summer 1995): 182-83.
" 4
Lawrence Jacobs, “The Recoil Effect: Public Opinion and Policy Making in the United States and
Britain,” Comparative Politics, 24 (January 1992): 199-217; Lawrence Jacobs, The Health ofNations:
Public Opinion and the Making ofAmerican and British Health Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 1993), chap. 2; Jacobs and Shapiro, “The Rise of Presidential Polling,” 183, n. 81; Jacobs and
Shapiro, Politicians Don ’t Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss ofDemocratic Responsiveness
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 52-3, 363-64, n. 18; Green, “The Other War Room.”
25
Approximately a year later, as the upcoming presidential election loomed on the horizon, the
Johnson administration renewed its ties with Quayle. See for instance, Jacobs and Shapiro, “The Rise
of Presidential Polling,” 183, n. 82.
26
Ibid, 183.
8
released to any members of the staff except at his explicit approval.”27 As a result,
most senior officials, including the Vice President, were denied access to the data.
In addition he arranged for aides David Derge and Robert Teeter to contract
with survey firms on his behalf. The goal was not only to create “a buffer between
the White House and pollsters,” but also to give the administration “a basis for
plausibly denying that the president was engaged in polling.”28
Despite the increase in polling since the early 1970s, recent presidents have
also attempted to distance themselves from polling. 29 Even Bill Clinton, who many
argue was one of our most “poll conscious presidents,” expressed concern about
appearing “poll driven.”30 When pollster Dick Morris came to the White House in
1995 Clinton kept his work secret, even from many on his staff. It was only nine
months later when The New Yorker ran a story “outing” Morris that his presence in
the White House became public. 31
Ibid., 184, n’s. 84-88; Green, “The Other War Room.”
28
Jacobs and Shapiro, “The Rise of Presidential Polling,” 183-84.
Euchner suggests that “polling became a daily part of White House operations” beginning with the
Carter administration. Others, such as Jacobs and Shapiro and Heith, argue that the institutionalization
of the White House polling apparatus began slightly earlier during the Nixon administration. See for
instance, Charles C. Euchner, “Public Support and Opinion,” in Congressional Quarterly’s Guide to
the Presidency, vol. 1, 2
nd
ed., ed. Michael Nelson (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc.,
1996): 887; Diane J. Heith, “One for All: Using Focus Groups and Opinion Polls in the White House,”
Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco,
California, August 30-September 2, 2001, 4; Diane J. Heith, “Staffing the White House Public Opinion
Apparatus: 1969-1988,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 63 (Summer 1998); Jacobs and Shapiro, “The Rise
of Presidential Polling.”
30
Harris, “The Clinton Years: Story of a Survivor - Policy and Politics by the Numbers: For the
President, Polls Became a Defining Force in His Administration,” Washington Post, December 31,
2000; David Gergen, “Public Leadership: Presidents and Opinion Polls,” Public Perspective,
March/April 2000, 19; For similar arguments, see Green, “The Other War Room”; Jacobs and Shapiro,
Politicians Don 't Pander, 3-4.
31
Morris notes that the desire to maintain secrecy prompted the President to assign him the code-name
“Charlie” (a reference to Republican pollster and consultant Charlie Black). Shortly after the New
Yorker piece ran in mid-April 1995, however, both the Washington Post and New York Times “ran
front-page stories announcing” Morris’ presence in the White House. See Dick Morris, Behind the
Oval Office: Getting Reelected Against All Odds (Los Angeles: Renaissance Books, 1999), 26-9, 1 06-
7, 114-15.
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Clinton was so concerned when author Bob Woodward accused him of
“governing by polls” that he asked his aides to put together a list of “unpopular
actions he had taken despite the polls. Among the items cited in the memo: the
school prayer and balanced budget amendments, Bosnia, NAFTA, China’s Most
Favored Nation status, and term limits .32
Evidence of Use
Like his predecessors, G. W. Bush has taken steps to distance himself from his
polling apparatus. Not only are his top pollsters “discouraged from identifying
themselves as such” but each maintains an office outside of the White House:
principal pollster Jan van Lohuizen at Voter/Consumer Research in Washington D.C.,
focus group expert Fred Steeper at Market Strategies in Southfield, Michigan, and
Chief of Polling Matthew Dowd at the Republican National Committee (RNC)
headquarters in Washington D.C . 33
The strategy seems to be working. Joshua Green reports that Steeper and
Lohuizen, are “the best-kept secrets in Washington.” As he writes, “a brief,
unscientific survey of White House reporters revealed that most couldn’t name
Lohuizen as the Bush’s primary pollster.” 34
Following Nixon’s lead, Bush has also developed strict guidelines for the
dissemination of data. Lohuizen and Steeper report to Dowd who then presents the
findings to the administration via Senior White House political advisor Karl Rove.
32
Ibid., 583.
33
Steeper previously worked for George H.W. Bush’s administration and with President George W.
Bush confidant Karl Rove. Van Lohuizen has worked with George W. Bush in Texas since the early
1990s. Green, “The Other War Room.”
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Rove reports the results during weekly strategy meetings with senior officials
such as the Chief of Staff, National Security Adviser, and Chief Counsel to the
President. He is also in charge of relaying findings directly to the President. Aides
suggest that unlike his predecessor, Bush prefers “bare-bones oral reports” on public
opinion to more detailed written analysis
.
35
Despite Bush’s efforts, however, White House observers have not been
fooled. As one reporter noted, “the Bush adm.nistration is a frequent consumer of
polls, though it takes extraordinary measures to appear that it isn’t .”36
According to many pundits, the Bush administration’s polling apparatus is
comparable to Clinton’s. As John Harris writes “Bush’s White House at times bears
stnking resemblance to Bill Clinton’s.
.
. Under Bush, just as under Clinton, these
[policy] judgments are girded by extensive polling.”37 Similarly, Maureen Dowd
argues, the Bush administration “is giving the Clinton White House a run for its
polling money”38
As evidence of the current administration’s commitment to polling, critics not
only cite Bush’s accomplished team of pollsters, but also the amount of time and
money he has spent measuring opinion. At least six months into Bush’s term, for
instance, the RNC reported that formal polls were being conducted on behalf of the
35
Ibid '
Kenneth T. Walsh, “Bush by the Numbers,” U S. News & World Report, July 29, 2002. Francine
Kiefer reports that the Bush White House reviews polls “every week. Karl Rove, Bush ‘s key political
adviser goes over the latest surveys with a dozen senior aides jokingly referred to as the ‘strategery
group a reference to Bush s frequent malapropisms. At the table are heavyweights such as the chief
of staff and the national security adviser, and the counselor to the vice president.” “How the White
House Uses (Gasp!) Polls.” See also Harris, “Clintonesque Balancing of Issues”; Green, “The Other
War Room.”
36
Green, “The Other War Room.”
Harris, “Clintonesque Balancing of Issues.”
38
Dowd, “Addiction to Addition.”
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White House once every two to three weeks. 39 The RNC also released data that
showing that it spent $1 million for polls on behalf of the White House during Bush’s
first year, a figure that does not include additional monies paid to a variety of
“boutique polling firms” regularly employed for “specialized and targeted polls.”40
In addition, RNC disbursement filings at the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
show that in the first three months of 2002 the national party spent more than
$300,000 on White House polls. The cost of polling during Bush’s second year alone
is estimated to exceed one and a half million dollars. 41
ConflictinR Assessments of Use
Given the administration’s commitment to polling, it was no surprise when
critics began calling Bush’s denials of use “hypocritical,” a “myth,” and a “tactic”
that runs contrary to the evidence. A bruising New York Times editorial, for instance,
read,
at least the Clintonites were upfront about their addiction to addition.
The Bush method is all denial and secrecy... The president’s pollsters,
Jan van Lohuizen and Fred Steeper, are kept in a secure location - the
very distant background. 42
39
It has become common practice for presidents to have polling expenses paid for by their parties’
national committee. This helps explain why Bush’s Chief of Polling is, for instance, stationed at RNC
headquarters. Euchner, “Public Support and Opinion,” 889; Harris, “Clintonesque Balancing of
Issues.”
40
Another report suggests that the RNC actually paid a total of $1.2 million in expenditures for polling
during 2001. Either way, this is still approximately half of the amount Clinton paid during his first
year in office. Ralph Z. Hallow, “As Polling Goes, Bush Is No Clinton,” Washington Times, April 10,
2002. Available: http://www.washtimes.com/national/20020410-31 1607 (accessed July 3, 2002);
Green, “The Other War Room”; Dowd, “Addicted to Addition”; “Devil in the Details.”
41 Some speculate that the rate of spending is likely to not only keep pace, but probably increase,
because 2002 is a mid-term election year. “Devil in the Details.”
42
Dowd, “Addiction to Addition.”
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In the face of such criticism. Bush administration officials admitted spending
a good deal of time and money measuring opinion, but denied they were doing so for
any reason other than to market the president’s policies. Far from pandering to
opinion, they argued. Bush was merely using the data to identify language to help
communicate his message more effectively
.
43
As Bush’s Chief of Staff, Andrew Card stated:
When he [Bush] makes a decision, we market his decisions
and sell them. Market and sell them in the right time to the right
audience... We are not driven by polls. We know polls are important,
but they usually don’t measure policy. They measure marketing of
policy: it’s how you say things, rather than what you say . 44
Similarly pollster Fred Steeper explained, Bush has never been interested in
‘what-should-I-do’ polls, but rather ‘what-should-I-say’ polls
.
45
“I’ve used focus
groups and surveys to find language to help [people] understand.”46
Bush’s Chief of Polling echoed this, telling reporters that the president “has a
skepticism about polls driving public policy. You decide your principles first, and
then use polling to figure out the best way to communicate them .”47 According to
Dowd, the Bush administration uses polls “to help sell a plan like the tax cut or
education program to the public by determining which points to emphasize.”48
43
Kenneth T. Walsh reports that “Rove, Dowd, and other Bush advisers say the president doesn’t use
polling to determine his views, but they use the numbers and the reactions of focus groups to figure out
ways to sell his policies publicly.” “Bush by the Numbers.”
44
Bill McAllister, “Bush Polls Apart from Clinton in Use of Marketing,” Denver Post, June 17, 2001.
Available: http://www.lexis-nexis.com/ (accessed October 2, 2001).
45
Allan F. Kay, “Addressing Major World Problems—Making Governments Work for People”
Americans Talk Issues, 2002. Available: http://www.publicinterestpolling.com/toppagel.htm
(accessed July 3, 2002).
46
Hallow, “As Polling Goes.”
47
Kiefer, “How the White House.”
48 Mimi Hall, “New White House, New ‘War Room’ for Strategizing,” USA Today, July 4, 2001.
Available: http://www.usatoday.com/news/washdc/july01/2001-07-05-westwing.htm (accessed
October 2, 2001).
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The argument is eerily reminiscent of the one used by Clinton administration
officials just a few years earlier." Every time Clinton was accused of being “poll
driven” his staff quickly denied using sutveys to guide policy decistons. Instead they
insisted the data was used to “learn how to persuade others to share their positions -
not to follow... but to lead .”50 As Mandy Grunwald explained, Clinton:
knows what he believes and wants to know better ways of describing
ese positions. We shouldn’t change them, but we should help him
8
commumcate them. Stan [Greenberg, Clinton’s first pollster] does abrilliant job of testing and analyzing the different options for the
message, once the substantive decisions have been made
.
51
Similarly, Democratic strategist Vic Kamber noted,
We use poll and focus groups... to articulate the positives
and negatives that will come up about a policy that already hasbeen decided on
Presidential pollster Dick Morris made an identical argument:
[Clinton] never used polling to determine what position on
an issue he should take. Never.
. . When the polls indicated
that his position on an issue was unpopular, he would usually
ask for a study of how he could convince people of his point of view
.
53
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Balancing of Issues
; “Unlike Mr. Clinton
.
. . Bush avoids using surveys to put politics over
principle. Hallow, “As Polling Goes.”
James Bennct, “The Guru of Small Things,” New York Times Magazine
,
June 18, 2000; Euchner
Public Support and Opinion,” 889.
James A. Barnes, “Polls Apart,” National Journal
,
25, no. 28, July 10, 1993, 1750 Available-
http://web.lexis-nexis.com (accessed March 1, 2001).52
Hallow, “As Polling Goes.”
* Monis also gives several examples of this type of use. See Behind the Oval Office
,
338-39. Angie
Cannon makes a similar argument. “More than any previous president, Bill Clinton uses polling to
help
. . . sell his message on policy issues.” “Clinton’s Pollster Busy on Issue that Can Sell,” Detroit
Free Press
,
April 12, 1994. In addition, Euchner gives an example ofhow polling data was used to
14
Even Clinton said that he used data merely “to refine the sales pitch” not the
substance of policy. As he stated, “[I] use polls to help determine the best arguments
for policies .”54
Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro refer to the use of opinion to market
or sell policy as “crafted talk.”
Politicians track public opinion not to make policy but rather to
determine how to craft their public presentations and win public
support for policies they favor... they use research on public opinion
to pinpoint the most alluring words, symbols and arguments in an
attempt to move public opinion to support their desired policies...
politicians craft how they present their policy stances in order to attract
favorable press coverage and ‘win’ public support for what they
desire. We refer to this strategy as one of crafted talk
.
55
This is the use of polls not to follow the public’s preferences, but to “manipulate” the
majority into supporting a political officials’ favored positions
.
56
John Zaller
describes the situation as one in which “elites induce citizens to hold opinions that
they would not hold if aware of the best available information and analysis .”57 The
goal is to “simulate responsiveness.”5 - Officials craft their “words and presentations”
in an effort to “change public opinion and create the appearance of responsiveness”
while they pursue “their own desired policies .”59
package and describe Clinton’s 1993 budget deficit reduction package. “Public Support and Opinion ”
889-90.
54
Harris, “The Clinton Years.”
Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, xiii, xv, 27 (italics in
original).
56
Ibid., xv.
John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins ofMass Opinion (Cambridge: University of Cambridge
Press, 1992), 313; Also quoted in Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don ’t Pander, xv.
Responsiveness “means that the public’s substantive preferences point government officials in
specific [or broad) policy directions.” For a discussion of “simulated responsiveness” see Jacobs and
Shapiro, Politicians Don ’t Pander, xv, 302.
59
Ibid., xv.
15
Setting aside the question of whether recent presidents actually use poll data
in this way, that they are more willing to admit using opinion to sell rather than make
policy is important from a democratic perspective. It is indicative of the fact that
using opinion as a guide to decision-making, as means of responding to the
substantive desires of the majority, has somehow become distasteful. This sentiment
is so strong, in fact, that the “derogatory term pander” is now commonly used to
describe the mere act of following or abiding by majority preferences
.
60
Jacobs and
Shapiro are correct when they note it is “odd in a democracy to consider
responsiveness to public opinion as disreputable.”61
It is also diametrically opposed to what the early proponents of survey
research had in mind when they talked about how polling would serve as an
instrument of good government and help “create a new and more responsive
democracy.”62
Jacobs and Shapiro “challenge the stigmatizing use of the term ‘pandering’” and instead “adopt the
more neutral concept of ‘political responsiveness’.” This study, however, differentiates between
“pandering” and responsiveness (either governmental, democratic, or political). The former is seen as
a way in which opinion can be used. The latter “means that the public’s substantive preferences point
government officials in specific [or broad] policy directions.” Ibid., xiv-xv 302
61
Ibid., xiv.
6
‘ Lord James Bryce, for instance, suggested there were four identifiable stages in the development of
public opinion. The last stage, “would be reached if the will of the majority of the citizens were to
become ascertainable at all times, and without the need of its passing through a body of
representatives, possibly even without the need of voting machinery at all.” For Bryce, however, the
“fourth stage” was a utopian concept, and he was pessimistic about its ever coming to fruition. As he
wrote,“[T]he obvious weakness of government by opinion is the difficulty of ascertaining it.” Bryce
could not have imagined that less than a half century later the advent of modem, scientific survey
research would make the last “stage” a possibility. Lord James Bryce, The American Commonwealth,
(London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1888), 2:220. Gallup and Rae quote Bryce extensively and argue
“few political observers have matched Bryce’s remarkable insight into the forces behind popular
government.” See Sidney Verba, “The Citizen as Respondent: Sample Surveys and American
Democracy - Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1995,” American Political
Science Review, 90, no. 1 (March 1966): 3; Jean Converse, Survey Research in the United States
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); George Gallup and Saul Forbes Rae, The Pulse of
Democracy: The Public Opinion Poll and How it Works (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1940), 16-
17,18, 20, 24-25,28-33.
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George Gallup, Archibald Crossley, and Elmo Roper were optimistic about
the potential for surveys to meet one of the fundamental challenges in a democracy -
to make the government responsive to the people
.
63
They argued that polls make this
possible because they are a “mandate from the people,” a concrete expression of the
public s desires. No longer could the failure to take majority preferences into account
be blamed on the fact that public opinion is unknowable. The birth and subsequent
growth of scientific survey research had finally made Montaigne’s claim that “public
opinion is a powerful, bold, and unmeasurable party” obsolete
.
64
In the early twentieth century polls were described as “the most useful
instrument of democracy ever devised.” 65 Unlike voting which occurs only
periodically, survey research made it possible for government officials to take the
views of ordinary people into account on a continuous basis .66
Not everyone at the time was enthusiastic about this new technique. Herbert Blumer and Lindsay
Rogers, for instance, are among several critics whose views are in stark contrast to the optimistic
forecasts of the early survey advocates. For a brief overview of this criticism, see for instance, Robert
S. Erikson and Kent L. Tedin, American Public Opinion
,
5
th
ed. (Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and
Bacon, 1995), 4-6; Hennessy, Public Opinion, 150-53. See also, Herbert Blumer, “Public Opinion and
Public Opinion Polling,” American Sociological Review, 13 (October 1948): 452-54; Lindsay Rogers,
The Pollsters (New York: Knopf, 1949); Verba, “The Citizen as Respondent,” 3; Gallup, “Polls and
the Political Process—Past, Present, and Future,” Public Opinion Quarterly 29, no. 4 (Winter 1965-
1966)
: 544, 549.
64
Michel de Montaigne, The Complete Works ofMontaigne (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press,
1967)
.
65
As Jacobs and Shapiro write, Gallup “hoped that the technology of public opinion research would in
itself create an objective and non-partisan means for making policy that follows the popular will.”
Gallup, “Polls and the Political Process,” 544; Gallup and Rae, The Pulse ofDemocracy, Hennessy,
Public Opinion, 149-50; Foreword to John M. Fenton, In Your Opinion (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1960), x, n. 5; Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don ’t Pander, 337.
66
Despite their optimism, the early proponents did not go so far as to suggest that that popular opinion
ought to be translated directly into governmental policy. Even Gallup, who referred to a poll as a
“sampling referendum,” did not recommend government by polls or think of it as a means of
legislating or policy-making. He made this point clearly in an address to the American Association for
Public Opinion Research (AAPOR), “The views of the people must be taken into account. This does
not mean that leaders must follow the public’s views slavishly; it does mean that they should have
available an accurate appraisal of public opinion and take some account of it in reaching their
decision.” Hennessy, Public Opinion, 149, n. 3; Jerome Bruner, Mandatefrom the People (New York:
Duell, Sloan, & Pearce, Inc., 1944), 227; Verba, “The Citizen as Respondent,” 6; Gallup, “Polls and
the Political Process,” 547.
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Whereas substantive responsiveness was heralded at the beginning of the
twentieth century, that is no longer the case. While the causes of this sea change are
unclear, what remains certain is that there is an enormous gap between how officials
say polls are used today and how the early proponents of survey research said they
should be used.
Primary Question
This divide lays the foundation for the central avenue of inquiry for this
dissertation: how do public officials use the enormous amounts of survey data at their
disposal?
67
Are polls used as Bush-Clinton officials suggest, to “craft rhetoric”? Are
they used as the early ‘good government’ proponents of survey research predicted, to
allow officials to be more responsive to the majority will? Or are they used in other
ways? There is, for instance, a little known body of sociological research, which
suggests that polls may be used in ways not widely considered in the political science
literature .
68
Despite the import of these questions, studies ofhow officials use survey data
are rare. As Jacobs and Shapiro note, “although policy makers’ use of polls has
67
The early proponents are speaking from a normative standpoint regarding what role polling should
play, while recent administration officials have motives to protect the president and administration
from the negative charge of pandering. Moreover, social scientists need to be wary about accepting the
statements of current and former White House officials as proof that polls are used primarily to craft
rhetoric. See for instance, George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne who discuss the difficulties
and limitations of relying primarily on insider accounts. Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy
Making (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 420-23.
68
This body of research, known as the sociology of knowledge application literature, has its roots in
the work of Burkart Holzner. See for instance, Burkart Holzner and John H. Marx, Knowledge
Application: The Knowledge System in Society (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1979).
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profound implications for democratic government, there has been relatively little
investigation of how politicians actually use polls .”69
Moreover, the work that has been done is methodologically flawed. Recent
studies by Jacobs and Shapiro and by Susan Herbst are notable because they are
among the first to examine how public officials use polls. Both, however, suffer from
basic problems of conceptualization and operationalization
.
70
Implications for Democratic Government: Use and Responsiveness
Policymakers’ use of polls has profound implications for democratic
government. Among the most important is that it is intimately connected to the
extent and nature of responsiveness. While governmental responsiveness is a key
concern, the link has gone largely unrecognized and unexamined.
A basic tenet of democratic government is that the government should be
responsive to the preferences, desires, wishes, and needs of its citizens
.
71 As Ladd
writes, “democracy endows public opinion with a certain moral or ethical status:
democratic government simply does not exist if citizens’ preferences on the many
questions of public policy are not respected.”
69
Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Presidential Manipulation of Public Opinion: The
Nixon Administration and the Public Pollsters,” Political Science Quarterly, 1 10 (Winter 1996).
Available: http://www.polsci.urnn.edu/faculty/ljacobs/polster.html (accessed May 11, 1999).
70
Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don ’t Pander, Susan Herbst, Reading Public Opinion: How
Political Actors View the Democratic Process (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998).
71
It is clear that the public agrees with this basic tenet of democratic theory. In a recent survey, nine
out of ten Americans said that the views of the majority “should have a great deal or a fair amount of
influence on the decisions of elected and government officials in Washington.” Brodie et al., “Polling
and Democracy,” 12. See for instance, Manza and Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,”
1-2; Verba, “The Citizen as Respondent,” 1.
72
Ladd, The American Polity, 333.
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In keeping with this, there has been a great deal of literature and theorizing
about the nature and extent of democratic responsiveness: how much impact opinion
has on governmental decision-making and the extent to which public officials
respond to the preferences of the majority? 73
Over the last forty years, empirical researchers have used a variety of methods
to examine these questions .74 They then draw conclusions about how responsive
officials are to majority preferences, how much of an impact opinion has on policy-
making, and the health of democracy. This study shows, however, that it can be
misleading to draw conclusions about the nature and extent of responsiveness without
first considering how officials use polls.
Conclusion
The primary goal of this study is to determine how officials use polls during
the policy making stage of the policy process. The case analysis shows that despite
the focus on pandering and, more recently crafted talk, officials actually have a
73
While most researchers agree public preferences have at least some impact on policy-making, there
is little agreement regarding the extent to which opinion influence policy. In a recent review of the
literature, Paul Bumstein notes that disagreement over the extent to which opinion influences policy is
one of the oldest and most vexing controversies in this area. Paul Bumstein, “The Impact of Public
Opinion on Public Policy: A Review and an Agenda,” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Sociological Association, Anaheim, CA, August 2001, 1-4. In another review of the
literature, Manza and Cook argue that there are currently three major schools of thought in this area:
those who believe opinion has a strong and consistent impact on policy, those who reject that idea, and
those who argue that the impact is contingent on several factors. Manza and Cook, “Policy
Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 1-33.
74 Some of the methods used, which are discussed in more detail in the literature review chapter,
include: dyadic, congruence, consistency, and case studies. As Jacobs and Shapiro argue, the amount
and quality of research on the opinion/policy nexus has increased dramatically over the last thirty
years. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Public Opinion, Institutions, and Policy Making:
Studying Substantive Democracy,” PS Political Science and Politics, 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 9. See
also, Manza and Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 1-6; Burstein, “The Impact of
Public Opinion on Policy”; Robert Y. Shapiro and Lawrence R. Jacobs, “The Relationship Between
Public Opinion and Public Policy: A Review,” in ed. Samuel Long, Political Behavior Annual
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 2:149-150.
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variety of options at their disposal when it comes to poll use. Polls can be used not
only to pander and craft rhetoric, but in other ways as well, not all of which result in
substantive responsiveness to the majority will.
This finding is important for two reasons. First it underscores the need to
supplement studies of responsiveness with research that examines the reality of poll
use. To this extent V.O. Key was correct in his assertion that in order to understand
the nexus between opinion and policymaking, it is important to examine how officials
or “elites” as he refers to them, use and respond to surveys. 75
Second, it suggests that despite the claims of early proponents of survey
research, polls do not necessarily facilitate representative democracy or help create a
better and more responsive government. This is not to suggest that they consistently
undermine it either. At times polls are used to respond to the majority will. At other
times, however, officials act contrary to popular opinion, and polls aide them in this
endeavor. The impact of opinion on policy and the extent to which policy outcomes
reflect the majority will depends in part on how officials use poll data.
The following chapter focuses on the history of public opinion, the
development of survey research, and the growth in the White House polling
apparatus. The subsequent chapter examines the primary ways in which political
scientists have examined the opinion-policy nexus and the current state of research on
responsiveness. Chapter 4 details a new means of examining governmental
responsiveness. It argues in favor of focusing not only on the degree of opinion-
3
V.O. Key, “Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy,” Virginia Quarterly Review, 37 (Autumn
1961): 488-512; V.O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf 1961) 24
24n, 535-38.
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policy congruence, but how officials use opinion during the policymaking stage of the
policy process. The chapter begins by defining poll use and then builds several
models of use. In chapters 5 and 6 these models are applied to ten cases of policy and
decision-making during the Clinton administration (1993-2000), the most recent
administration for which we have a complete record. The goal of the case analysis is
to test the utility of the models and develop several hypotheses and conclusions
regarding how opinion operates in the policy arena, the nature of responsiveness, and
the link between polling and policy-making.
22
CHAPTER 2
PUBLIC OPINION, POLLING, AND THE WHITE HOUSE
Public opinion has been an object of interest since before Rousseau coined the
phrase “l’opinion publique.” 1 Theorists ranging from Plato and Aristotle, to Hobbes,
Locke, and Rousseau, all discussed the “general will,” “group mind,” or “public
opinion and its impact on government. 2
Even those writing at a time when rulers still derived their legitimacy from
divine right acknowledged the import of the majority will. They recognized that in
order to maintain power, a ruler must be aware of, if not responsive to, the
preferences of the masses. In The Discourses, for instance, Niccolo Machiavelli
1
Jean Jacques Rousseau,
-The Social Contract” in The Social Contract and the Discourses
,
trans. G.
D. H. Cole (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1913). Rousseau is often credited with being the “first
modern thinker to make an extended analysis of public opinion” and perhaps the “father of modem
public opinion.” It is important to note, however, that long before Rousseau, various thinkers
including Machiavelli more than two-hundred years earlier, used the phrase “public opinion” but for
the most part failed to define or clarify the term. Hennessy, Public Opinion, 22-23; Erikson and Tedin
American Public Opinion
,
1 ; Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, The Spiral ofSilence (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1984), 80.
2
Each of these thinkers articulates very different conceptions of public opinion. Even today, this term
continues to be “notoriously difficult” for scholars to define. As V.O. Key writes, “[T]he discussion of
public opinion becomes murky when meticulous scholars try to define their conceptions and to form
distinctions that enable them to make statements that seem to fit observable realities of the interaction
of public opinion and government. ... To speak with precision of public opinion is a task not unlike
coming to grips with the holy ghost.” For an overview of the many different conceptions, definitions,
and distinctions of public opinion developed over the years, see: Blumer, “Public Opinion and Public
Opinion Polling”; Harwood Childs, Public Opinion: Nature Formation, and Role (Princeton, NJ: Van
Nostrand, 1965); Michael Corbett, American Public Opinion: Trends, Processes, and Patterns (White
Plains, NY: Longman Publishing, 1991), 21-4; Erikson and Tedin, American Public Opinion
,
6-8;
J A W. Gunn, ‘“Public Opinion’ in Modem Political Science,” in eds. James Farr, John S. Dryzek, and
Stephen T. Leonard, Political Science in History: Research Programs and Political Traditions
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 99-107; Hennessy, Public Opinion
,
21-30; Susan
Herbst, Numbered Voices: How Public Opinion Has Shaped American Politics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1993); Herbst, Reading Public Opinion
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Opinion,” Public Perspective, 3, no. 2 (January-February 1992): 30; Daniel Katz, Dorwin Cartwright,
Samuel Eldersveld, and Alfred McClung Lee, eds. Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York: Henry
Holt, 1954), 50-51; V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1963), 8-18; Allan M. Winkler, “Public Opinion,” in ed. Jack P. Greene, Encyclopedia of
American Political History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1984), 3:1031-33.
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counseled that “wise men will not ignore public opinion” and must always “try and
secure the good will of the people” if they hope to retain power and authority. 3
Public opinion did not, however, become a major force until the end of the
17
th
and beginning of the 18 th Centuries when democracy began to move across the
United States and parts of Europe. The rise of popular sovereignty, the gradual
extension of the franchise, and the development of new electoral and legislative
bodies made it almost impossible for these governments to ignore the views of the
masses.
Balancing Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian Concerns
Considering its intimate connection with democracy, it is no surprise that
public opinion has been a potent force in American political life since the founding.
As Abraham Lincoln stated: “In this and like communities, public opinion is
everything. Without it, nothing can succeed. With it, nothing can fail.”4
The framers of the United States Constitution not only recognized how
essential and powerful the majority will is, but the danger it can pose. As a result they
attempted to construct a system that both insured popular sovereignty and guarded
against its excesses.
There is evidence that the Founders supported the principle of popular
sovereignty and agreed with Thomas Jefferson that, “the will of the people is the only
3 Quoted in Hennessy, Public Opinion, 21-22; Winkler, “Public Opinion,” 1033.
4 Abraham Lincoln also noted that in a free state, “the first task of statesmanship is not legislation but
the molding of that opinion from which all legislation flows.” Quoted in Matthew Robinson,
Mobocracy: How the Media 's Obsession with Polling Twists the News, Alters Elections, and
Undermines Democracy (Roseville, CA: Pnma Publishing/Crown Group/Random House, 2002), 21.
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legitimate foundation of any government .” 5 At the same time, however, they
distrusted the masses and were concerned that the public could be easily swayed and
subject “to fits of passion”. As Alexander Hamilton argued:
The voice of the people has been said to be the voice of
God; and however generally this maxim has been quoted
and believed, it is not true in fact. The people are turbulent
and changing; they seldom judge or determine right
.
6
As a result, the Founders went to extraordinary measures to balance these
competing claims. Interest in insuring popular participation, for instance, led them to
grant the franchise, establish mechanisms for periodic elections, and insure popular
election of members of the House of Representatives. While in an effort to guard
against the excesses of the masses, they constructed institutions such as the electoral
college, indirect election of the Senate, and a Supreme Court composed ofjustices
appointed for life. These and other such institutions were designed to serve as “an
anchor against popular fluctuations,” defending the “people against their own
temporary errors and delusions .”7
5 Quoted in Brodie et al. “Polling and Democracy,” 10-1 1. In the “Declaration of Independence”
Jefferson also writes that “[gjovemments are instituted among Men” and derive “their just powers
from the consent of the governed.” This sentiment is reflected by the authors of The Federalist Papers
,
among others, who argue that “supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the majority of the
people in the Union.” James Madison, “Federalist Paper No. 39,” in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The
Federalist Papers: Hamilton, Madison, Jay (New York: Mentor, 1961), 246. To a large degree, this
sentiment is reminiscent of David Hume who wrote, it is “on opinion only that government is
founded.” Quoted in Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, 7.
6
Hamilton made this statement as part of a plea to members of the Constitutional Convention who he
hoped would consider having a president, with absolute veto power over the House of Representatives
and Senate, both elected for life (June 18, 1787). Quoted in Max Farrand, ed., The Records ofthe
Federal Convention of1787 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961), 1:299-300. See also,
Benjamin F. Wright, Five Public Philosophies of Walter Lippmann (Austin, TX: University of Texas
Press, 1973).
7
In discussing the electoral college, for instance, Hamilton writes that, “[I]t was equally desirable that
the immediate election [of president] should be made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities
adapted to the station and acting under circumstances favorable to the deliberation, and to a judicious
combination of all the reasons and inducements which were proper to govern their choice. A small
number of persons, selected . . . from the general mass, will be most likely to possess the information
25
The Pendulum Swings. The struggle to maintain a balance between these two
claims has continued throughout American history. In the mid-late 19th Century two
Europeans visited the United States and recorded their impressions. Both not only
recognized the power of opinion but also expressed concern about the future.
Alexis de Tocqueville noted there is “no country in which there is so little
independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America.”8 He worried
about the power of popular opinion to silence the minority and feared that the
majority would suppress minority views to such an extent that “freedom of opinion”
would be destroyed and the result would be tyranny. 9
Lord James Bryce echoed Tocqueville’s assessment of the import of opinion
in America: “[i]n no country is public opinion so powerful as it is in the United
States.”
10
Unlike Tocqueville, however Bryce did not fear “tyranny of the majority,”
instead he was concerned about the feasibility of measuring opinion and how that
might impede the ability of the public to control government.
Bryce wrote about the development of government by public opinion in terms
of a four-stage process. “In the first stage, public opinion is static and passive,
acquiescing” to authority. “A second stage is reached... when conflicts arise between
this ruling group and the people. . . In the third stage, public opinion becomes an
and discernment requisite. ... It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity as possible
to the tumult and disorder. . . . The choice of several to form an intermediate body of electors will be
much less apt to convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements.” Alexander
Hamilton, “Federalist Paper No. 68,” 412; and James Madison, “Federalist Paper No. 63,” 384-85 in
Farrand, Records.
8
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (New York: Vintage, 1990), 1:263.
9
Ibid., 1:265. Others, including Plato, Aristotle, Madison, and J.S. Mill, also expressed fear of majority
tyranny.
10 Quoted in Erikson and Tedin, American Public Opinion
,
3. Bryce also referred to public opinion as
“the real ruler of America.” Quoted in Gallup and Rae, Public Opinion and American Democracy, 17.
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active and controlling force influencing the course of public policy.” 11 He was
pessimistic, however, about the possibility of ever reaching the “last stage” in which
“public opinion would. .
.
govern” because he was aware of the challenges involved in
measuring it. “The obvious weakness of government by opinion,” he wrote, “is the
difficulty of ascertaining it.” 12
While Bryce was a Jeffersonian to the extent that he welcomed the
development of a state in which the public serves as a “guiding or ruling power,” he
had reservations about it ever coming to fruition. 13 Bryce could not have foreseen that
less than four decades later survey research would make it possible to measure
opinion on a daily basis.
The pendulum, which with the writings of Bryce and others in the late 1800’s
began to swing towards the Jeffersonian side, moved even further in that direction in
the first two decades of the 20 th Century. During the Progressive Era, reformers were
intent on restructuring American politics and government to insure that the voice of
the people prevailed. President Theodore Roosevelt summed up this general
philosophy:
[t]he majority of the plain people of the United States will, day
in and day out, make fewer mistakes in governing themselves than
any smaller group will make in governing them. 14
1
1
The stages as described in Gallup and Rae, The Pulse ofDemocracy
,
125. For a brief overview, see
also Winkler, “Public Opinion,” 1034-35.
12 Quoted in Erikson and Tedin, American Public Opinion , 3.
13 Quoted in Gallup and Rae, The Pulse ofDemocracy , 17.
14 Quoted in ibid., 289.
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To this end, the Progressives worked to extend the franchise, ratify the 17th
Amendment, and push for additional reforms designed to give the public a stronger
voice in legislative and electoral processes at both the state and national levels.
The idea that public opinion had a moral and ethical status was not reserved
for domestic politics alone. During the early 1900’s American leaders echoed this
sentiment in regard to foreign policy as well. William Howard Taft, for instance,
stated that world nations were unlikely to disregard the judgements of international
tribunals because few “will care to face the condemnation of international public
opinion.” 15 Similarly, Woodrow Wilson described World War I as a “people’s war,
not a statesman’s.”
16
Throughout the War, the government operated on the assumption that
securing popular support was central to achieving victory. They engaged in a
massive campaign of persuasion, and established the Committee on Public
Information (CPI) to “promote the war domestically, while publicizing American war
aims abroad.” The Committee, headed by muckraking journalist and Wilson
supporter George Creel, engaged in censorship and propaganda initiatives using a
host of innovative advertising and public relations techniques. 18 Through popular
fiction, film, pamphlets, posters, cartoons, advertisements, billboards, speakers, and
15 Quoted in Winkler, “Public Opinion,” 1035.
16
Ibid.
17
“Propaganda Wartime Propaganda: World War I - The Committee on Public Information.”
Available: http://carmen.artsci.washington.edu/propaganda/war2.htm (accessed July 26, 2002).
18 The CPI engaged in what can be classified as both censorship and propaganda activities. Despite
Creel’s outspoken opposition to censorship, “the CPI took steps to limit damaging information” by for
instance: implementing “voluntary guidelines for the news media” and helping to “pass the Espionage
Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918.” Although the Committee “was not a censor in the strictest
sense ... it came as close to performing that function as any government agency in the United States
has ever done.” In addition to its “censorship” activities, the CPI also employed the most modem
means to issue propaganda in favor of the war. See for instance, “Propaganda - Wartime Propaganda”;
28
even messages hidden inside payroll envelopes, the CPI engaged in what Creel
described as “‘the world’s greatest adventure in advertising’.” To the dismay of
many, however, the CPI experiment merely “showed how easily manipulation could
take place .”
19
In the post-War period, several events helped fuel the perception that elite’s
could sway opinion. This included the rapid growth in advertising and public
relations, the development of the radio industry, the general malaise that followed the
War, and most importantly, the failure of the League of Nations. Many prominent
individuals, such as Walter Lippmann, blamed the failure of the U.S. to join the
League on the ease with which elite’s were able to manipulate mass opinion
.
20
Fresh from his own propaganda work during the War, Lippmann understood
first-hand how easy it is to sway popular opinion. This prompted him to ask whether
the general public could actually play the role of the “omni competent citizen” that is
at the heart of classical democratic theory?21
In Public Opinion and The Phantom Public, Lippmann repeatedly challenged
this notion and questioned whether the average citizen had the time, knowledge, or
interest in public affairs to fulfill the role required by democratic theory . 22 As he
noted: “The individual man does not have opinions on all public affairs,” “He does
“Creel Committee of World War I.” Available:
http://history.acvsd.edu/gen/st/~ryehl.creelcommittee.html (accessed July 26, 2002).
19
“Propaganda - Wartime Propaganda”; “Creel Committee”; Winkler, “Public Opinion,” 1035.
20
Erikson and Tedin, American Public Opinion, 3.
21
Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1922): 284-87, 358-65.
22
In addition to Public Opinion and The Phantom Public (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1925),
Lippmann wrote more than nine other books, including Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1955), as well as numerous pamphlets, editorials, columns, and articles. For an
introduction to his work, see for instance: Clinton Rossiter and James Lare, eds. The Essential
Lippmann: A Political Philosophyfor Liberal Democracy (New York: Random House, 1963) and
Wright, Five Public Philosophies.
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not know how to direct public affairs,” “He does not know what is happening, why it
is happening, or what ought to happen.”23
Lippmann’s prescription was similar to that of Hamilton whom he quoted at
the outset of The Phantom Public u Given that the “pictures” of the outside world
“in people’s heads” are generally distorted, oversimplified, misleading, and largely
predetermined by stereotypes, this is hardly the basis for sound analysis and decision-
making in a complex world. Moreover, the public cannot be expected to have expert
opinions on all questions, or the time to analyze and investigate the multitude of
issues that need to be addressed.
Consequently, he argued the public’s role should be limited to that of
choosing competent leaders. The construction of policy and decision-making should
be left to responsible administrators, independent experts who are specially trained to
provide the type of leadership required in a complex age . 25
Polling and Pollsters: The Advent of Scientific Survey Research26
In addition to his provocative analysis, Lippmann also lamented the lack of
theoretical and empirical research on opinion. Among other things, his work helped
encourage a new cadre of scholars to begin addressing normative questions such as
23 Quoted in Wright, Five Public Philosophies, 59.
24
While perhaps the most well-known, Lippmann is certainly not alone in his contention that polls are
simply a tool elites use to process and manufacture opinion. See for instance, Benjamin Ginsberg, The
Captive Public: How Mass Opinion Promotes State Power (New York: Basic Books, 1986); Herbst,
Numbered Voices.
25
E.E. Schattschneider makes a related argument as it pertains to the need to replace the classical
definition of democracy with a modem definition, as well as the gap between the expectations and
actual capacities of citizens. The Semisovereign People: A Realist 's View ofDemocracy in America
(Hinsdale, IL: The Dryden Press, 1975).
26
For a complete history of the development of survey research in the United States, see Converse,
Survey Research in the United States.
30
what role should opinion play in a democratic society?27 It also encouraged
researchers who began making strides on the measurement of opinion. 28
Roots I - Straw Polls: 1824-1936. While the advent of scientific survey
research is often dated to 1936, the measurement of opinion and attitudes was nothing
new.
29
Throughout much of the 19th and early 20th Centuries, newspapers throughout
the United States conducted “straw polls.”30 The Harrisburg Pennsylvanian and the
Raleigh Star were the first newspapers to conduct this type of informal canvass in the
presidential election of 1 824. In both cases, Andrew Jackson was declared the winner
by an overwhelming percentage. 31
‘ 7
In Public Opinion, for instance, Lippmann writes, “Since Public Opinion is supposed to be the prime
mover in democracies, one might reasonably expect to find a vast literature. One does not find it
The existence of a force called Public Opinion is in the main taken for granted,” 253.
Despite Lippmann’s focus on normative questions, over the next several decades empirical research
came to dominate the work in this field. Erikson and Tedin, American Public Opinion, 5-6.
Converse, for instance, traces the “origins of polls to three ancestors”: “The Reformist Ancestor of
Policy: The Social Survey” (i.e., the English and American social surveys, Charles Booth, Hull House,
etc ); “Attitude Measurement in Psychology and Sociology”; and what she calls the “Most Direct
Line: Business” (i.e., journalism straw polls and market research). Survey Research in the United
States, 4, 1 1-127. Similarly, L. John Martin’s genealogy of polling finds that its development is a
result of several factors, such as: wars, politics, business, and humanitarianism. In addition, Martin
points to factors involving various individuals and groups, including: those who worked on the
conceptualization necessary before measurement could take place (i.e., philosophers, social scientists),
those who worked on the methods of social surveys (i.e., landowners, social reformers), those who
developed questionnaires (i.e., journalists, psychologists, sociologists), those who developed sampling
theory (i.e., astronomers, mathematicians, economists), and those who perfected data analysis (i.e.,
statisticians, psychologists, and sociologists). “The Genealogy of Public Opinion Polling,” Annals of
The American Academy ofPolitical and Social Science All (March 1984): 12-23. Hennessy also
traces the origins of polling to: “journalistic straw votes,” “the field of market research,” “the
development of psychological testing,” and “the application of . .
.
laws of probability and sampling to
human behavior.” Public Opinion, 67-92.
30
Claude E. Robinson defines a straw poll as “an unofficial canvass of an electorate to determine the
division of popular sentiment on public issues or on candidates for public office.” Straw Votes: A Study
ofPolitical Predicting (New York: Columbia University Press, 1932), 6. Erikson and Tedin write that
the term “comes from a practice in rural areas of throwing straw into the air to see which way the wind
is blowing. Presumably, a ‘straw poll’ is a method for determining the political winds. . . . Today the
term generally refers to any assessment of public opinion based on nonscientific sampling methods.”
American Public Opinion, 20, n. 12.
31 The Harrisburg Pennsylvanian sampled 532 respondents in Wilmington, Delaware, and printed the
results on July 24, 1824. It showed Jackson with 63% of the vote. In August, the Raleigh Star
canvassed 4,256 respondents at political meetings in North Carolina. It found Jackson the
overwhelming winner with 81% of the vote. Jackson went on to carry North Carolina with 56% of the
vote compared to John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay who each received 0% of the vote and William
31
By the mid-late 1 800 s, straw polling had become a regular fixture in election
coverage.
32
Newspapers such as the Boston Globe, New York Herald, Cincinnati
Enquirer, Columbus Dispatch, Chicago American, and Chicago Record-Herald were
early leaders in the field. In 1908 the New York Herald collaborated with three other
newspapers, and by 1916 seven newspapers had joined together to conduct polls in
more than thirty-five states. 33
At the same time, magazines and periodicals began to display interest in straw
polling as well. In 1912 the Farm Journal launched its series of presidential polls,
followed four years later by The Literary Digest and the Pathfinder ,34
Roots II - Market Research: 1879-1935. In addition to straw polling, modem
survey research also has its roots in market research. 35 While market research began
in the late 1870s, it did not become commonplace until the early 1920’s. 36
Crawford who received 43%. Jackson carried Pennsylvania as well, gamering 75.9% of the vote
compared with Adams, Clay, and Crawford who received 1 1.6%, 3.6%, and 8.9% of the vote
respectively. Jackson also won the popular vote and received more electoral votes than any of the
other three candidates. Since no candidate had a clear majority, however, the vote was thrown into the
House of Representatives, and John Quincy Adams was elected president. Gallup and Rae, The Pulse
ofDemocracy, 34-35. The 1824 election data is accessible on-line at “History Central.” Available:
http://www.multimed.com/elections/1824.html (accessed January 14, 2004).
32 Some describe the newspapers’ straw polling between 1824 and the late 1800s as an “intermittent
practice.” See for instance, Hennessy, Public Opinion, 77. Nevertheless, by the turn of the century it
became a common practice of newspapers and magazines. By the 1928 presidential election, for
instance, eighty-four separate straw polls were conducted, a handful of which were national, and they
“occupied thousands of column inches in the print media.” Erikson and Tedin, American Public
Opinion, 8.
33
Robinson, Straw Votes, chap. 6; Hennessy, Public Opinion, 76-79; Gallup and Rae, The Pulse of
Democracy, 34-38.
34
Gallup and Rae, The Pulse ofDemocracy, 36.
35
Until the turn of the century polls measured two things: demographics (i.e., age, sex, income, race,
religion, etc. . .
.) and intended behavior (i.e., prospective voting). It was not until the late 1800s/early
1900s that the idea/prospect of measuring people’s attitudes, beliefs, and opinions was [even]
considered. As a result, few attitudinal or issue surveys were conducted until the 1920s. The first
attitudinal poll was done by German labor leader Adolf Levenstein between 1907 and 1911. Max
Weber showed him how to analyze the data and encouraged him to publish the results. Levenstein’s
work did not result in a dramatic increase in attitudinal surveys. As Gallup and Rae note, “such tests
of public opinion on issues occurred but seldom and were usually local in scope.” In 1917, for
instance, Minnesota congressman Ernest Lundeen sent out a questionnaire to his constituents regarding
U.S. entry in the war. Moreover, until the late 1920s when Louis Thurstone developed scaling
32
By the end of World War I, it had become common for businessmen,
manufacturers, media outlets, and advertising agencies across the country to employ
research and market specialists. As the field grew, these researchers increasingly used
innovative sociological and psychological testing, economic and demographic data
analysis, and sophisticated sampling techniques to measure consumer reaction to
goods and services. Within a decade, these methods and techniques would be applied
to political analysis of opinion as well. 37
The Advent of Scientific Survey Research: 1936. In 1935 four market
researchers began conducting surveys for media outlets that relied on scientific
sampling, interviewing, and questionnaire techniques. Elmo Roper and Paul
Cherington founded what eventually became the Roper Poll for Fortune magazine,
while Archibald Crossley began doing political polls for Hearst and its subscribers.
At the same time, George Gallup created the American Institute of Public Opinion
(AIPO)/the Gallup Poll to sell surveys on public policy issues to news organizations.
He immediately made a name for himself by challenging the results of the Literary
Digest ’s 1936 straw poll. Using in-person interviews and quota sampling, Gallup
predicted that the Digest poll would be almost twenty percentage points off and
methods, response categories on attitudinal surveys were dichotomous. Martin, “The Genealogy of
Public Opinion Polling,” 17-19. Gallup and Rae, The Pulse ofDemocracy, 36-7.
36
Converse, Hennessy, Martin, and others trace the origins of survey research to several additional
sources, such as: reformist/social surveys, attitudinal measurement in psychology and sociology, and
the application of sampling and probability theory to human behavior. See for instance: Converse,
Survey Research in the United States, 11-127; Hennessy, Public Opinion, 67-92; Martin, “The
Genealogy of Public Opinion Polling.” In 1948, the Committee on the Definitions of the American
Market Association said that market research is “the gathering, recording, and analysis of all facts
about problems relating to the transfer and sale of goods and services from producer to consumer.”
Quoted in Lyndon O. Brown, Marketing and Distribution Research (New York: Ronald Press Co.,
1949): 5, n. 3.
37
The first known market research was by N.W. Ayer and Son in 1 879. The Ayer Company collected
crop statistics and information about the circulation of advertising rates of newspapers for a
33
Franklin Roosevelt would win the election with 55.7 percent of the vote. 38 While
Roosevelt actually received 62.5 percent of the vote, Gallup had accurately predicted
both the Digest s point error and the winner. The magazine, which was unable to
recover from this very public failure, went bankrupt a year later. 39
As a result the 1936 election has come to signify not only the death of straw
polling but also the advent of scientific survey research. Moreover, it helped cement
Gallup’s reputation as the nation’s most respected pollster.
The End of Quota Sampling: 1948 . For the next three presidential election
cycles, Roper, Crossley, and Gallup continued to rely on quota sampling. While they
accurately predicted the winners of the 1940 and 1944 elections, in 1948 all three
incorrectly forecast that Thomas Dewey would defeat Harry Truman.40 After careful
study, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) recommended abandoning quota
sampling in favor of probability sampling, a method that is still used today. 41
Emergence of Other Research Centers . In addition to the commercial
pollsters, many other individuals, institutions, and opinion research centers emerged
manufacturer of threshing machines. Winkler, “Public Opinion,” 1036; Hennessy, Public Opinion, 84-
86 .
38 Quota sampling was widely used from 1936 to 1948 when it was discredited as a result of the
problems pollsters confronted predicting the 1948 presidential race between Harry Truman and
Thomas Dewey. Quota sampling is a “sampling design that requires a set number or proportion of
respondents with given characteristics or attributes.” Pamela L. Alreck and Robert B. Settle, The
Survey Research Handbook (Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1985), 417.
39
Using sampling techniques similar to that of Gallup, both Elmo Roper and Archibald Crossley
accurately predicted Roosevelt would win the 1936 election as well. See Gallup and Rae, The Pulse of
Democracy, 38-55.
40
Gallup predicted Dewey over Truman by a margin of 49.5 to 44.5 percent, while Roper had Dewey
at 52.2 and Truman at 37.1. Erikson and Tedin, American Public Opinion, 10.
41
The major problem was the sampling method employed, as well as the fact that most pollsters
stopped conducting research too far in advance of election day. As a result, the SSRC determined that
quota sampling should be abandoned and replaced with probability sampling. Probability sampling is
based on the idea that every respondent “in the population has either an equal probability of selection,
as with random sampling, or has a given probability of being selected that is known in advance and
used in analysis to assess significance.” Erikson and Tedin, American Public Opinion, 10; Alreck and
Settle, The Survey Research Handbook, 416.
34
in the U.S. and abroad. The U.S. government, for instance, has engaged in extensive
research, although the exact amount is difficult to determine because much of it has
been done secretly. In 1939, for instance, a Division of Program Surveys was
established within the Department of Agriculture and served as the training ground
for many who eventually left to pursue academic research at the University of
Michigan. Despite periodic opposition by Congress, other Federal agencies, such as
the State Department, have also engaged in research and contracted with private
firms.
42
Several major academic centers and libraries have also been established.
These organizations are primarily headquartered at colleges and universities such as:
the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago (est.
1941), the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University (est. 1944), the
Survey Research Center (SRC) at the University of Michigan (est. 1940s), and the
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research at the University of Connecticut (est.
1947).
43
Media Polls: 1970s & Beyond . The death of the straw poll did not mean the
death of media polling altogether. From the mid- 1930s to the mid-1970s, media
outlets purchased data from commercial pollsters and polling firms. In the interim,
however, survey research techniques and technology were developed to such an
extent that the cost of conducting a national poll dropped significantly. As a result, in
42
See for instance, Hennessy, Public Opinion, 88-92.
43 The Roper Center houses the world’s largest archive of public opinion data. For a more complete
overview of “Online Survey Research/Public Opinion Centers” worldwide see: “Online Survey
Research/Public Opinion Centers: A Worldwide Listing.” Available:
http://www.ukans.edu/cwis/units/coms2/pol (accessed January 14, 2004).
35
the 1970s, it once again became feasible for media outlets to conduct their own
research.
In 1976 CBS News and the New York Times joined forces and began
conducting in-house surveys. NBCl Wall Street Journal, ABCl Washington Post,
CNN/USA Today/Gallup, and a host of other national, state, and local news
organizations soon followed.
Whereas in the early 1970s, no news organizations conducted polls, by the
end of the decade most major news outlets were conducting their own surveys.44 As a
result there was a sharp increase in both the frequency and reporting of poll results.
In the twenty months preceding Nixon’s resignation, for instance, 128 media polls
were conducted, compared with 325 media surveys conducted in the nine months
after the Monica Lewinsky scandal broke. Similarly, there were twenty-six “horse-
race” media polls conducted during the first seven months of 1980. By the 2000
election, that number increased by four times. 45
The Proliferation of Polling
The proliferation in media polling reflects the growth in polling overall. In the
last seventy years, survey research has quickly surpassed every other technique to
44
Charles Euchner, “Public Support and Opinion,” 887.
45
Reminiscent of the newspaper association created in the early 1900s, in 1993 several major networks
and the Associated Press (AP) also joined forces to develop the Voter News Service (VNS). The
consortium was established to provide exit polling and analysis of voters leaving the polls on election
day. In the wake of erroneous projections in 2000, the VNS suffered even more extensive
technological problems with its newly redesigned vote-tabulation system during the 2002 midterm
election. As a result, it is unclear whether the consortium will continue to provide media outlets with
information in the 2004 presidential election. Alessandra Stanley and David D. Kirkpatrick, “Election
Ritual Makes Return: Awaiting Votes,” New York Times, November 6, 2002; Jim Rutenberg, “Voter
Surveys: Many Questions on the Day After a Technology Fiasco,” New York Times, November
36
become the primary means by which opinion is assessed. 46 One indication of this
growth is the sheer number of survey questions housed in the Roper Center archives.
Whereas the collection contains just 9,300 questions from the 1960s, it houses almost
fifteen times that amount from the 1 990s.47
In little more than seventy years, polling has come to assume a central place in
modem American life. It is now commonly used in fields as diverse as: marketing,
business, education, law, entertainment, medicine, science, technology, politics, and
government. As Erikson and Tedin note, few Americans “can remember a time when
public opinion polls — like television, shopping malls, and eight-lane freeways — were
not part of the popular landscape.”48 Similarly, Herbert Asher concludes that as we
embark on the 21 st Century, “the barrage of public opinion polls on Americans has
continued and, in fact, increased.”46 Polls tell us which television shows are most
popular, how often people attend church, which Americans are most admired, how
people view the O.J. Simpson trial, the baseball strike, sexual behavior, and so on. 50
Polling and Politics . At the turn of the century, the ubiquity of polling is
perhaps most apparent in the arena of politics and government. As Michael Traugott
7,2002; Alessandra Stanley, “Man at the Uneasy Helm of Voter Survey Service,” New York Times,
November 7, 2002; Robinson, Mobocracy, 23, 47.
46
The fact that survey research has become the predominant means by which to measure mass opinion
has been subject to a great deal of criticism. As Manza and Cook write “[T]he rise of public opinion
polling as the predominant method of assessing mass opinion (as opposed to other possible indicators)
has been subject to plenty of critiques.” “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 1-2. In addition
to Blumer, “Public Opinion and Public Opinion Polling,” see for instance: Pierre Bourdieu, “Public
Opinion Does Not Exist” in Armond Matelart and Seth Siegelaub, eds. Communication and Class
Struggle, vol. 1 (New York: International General, 1979); Herbst, Numbered Voices; Taeku Lee,
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and Paul Lavrakas note, “[contemporary American politics is awash in polling
data.”
51
Similarly, Jacobs and Shapiro conclude, “[pjublic opinion polls are
everywhere. The media report them without stop and political activists of all kinds -
from candidates in election contests to political parties and interest groups- pump
millions into focus groups and polls.”52 Karlyn Bowman adds that, not only has
polling activity has exploded, but the surfeit of surveys is clearly evident in
politics.” By the time the Iowa caucus was held in January 2000, for example,
pollsters had already asked more than 1,000 questions about the upcoming
presidential election. Some pollsters even asked about the 2000 contest before the
1996 election ended. 53
Polling and the White House. The increasing commitment to polling in
American political life is particularly evident at the presidential level. In the last forty
years polling has come to play an increasingly important role in the modem
presidency.
54 As Carl Cannon writes, “polls are being used more aggressively than
50
Ibid., ix-1; Erikson and Tedin, American Public Opinion, 1.
51
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Moreover, the Roper Center database shows that five times more surveys were conducted in the two
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ever before by the president and his loyalists,” both are “endless consumers and
endless peddlers of polls.”55
Ihe Emergence of the White House Polling Apparatus
Prior to the advent of survey research, presidents relied on a variety of sources
for information about opinion, including the media, interest groups, constituent
letters, petitions, editorials, social movements, party officials, and political activists.56
White House officials also employed innovative techniques such as canvassing and
straw polling to assess majority sentiment. In the 1920s and 30s, for instance, Herbert
Hoover’s staff performed fairly complicated content analysis of editorial pages in
order to keep abreast of changes in opinion. 57
Birth of Presidential Polling: 1935-1968. The development of the White
House polling apparatus, however, coincided with the advent of survey research and
the emergence of the modem presidency. The first president to use polling was
Franklin D. Roosevelt who, as Table 2.1 shows, relied on three pollsters: Emil Huija,
Hadley Cantril and George Gallup. Their polls on behalf of the Democratic National
Science Association, Boston, September 3-6, 1998); Wynne Pomeroy Waller, “Presidential Leadership
Style and Public Opinion: An Analysis of the Ford and Carter Administrations” (delivered at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 30-September
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Committee (DNC) and FDR respectively, “signified the birth of presidential
polling.”
58
Table 2.1 Presidential Pollsters, 1935-1968
Roosevelt Emil Huija (DNC); George Gallup; Hadley Cantril
Truman
Eisenhower
Kennedy Louis Harris
Johnson Oliver Quayle; Albert Cantril*
‘Albert Cantril served on Johnson’s staff, but was not his primary pollster.
In the mid-late 1930s, for instance, Gallup advised Roosevelt on reaction to
entering the War. Cantril polled not only on America’s War effort, but also on issues
such as housing and consumer goods. Cantril is said to have been partly responsible
for the President’s move to the left in 1935 after polls showed Huey Long was a
major threat to Roosevelt’s reelection bid. 59
The links forged between pollsters, parties, and presidents, during Roosevelt’s
administration, were a precursor of what was to come. Huija’s work on behalf of the
DNC, for instance, inspired future pollsters to forge close ties with their parties. 60
Likewise, Roosevelt set a precedent in keeping Cantril’s work secret. Although
58
Robert Eisinger and Jeremy Brown, “Polling as a Means Toward Presidential Autonomy: Emil
Huija, Hadley Cantril and the Roosevelt Administration,” International Journal ofPublic Opinion
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William Schneider, “Here’s One High-Stakes Numbers Game,” National Journal, 29, no. 18 (May
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60 Most notably, for instance, Robert Teeter and Richard Wirthlin who served four Republican
administrations: Nixon, Ford, Reagan, and Bush.
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unlike some of his successors, FDR was primarily motivated by a desire to secure a
source of information independent from his party. 61
While Roosevelt’s two immediate successors continued to assess opinion,
they did so with much less frequency and primarily in conjunction with the elections
of 1948 and 1952. During Truman and Eisenhower’s administrations, many of
Roosevelt’s polling “arrangements (including both the relationship with pollsters and
the government’s own polling operation) were abandoned.” 62
Beginning in the early 1960s, however, there was a major shift. Throughout
the decade, White House officials increasingly relied on polls not only for electoral
purposes, but to assist in policy formulation and decision-making. 63 These years
mark what some refer to as the institutionalization of the White House “polling
apparatus”. As Jacobs and Shapiro write,
[smarting with John Kennedy... the White House’s sensitivity
to public opinion became an enduring institutional character
of the modem presidency. . . Public opinion analysis was
conducted... by a ‘public opinion apparatus’ - an operation that
was centralized in the White House and organized around routinized
procedures for assembling public opinion data and conducting
public relations activities.
Kennedy hired pollster Louis Harris two years before his 1 960 campaign and
continued to seek his advice throughout his presidency.
65
Harris was, for instance,
61
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among the first to warn Kennedy that civil rights might make it difficult for him to
hold the South in 1964.66
Johnson not only consulted pollster Oliver Quayle on a regular basis, but he
was the first president to hire a pollster for the White House staff, Hadley Cantril’s
son Albert. Johnson sought advice on an array of issues, including American reaction
to the Vietnam War and his chances of winning reelection to a second full-term. He
is also said to have carried polls in his pocket, and flashed positive number to
reporters from time to time. 67
While Kennedy and Johnson used polls, they did not commission them
directly. “Kennedy and Johnson’s private polls were generally offered as a low-or-no
cost favor in which the pollster ‘piggybacked’ a few questions onto surveys
conducted for other political candidates.”68 It was not until the Nixon administration
that the White House served as the main sponsor of polls. The lack of control over
key issues, such as the timing, number, extent, and substance of questions made
reliable measurement fairly difficult.
Consequently, while White House officials attempted to use polling, it was
not until the late 1960s that a President had regular, unfettered access to survey data.
Until then, polling had been largely tangential to the presidency. As Diane Heith
writes, during this early period, “public opinion polling and the polling consultant
were not critical to either presidential campaigns or to presidential governing
efforts.”
69
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66
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“Awkward Adolescence”: 1 969-1 99 T Scholars continue to debate the exact
date that polling became institutionalized in the White House. Nevertheless, most
agree that by the early 1970s, polling had become an integral and “daily part of White
House operations.”70
Heith describes the years from 1969-1988 as the “awkward adolescence of
presidential polling” A time during which the use of polling was institutionalized
within the White House and relied on not only as a instrument of campaigning, but
also as a tool of governance. 71
The Nixon White House begins “the modem presidency’s standing date with
the public, institutionalizing the use of opinion polls.”72 As Table 2.2 demonstrates,
Nixon retained several prominent pollsters, beginning with David Derge who sewed
until 1972 when he was replaced by Robert Teeter and Richard Wirthlin. 73 Between
them, these pollsters studied American attitudes towards issues as diverse as Vietnam,
inflation, busing, the admission of China to the United Nations, wage and price
controls.
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Diane Heith, for instance, begins her analysis of the “White House public opinion apparatus” in
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Table 2.2 Presidential Pollsters, 1969-1991
Nixon David Derge (pre-1972); Robert Teeter (post- 1972);
Richard Wirthlin (post- 1972)
Ford Teeter; Wirthlin
Carter Patrick Caddell
Reagan Wirthlin
Bush Teeter
Teeter and Wirthlin went on to become the dominant Republican pollsters of
the 1970s and 80s and between them served all three of the next Republican
Presidents. Ford relied primarily on Teeter and his firm Market Opinion Research
(MOR). During that time, Teeter subcontracted work to Wirthlin and his
organization, Decision Management Information (DMI). 75 The President was
reportedly so impressed with Wirthlin that he tried to hire him full-time. When the
White House learned that Wirthlin had contracted with Ronald Reagan to study the
viability of a run for the Republican presidential nomination, however, Ford
terminated their relationship.
76
The three subsequent presidents, each retained only one pollster and in all
cases the campaign pollster went on to be the presidential pollster. Carter formed
such a close relationship with Patrick Caddell that many have described him as the
“first true Pollster General,” under whom government became synonymous with “a
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permanent campaign.”78 Caddell had unprecedented access to the president. This
gave him an opportunity to provide Carter not only with polling data, but “analysis,
advice, and a personal agenda.”79
There is a great deal of evidence, for instance, that Caddell was directly
responsible for the most pivotal moment in Carter’s presidency. In 1979, Caddell
urged Carter to abandon a speech promoting energy conservation and development
initiatives, and instead to deliver the now infamous “malaise speech” in which he
focused on the “crisis in confidence” that threatened to destroy the social and political
fabric of the nation. 80
Despite widespread criticism of Carter’s reliance on Caddell, Reagan followed
suit by bringing his campaign pollster Richard Wirthlin to the White House with him
in 1981. With annual funding by the RNC of approximately $900,000, Wirthlin
conducted the “most extensive and expensive polls ever undertaken on behalf of a
president.” His traditional surveys and ‘tracking’ polls had an impact on the
administrations strategic and substantive decision-making in both foreign and
domestic policy. Wirthlin’s work has been cited as a key component, for instance, of
Reagan’s decision to seek a dramatic tax cut and budget legislation during the first
few months of his presidency. His polls are also said to have influenced decisions in
78
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other areas such as social security, tax policy, budgeting. Supreme Court
nominations, U.S. involvement in the Lebanese civil war, and foreign summits.82
After a lengthy hiatus, Teeter returned to the White House in 1988 to serve
under George H.W. Bush. They formed such a close relationship that Bush asked
Teeter to serve as the Chairman of his unsuccessful bid for a second term.
Unprecedented Commitment to Polling: 1992 & Beyond. President Clinton
set a record in terms of the sheer number of pollsters. 83 As Table 2.3 shows, he began
with Stanley Greenberg, who served as both the campaign and presidential pollster
until after the Democrat’s devastating defeat in the 1994 midterm-elections. Dick
Morris then replaced Greenberg and introduced the president to two unknown
pollsters, Mark Penn and Douglas Schoen. Penn and Schoen succeeded Morris in
late 1995 and went on to serve as Clinton’s primary pollsters during his second term
in office. Between them, they polled on almost every conceivable issue, from social
security, health care, and Bosnia, to needle exchanges, school uniforms, smoking, and
spousal abuse.
82
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Table 2.3 Presidential Pollsters, 1992+
Clinton
Bush
Stanley Greenberg (pre-1995); Richard (Dick)
Morris (1995-1996); Douglas Schoen and Mark Penn
(post- 1995)
Matthew Dowd; Jan van Lohuizen; Fred Steeper
Clinton’s reliance on pollsters was unprecedented not only in terms of the
sheer number and cost, but also in terms of their level of influence. As Elizabeth
Drew notes,
previous Presidents had pollsters and other outside
political advisers, but never before had a group of
political consultants played such an integral part in
a Presidency. Clinton’s consultants were omnipresent,
involved in everything from personnel to policymaking
to the President’s schedule. 85
It is difficult to determine whether Clinton’s extensive reliance on pollsters
and polling data is primarily a reflection of personal predilection or the logical
extension of a practice that began with Nixon. One indication that it may be more
than just a reflection of personal style however is that despite his rhetoric, Clinton’s
successor established a polling operation that is eerily similar.
86
George W. Bush, “ran for president pledging not just a change in policies but
a change in the way those policies are made,” denouncing policy-making by polls,
and promising “an end to the ‘permanent campaign’.”87 Nevertheless, within the first
year of his administration, Bush’s use of polling “bears striking resemblance” to that
85
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of his predecessor. Like the Clinton White House, Bush aides acknowledge meeting
weekly to “pore over polling.” Like the DNC, the RNC is picking up an expensive
tab for Bush’s polling team. Whereas Penn and Schoen polled weekly during
Clinton’s second term, Dowd admits that in the first few months alone the Bush
administration was polling at least once every two weeks. James Thurber describes
the Bush administrations “wide-ranging political efforts” as “the most sophisticated
he’s seen.”
89
Conclusion
Over the last eighty years, polling has become the primary means by which to
assess public opinion. In that time it has also come to assume a central place in
American politics and government, particularly at the presidential level. Every
president, beginning with Franklin Roosevelt, has relied on this technique to
understand what the public is thinking about important issues.
The proliferation in polling raises an important question: how do public
officials use the enormous amounts of survey research data at their disposal? How do
polls impact policy and decision-making? Are they used, as the early proponents of
survey research suggested, to respond to the majority will? Are they used, as Clinton
and George W. Bush argue to market favored policies? Or are they used in other
ways?
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Despite the import of these questions, there has been surprisingly little
research on this issue. Instead of focusing on how elites use opinion, researchers
have employed sophisticated empirical techniques to examine the opinion-policy
nexus. They have then used this research as a basis for drawing inferences about elite
use of opinion. Because much of the research has shown that there is a strong
correlation between opinion and policy outcomes, many scholars have concluded that
officials follow or pander to opinion. Not all scholars, however, support the “large
effects” conclusion. In addition to those who argue opinion has a substantial impact
on policy, there are others who conclude that the impact of opinion on policy is
negligible and still others who say it is contingent.
The following chapter reviews the three primary schools of thought and
argues that the contradictory nature of these findings is a key reason that an
alternative approach to examining the opinion-policy relationship is needed. The
chapter concludes that examining elite’s use of opinion is important not only on its
face, but because it will aid political scientists seeking to understand the relationship
between opinion and democratic policy-making and the nature of governmental
responsiveness.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
The advent of modem survey research and the institutionalization of the
White House polling apparatus have resulted in a “profusion” of scholarship on polls,
public opinion, and policy making. 1 As Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro note,
“the amount and quality of research on the relationship between opinion and policy
making” took “a dramatic step forward” in the later half of the 20th Century. 2
While much of the research on American politics is at least somewhat relevant
to the opinion-policy linkage, this review will focus on studies that compare mass
preferences and policy outcomes. 3
The substantive findings from this body of work are not easily summarized
because the results are mixed. Some studies conclude that opinion has a significant
impact on policy-making. Others suggest that the effects are contingent on historical
and institutional factors. Still others conclude that the impact is either negligible or
1
Manza and Cook also write that there is a “rapidly growing body of research on polls, public opinion,
and policy making in contemporary American politics. “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 1,
5.
2
Jacobs and Shapiro, “Public Opinion, Institutions, and Policy Making,” 9. Earlier, they also noted
that “an increasing number of studies have examined ... the relationship between public opinion and
public policy in democratic countries.” Shapiro and Jacobs, “The Relationship Between Public
Opinion and Public Policy,” 149-50. [Note: You don’t have this reference in your bibliography.]
3
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and the media.”See Alan D. Monroe and Paul J. Gardner, “Public Policy Linkages,” in Samuel Long,
ed. Research in Micropolitics (New York: JAI Press, 1987), 2:207-32 for “a survey of this topic in the
broader sense.” Alan D. Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999” (presented at the
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, California, August 30-
September 2, 2001), 1; Alan D. Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” Public
Opinion Quarterly 62 (1998): 6-7.
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declining.
4 The contradictory state of these findings is one of the key reasons that a
new approach to studying the opinion-policy relationship is needed.
Before developing this argument, I will review the three primary schools of
thought that emerge from the opinion-policy literature: large effects/significant
relationship, contingency/dependent relationship, and small effects/insignificant
relationship. I will then discuss the implications of these findings as they pertain to
poll use and governmental responsiveness.
Large Effects: Significant Relationship
The most prominent advocates of the argument that opinion has a significant
impact on policy are those working within what is loosely known as the
“correspondence” tradition. This research dates back to Warren Miller and Donald
Stokes 1963 study of the relationship between the roll-call votes of members of
Congress and the preferences of their constituents.
5
Since that time, researchers have
employed a variety of approaches to examine the degree of correspondence between
opinion and policy, institutional output, the ideology, and behavior of public officials.
Despite variations in approach, most of these studies confirm that opinion has
a substantial impact on policy. As Shapiro and Jacobs conclude, “the overall
evidence from these very different research traditions has increasingly suggested that
public opinion has had a substantial impact on policy making in the United States.”
6
4
This approach to summarizing the substantive findings as “significant,” “contingent,” and
“insignificant” is borrowed from Manza and Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 3.
5 Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, “Constituency Influence in Congress,” American Political
Science Review 57 (March 1963): 45-56.
6
In a later review, Jacobs and Shapiro confirm these findings. “What is striking is that these very
different research approaches have led to very similar findings — sizeable statistical relationships
between measures of mass public preferences and policy making. Jacobs and Shapiro, Public
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Similarly, Benjamin Page writes, “abundant evidence has been produced to
demonstrate substantial empirical relationships between public opinion and public
policy in the United States and elsewhere. Policy outputs - what governments do -
tend to correspond fairly closely with what surveys say their citizens want them to
•y
do.” This research can be categorized into three types: dyadic, collective, and case
studies .
8
Dyadic Analysis .9 The Miller and Stokes study began a tradition of analysis
by examining the “dyadic” correspondence between the behavior of congressional
representatives and the preferences of their constituents
.
10
Since then, a number of
researchers have employed this approach to determine if there is a correlation
between the “behavior of an individual decision-maker” (usually a legislator) and the
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preferences of his or her constituency
.
1
1
Variations on this approach have included
experimenting with different ways to “operationalize constituency variables,” such as
using demographic data, referenda results, and legislators’ perceptions
.
12
The results of these studies suggest that, overall, constituent preferences have
a moderate to substantial impact on legislative behavior
.
13
This is evident, for
instance, in studies examining the relationship between roll call voting, district
opinion and popular preferences
.
14
It is also the case for studies that focus on
particular issues such as women’s rights, civil rights, and social welfare . 15
Despite its import, however, dyadic analysis is limited in several ways. Of
particular concern is the fact that it tells us little about the relationship between mass
opinion and policy because it does not compare actual policy-outcomes or decisions.
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Legislative Studies Quarterly 6 (1981): 235-46; Benjamin I. Page, Robert Y. Shapiro, Paul W. Gronke,
and Robert M. Rosenberg, “Constituency, Party, and Representation in Congress,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 48 (1984): 741-56.
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Instead, it focuses on the link between constituent preferences and the behavior of
individual legislators. As a result, it does not tell us much about the “extent of
correspondence between mass opinion” and policy or allow us to evaluate
governmental responsiveness as a whole . 16
Systems Approach I: Congruence. In an effort to rectify some of the problems
inherent in dyadic analysis, researchers began experimenting with methods that
would allow them to compare actual policy decisions (such as laws passed) or the
output of governmental institutions (such as Congress or the executive branch) and
public preferences .
17
In contrast to dyadic analysis, this allows researchers to
compare “public preferences with enacted policies .” 18
Over the last thirty years, collective or macro-level analysis has become the
“most important” type of research in this area . 19 Researchers have approached
collective analysis in two ways, either by focusing on subsystems or the entire
political system.
Researchers who focus on “subsystems,” such as particular states or localities,
find that there is a strong link between preference and policy. The problem with
16
Shapiro and Jacobs, “The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Public Policy,” 154; Jacobs and
Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, 343; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 7;
Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999,” 1-2. These studies also contain additional
discussion of the limitations of dyadic research.
17
Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 7; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public
Policy, 1960-1999,” 2.
18
Jacobs and Shapiro, “Public Opinion, Institutions and Policy Making,” 9.
19
Shapiro and Jacobs also refer to this work as “macro-level studies of opinion-policy congruence.”
“The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Public Policy,” 150.
20
Both Erikson, and Joslyn and Ricci disaggregated national surveys to the state level. See for
instance: Robert S. Erikson, “The Relationship Between Public Opinion and State Policy: A New Look
at Some Forgotten Data,” American Journal ofPolitical Science 20 (1976): 25-36; Richard A. Joslyn
and David Ricci, “The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Public Policy Across the American
States” (presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago,
Illinois, April 1980), while others have used Pool, Ableson, and Popkin’s simulation technique to
estimate the distribution of opinion for states and other units. See for instance: Ronald E. Weber and
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this research, however, is that it is limited in terms of the number of issues that can be
considered. Moreover, since the primary focus is on local and state rather than
national issues, it tells us little about the impact of opinion on national policy and
decision-making.
The limitations of the subsystem approach prompted researchers to consider
methodologies that allow for comparison of opinion and policy at the national level.
The oldest and most popular approach enables them to examine the ‘congruence’
between opinion and policy change over time. To measure congruence, researchers
must have access to national polls that ask the same questions of the same population
at different points in time. The results are then used to compare the direction of
opinion change and the direction of policy change. If the two change in the same
direction, they are said to covary or be congruent . 21
There are a number of advantages to this approach. First, it allows for the
comparison of actual policy decisions and institutional outcomes with popular
opinion at the national level. Second, examining changes over time makes it possible
to speak more directly to causality. Finally, it helps alleviate the problem of
measurement validity. By relying on the same questions asked at different points in
time, researchers have a consistent measure of opinion change they might not have in
William R. Shaffer, “Public Opinion and American State Policy-Making,” Midwest Journal of
Political Science 16 (1972): 683-99; R. L. Sutton, “The State and the People: Measuring and
Accounting for State Representativeness,” Polity 5 (1973): 451-76; Paul D. Schumaker and Russell W.
Getter, “Responsiveness Bias in Fifty-One American Communities,” American Journal ofPolitical
Science 21 (1977): 247-81; George Edwards and Ira Sharkansky, The Policy Predicament (San
Francisco, CA: W. H. Freeman, 1978); Beverly B. Cook, “Public Opinion and Federal Judicial
Policy,” American Journal ofPolitical Science 21 (1977): 567-600; Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P.
Abelson, and Samuel L. Popkin, Candidates, Issues, and Strategies: A Computer Simulation ofthe
I960 and 1964 Presidential Elections (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965); Monroe, “Public Opinion
and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 8; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999,” 2.
21 Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 8-9; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public
Policy, 1960-1999,” 2-3; Jacobs and Shapiro, Public Opinion, Institutions, and Policy Making, 10.
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cases where differences in question wording produced different levels of support for a
policy.
22
Donald Devine and Robert Weissberg were among the first to examine the
congruence between opinion and policy outcomes at the national level. 23 It was
Robert Page and Benjamin Shapiro, however, who used this approach most
extensively in their 1983 study of over three hundred issues drawn from national
surveys between 1935 and 1979. 24 Since Page and Shapiro’s groundbreaking study,
this approach has been used to examine a variety of policy areas (such as federal
spending), institutional outcomes (such as Supreme Court decisions and
Congressional legislation), and the relationship between “public mood data”
(aggregate measures of ideology) and various summary indicators of collective policy
outcomes.
25
22
Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 9; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public
Policy, 1960-1999,” 3.
23
Donald J. Devine, The Attentive Public: Polyarchical Democracy (Chicago, IL: Rand McNally,
1970); Robert Weissberg, Public Opinion and Popular Government (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-
Hall, 1976).
24
Page and Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy.”
See for instance: Robert Weissberg, “Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress,” American
Political Science Review 72 (1978): 535-47; Patricia A. Hurley, “Collective Representation
Reappraised,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 7 (1982): 1 19-36; Charles Silver and Robert Shapiro,
“Public Opinion and the Federal Judiciary: Crime, Punishment, and Demographic Constraints,”
Population Research and Policy Review 3 (1984): 255-80; David G. Bamum, “The Supreme Court and
Public Opinion: Judicial Decision Making in the Post-New Deal Period,” Journal ofPolitics 47
(1985): 652-66; Charles W. Ostrom, Jr. and Robin F. Marra, “U.S. Defense Spending and the Soviet
Estimate,” American Political Science Review 80 (1986): 819-41; Steve Frakas, Robert Y. Shapiro,
and Benjamin I. Page, “The Dynamics of Public Opinion and Policy” (presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Lancaster, Pennsylvania, 1990);
Thomas Hartley and Bruce Russett, “Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs Military
Spending in the United States?” American Political Science Review 86 (December 1992): 905-15;
Angela Hinton-Andersson, “Opinion and Policy Congruence during Periods of Divided and Unified
Control in the National Government” (presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political
Science Association, New Orleans, March 18-20, 1993); William Mishler and Reginald S. Sheehan,
“The Supreme Court as Counter-majoritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme
Court Decisions,” American Political Science Review 87 (March 1993): 87-1 10; Lawrence Jacobs and
Robert Y. Shapiro, “Issues, Candidate Image and Priming: The Use of Private Polls in Kennedy’s 1960
Presidential Campaign,” American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994): 527-40; Christopher
Wlezien, “The Public as Thermostat: Dynamics of Preferences for Spending,” American Journal of
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The overall results of this research show that there is a great deal of
congruence between opinion and policy-outcomes
.
26 As Shapiro and Jacobs note,
“[t]he most striking aspect of these macro-level studies is that overall they have found
substantial congruence between public opinion and government policies .”27 Page and
Shapiro, for instance, found that opinion and policy was congruent (i.e., they changed
in the same direction) more than sixty percent of the time. Moreover, when cases
were discarded to account for issues such as opinion fluctuation, the degree of
congruity increased to ninety percent .28
For all its advantages, however, there are some drawbacks to the congruence
approach. It is, for instance, only possible to consider poll questions that have been
asked repeatedly over an extended period of time. Second, the manner in which
Political Science 39 (1995): 981-1000; David G. Bamum, The Supreme Court and American
Democracy (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993); James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and
Robert S. Erikson, “Opinion and Policy: A Global View,” PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 1
(March 1994): 29-35; James A. Stimson, Michael B. MacKuen, and Robert S. Erikson, “Dynamic
Representation,” American Political Science Review 89 (September 1995): 543-65. For additional
references, see also: Jacobs and Shapiro, “Public Opinion, Institutions, and Policy Making”; Shapiro
and Jacobs, “The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Policy”; Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians
Don 't Pander, 3-9; 341-44; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993”; Monroe, “Public
Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999.”
26
This more “controversial” work is discussed later in the chapter. The reference pertains primarily to
a small number of recent studies showing a decline in responsiveness or suggesting that there has been
a decrease in governmental responsiveness to opinion. Even given the decline, however, the findings
still show a good deal of congruence between opinion and policy outcomes. For a discussion of the
controversial nature of these claims, see Burstein, “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy,” 7-
8. For an overview of these studies, see for instance: Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, 4-
5, as well as Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999.”
27
Similarly, they write, “[0]verall, then, there is evidence for a substantial effect of public preferences
on government policies.” Shapiro and Jacobs, “The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Public
Policy,” 151, 153. In a later review of the literature Jacobs and Shapiro confirm this conclusion: “The
general findings of this body of research has been that the collective decisions of government
institutions have been strongly related to public opinion.” “Public Opinion, Institutions, and Policy
Making,” 9.
28
Their findings are also supported by other collective/macro-level analyses. Shapiro and Jacobs, “The
Relationship Between Public Opinion and Public Policy,” 151-53; Paul Burstein, “Public Opinion,
Demonstrations, and the Passage of Anti-discrimination Legislation,” Public Opinion Quarterly 43
(Summer 1979): 157-72; Paul Burstein, “The Sociology of Democratic Politics and Government,” in
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ol. 7 (Palo Alto, CA: Annual
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policy changes are assessed raises various concerns. If, for instance, public support
for a particular policy increases somewhat, but overall remains fairly low, and the
government adopts this policy, opinion change and policy change are said to be
congruent despite the fact that the action is at odds with majority opinion.29
System Approach II: Consistency. The limitations of congruence analysis
prompted a few researchers to look for alternative methods. While not widely
employed, the principal alternative is “consistency” analysis, whereby researchers
compare the distribution of mass opinion on a variety of issues with policy outcomes.
Unlike the congruence method, this does not require that the same questions be asked
over an extended period of time. 30
Vance Russell Tiede was the first to employ consistency analysis in his 1974
examination of issues on which the president and Congress disagreed. 31 Thomas
Marshall also used this method to determine whether Supreme Court decisions issued
between 1934-1986 were consistent with popular opinion. His findings show that the
overall level of opinion-judicial decision consistency during this period was 62-66%.
As he writes, “[w]hen a clear-cut poll majority or plurality exists, over three-fifths of
the Court’s decisions reflect the polls.”
Decisions,” American Politics Quarterly 7 (1979): 3-18; Page and Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion
on Policy.”
29
For a more complete description of these and other problems with this method, see: Monroe, “Public
Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 9; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999,”
3-4.
30
This is both an advantage and disadvantage of this method. The lack of opinion measures over time,
for instance, makes it fairly difficult to show or prove to any degree of certainty that public preferences
“caused or even influenced a policy outcome. Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-
1993,” 12; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999,” 6.
31 Vance Russell Tiede, “Do ‘The People’ Agree More Often with the President or Congress? A
Secondary Analysis of Survey Data,” (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, Chicago, August 29-September 2, 1974).
32 Thomas R. Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 97.
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The most extensive application of this method, however, is Alan Monroe’s
continuing examination of the “consistency” between majority opinion and policy
outcomes from 1960-1999. Over the last twenty-five years, Monroe has examined
more than 2,500 questions on issues of national import and compared the results with
national policy outcomes to determine whether the two are “consistent”. 33 As he
notes, “the basic dimension used to categorize both public opinion and policy
outcomes was that of maintenance of the status quo versus policy change.”34 Those
cases in which both majority opinion and the policy outcome favor the status quo or
policy change are labeled as “consistent”. Conversely, when majority opinion and
policy outcome differ (i.e., one favors maintaining the status quo and the other
change) they are said to be inconsistent. His findings show that from 1960-1999 the
overall level of opinion-policy consistency was 56%. 35
As in the case of congruence research, this approach is limited in a number of
ways.
36
Most troubling is that neither this, nor any of the other methods, is designed
to deal with the problem of non-spuriousness. Studies showing a high degree of
congruence, consistency or correspondence cannot rule out the possibility that other
factors or variables may have caused the apparent relationship between opinion and
policy.
37
Monroe, “Consistency between Policy Preferences,” 3-18; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public
Policy, 1980-1993”; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999.”
34
Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 1 1; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public
Policy, 1960-1999,” 5-6.
It is important to note that this figure is a result of “aggregating” three separate time periods (1960-
1979; 1980-1991; 1991-1999). As a result, it “overrepresents the later eras as there were
proportionately fewer cases in the first two decades reflecting the availability of fewer surveys before
1980.” Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999,” 6-8.
36
See for instance, Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 12; Monroe, “Public
Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999,” 6.
37
Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 12; Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public
Policy, 1960-1999,” 6.
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Case Studies. Another prominent source of support for the ‘large effects’
thesis comes from researchers using in-depth case studies to examine the impact of
opinion on the formation of specific policies, governmental programs, or within
particular policy domains. A substantial amount of this research is cross-national,
involving comparisons between the United States and Westem-European nations. 38
Pamela Alesky, for instance, studied the link between opinion and social welfare
policy in both the United States and Sweden. 39 Similarly, Jacobs examined the
impact of opinion on the creation of health policy in both the United States and Great
Britain. He concluded that public preferences played an important role in the
development of health care policy in both nations.40
In addition to comparative studies, there are also case studies that focus on
specific policy domains, most generally domestic social and foreign policy. Studies
within the domestic social arena include R. C. Fording’ s analysis of Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC), Paul Burstein’s study of equal employment
opportunity legislation from the 1940s to the 1970s, and Theda Skocpol’s
examination of the impact of opinion on the Clinton administration’s health-care
policy.
41
In each case the findings show that public opinion has a direct and
38
See Jacobs and Shapiro, for a review of case studies in this area “Public Opinion, Institutions, and
Policy Making,” 9.
39
Pamela D. Alesky, “Linkages Between Public Opinion and Policy: Why Are They Different in
Sweden and the United States” (prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, D.C., August 31 -September 3, 2000).
40
Jacobs, for instance, argues that opinion impacted policy in at least three important ways: agenda
setting, the influence of interest groups, and the design of administrative arrangements. The Health of
Nations.
41
Skocpol, for instance concludes that in regard to the creation of the Clinton health care plan, “public
opinion mattered], at least in relation to the broad outlines of reform and plausible public discussion.”
Paul Burstein, Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1998); R. C.
Fording, “The Conditional Effect of Violence as a Political Tactic: Mass Insurgency, Welfare
Generosity, and Electoral Context in the American States,” American Journal ofPolitical Science 41
(1997): 1-29; Theda Skocpol, “From Social Security to Health Security? Opinion and Rhetoric in U.S.
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substantial impact on policy and decision-making. The findings of these case studies
are not unique. As Jeff Manza and Fay Lomax Cook write, “most studies of policy
change within a single domain that have considered the role of public opinion have
generally found an impact.”42
In an exhaustive review of the case studies, Burstein found that, of the twenty
published since the early 1980s, all but one concluded that opinion has a significant
impact on policy-making in a given policy area. As Burstein writes,
the studies vary in subject, time period, measures,
comprehensiveness, and even quality.
. . Nevertheless, all
but one reach the same conclusion: that public opinion influences
policy.
43
These findings generally hold up in the case of foreign policy as well. Most
of the research in this area has disputed Bernard Cohen’s initial argument that
officials engaged in foreign policy-making are largely immune from public opinion.44
In a study of opinion and defense spending policy, for instance, Thomas Hartley and
Bruce Russett found “strong evidence consistent with the hypothesis that public
opinion did in fact influence government policy.
. . The influence of public opinion
Social Policy Making,” PS: Political Science and Politics 27, no. 1 (March 1994): 21-25. For
additional case studies see: Paul Burstein, “Bringing the Public Back In: Should Sociologists Consider
the Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy?” Social Forces 77, no. 1 (September 1998): 27-62;
Jacobs and Shapiro, “Public Opinion, Institutions, and Policy Making,” 9-10; Manza and Cook,
“Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 12-13.
42 Manza and Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 12, n. 6.
43
Burstein goes on to write that “sometimes the effect is statistically significant but perhaps of only
modest importance; sometimes it is very strong though perhaps not overwhelming; and sometimes the
effect is so strong that public opinion is clearly more important than any other variable - and all this is
true even after taking into account the impact of whatever other independent variables each study
includes.” “Bringing the Public Back In,” 41.
44
Bernard C. Cohen, The Public ’s Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston: Little Brown, 1973).
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was systematic over a penod of years .”45 This finding is replicated in various other
case studies of the relationship between opinion and foreign policy making 46
Journalistic Accounts. Finally, this conclusion is also prevalent in journalistic
accounts of decision-making
.
47
While outside the traditional rubric of empirical
social science research, these treatments tend to focus on the rapid and still growing
import of polling at all levels of American government and politics as evidence of a
significant relationship between opinion and policy-making. John Geer, for instance,
claims that the dramatic increase in access to opinion information has had an impact
on the behavior of political actors, making them more responsive to opinion “than
their less well informed counterparts .”48 In the last twenty years, this argument has
become common in the media. As a result, many candidates and officials have
become hypersensitive to the suggestion that they rely too heavily on polling and
“pander” to opinion . 49 In an effort to stave off criticism that may negatively impact
45
While significant and persistent, Hartley and Russett’s finding is actually smaller than Jencks’ who
in an earlier study concluded that the correlation between opinion and annual changes in military
spending was even higher. Hartley and Russett, “Public Opinion and the Common Defense,” 911-12;
Christopher Jencks, “Methodological Problems in Studying Military Keynesianism,” American
Journal ofSociology 90 (1985): 373-79.
46
For additional case studies see: Jacobs and Shapiro, “Public Opinion, Institutions, and Policy
Making,” 10; Manza and Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 13-14; Miroslav Nincic,
“A Sensible Public: New Perspectives on Popular Opinion and Foreign Policy,” Journal of Conflict
Resolution 36 (December 1992): 772-89.
47 Manza and Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 14-17.
48
John G. Geer, From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls: A Theory ofDemocratic Leadership (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996): 2.
49
The growth in polling and its widespread use, particularly at the presidential level, has contributed to
speculation in the media that candidates and officials frequently forgo leadership in favor of pandering.
While the extent of this is beyond the scope of this study, there is no shortage of examples. During the
Clinton administration, for instance, the New York Times ran an editorial deploring President Clinton’s
reliance on polls and suggesting that “polling has turned leaders into followers. . .
.
[T]here will never
be such a thing as greatness with a three-to-five point margin of error.” Similarly, Frank Lutz argued,
“Clinton does polls to decide what to do.” The Wall Street Journal declared, “Clinton uses polls not
just to promote his policies, but to decide them.” Finally, the Akron Beacon Journal ran an editorial
entitled “Foreign Poll-icy,” which began “[T]he name Stanley Greenberg may not be familiar to most
Americans. It should be. He is Bill Clinton’s pollster and for all intents and purposes he conducts the
country’s foreign policy.” Dowd, “Liberties: Leaders as Followers”; Lutz, quoted in Cannon, “Hooked
on Polls,” 2441; Frisby, “Clinton Seeks Strategic Edge,” A 16; Asher, Polling and the Public, 22. For
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their leadership images, many have taken steps to distance themselves from their own
polling operations
.
50
Contingency: Dependent Relationship
Unlike the large effects school,” contingency theory suggests that the impact
of opinion on policy depends on various factors, such as the nature of opinion,
differences in policy issues, and institutions. Contingency theory has its roots in the
work of V. O. Key who suggested early on that “the relationship between government
and public opinion is varied.” 1 One of the key findings supporting this contention
is that the degree of responsiveness does seem to vary depending on the nature of
opinion. Consequently, factors such as salience, the distribution, coherence, and
intensity of opinion may help determine the degree of responsiveness.
Some researchers have suggested, for example, that salience explains why
officials are more responsive to opinion in some instances rather than others . 52 The
more salient the issue, the more responsive officials are likely to be because the cost
of non-responsiveness increases exponentially
.
53 As Burstein concludes, “[t]he
similar arguments, see also: Shribman, “Leadership by the Numbers,” 67; Harris, “Policy and Politics
by the Numbers,”; Drew, Showdown
,
103; Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander
,
3-4, 302; Bill
Mclnturff and Lori Weigel, “Servants of the People: Political Leadership and the Public Voice,” Public
Perspective (July/August 2001): 32; Morris, Behind the Oval Office
,
583.
See chapter 1 for examples of how various presidents have attempted to distance themselves from
polling.
1
Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy
,
97.
‘ For a review of the importance of salience as a variable see Burstein, “The Impact of Public Opinion
on Public Policy,” 1, 4-5, 13, 18. See also, Barbara Hinckley, Stability and Change in Congress (New
York: Harper & Row, 1983); Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 7-8; Monroe,
“Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999,” 1-3; Shapiro and Jacobs, “The Relationship Between
Public Opinion and Public Policy,” 153; Burstein, Discrimination, Jobs, and Politics', Jacobs, The
Health ofNations', Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1994); Manza and Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 28.
Another variable that may have a similar impact on the degree of responsiveness is the distribution
of opinion. In this case responsiveness is likely to decrease when opinion is bimodal and there is little
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impact of opinion on policy is much more likely to be statistically significant, and to
be of substantial policy importance, on issues of greater salience.”54
In addition to the nature of opinion, another factor that may impact the degree
of opinion-policy congruence is the policy issue and domain. Fay Lomax Cook and
Edith Barrett, for instance, found that the influence of opinion on members of
Congress differs depending on the particular issue
.
55
Similarly, the overall structure
and character of a policy domain may also play a key role. Responsiveness is likely
to decrease, for instance, in domains with entrenched interest groups and established
policies; whereas it is likely to be higher in domains with weaker or fledgling
interests and new or emerging policy issues. Other characteristics of policy domains
that may impact the degree of responsiveness are the strength of social movements
exerting pressure from below and the size of the attentive public . 56
Researchers have also found that there are institutional reasons why levels of
responsiveness may vary. The nature of the institution in which policy is “made”, for
instance, can impact the degree of correspondence between opinion and policy.
Legislative members who are subject to periodic election tend to exhibit greater
responsiveness to public preferences than those who are appointed to the bench.
room for compromise, versus when it is unimodal. Geer, From Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls', Manza
and Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 28-29; Ruth A. Strickland and Marcia L.
Whicker, “Political and Socioeconomic Indicators of State Restrictiveness Toward Abortion,” Policy
Studies Journal 20 (1992): 598-620.
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Paul Burstein, “Social Movements and Public Policy,” In Marco Guigni, Doug McAdam, and
Charles Tilly, eds. How Social Movements Matter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999);
John Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (New York: Harper Collins, 1995): 148-49;
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Connection: Public Opinion and Social Policy (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1999).
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Similarly, differences between policy making at the local, state, and national levels
may impact responsiveness as well
.
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Small Effects: Insignificant Relationship
Despite three decades of empirical evidence showing a fairly significant
correlation between opinion and policy, an increasing number of scholars have
expressed skepticism about this conclusion. There are at least three schools of
thought that challenge this notion and argue to the contrary that opinion has relatively
little impact on policy . 58
American Voter Model: Incoherence. Some scholars have adopted the
general conclusions articulated in the classic American Voter study
.
59
Campbell,
Converse, Miller and Stokes’ research portrayed the average citizen as passive,
uninvolved in, unaware of, and uninterested in politics . 60 While this model sparked a
debate that has raged for more than forty years, its major claims remain largely
intact .
61
Despite numerous critiques, researchers have found little evidence to refute
57 Manza and Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 28; Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan
D. Jones, Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
58
There are other ideas that refute the “large effects” claims and are not reviewed in this section.
Some analysts, for instance, claim that public officials can and do deviate from public preferences
because they are largely autonomous. The incentives for deviation vary from an interest in responding
to the needs and desires of political activists over the mass public to strongly held policy preferences.
Not only is there little threat of backlash, but the dangers of “following” every shift in opinion make
this course of action attractive. See Manza and Cook, “Policy Responsiveness to Public Opinion,” 18-
19.
59
Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, The American Voter
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1960).
60
Nie, Verba, and Petrocik argue that despite the differences, several major studies published in that
time period presented a picture of the American electorate that was generally consistent with The
American Voter. See for instance: Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an
American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity
and Civil Liberties (New York: Wiley, 1955); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963); Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R.
Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979): 14.
61 Campbell et al., The American Voter, 538.
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its basic claims or to support competing notions, such as the idea that citizens have
become more sophisticated since the late 1950s. 62 The American Voter model is
significant because it challenges a major contention of the “large effects” school:
namely, that the American public has a significant impact on policy-making. If
citizens do not have coherent opinions, they cannot possibly influence policy-making
in any meaningful way.
Sources of Opinion. There are still others who question the sources of
opinion. Herbst, for instance, finds that public officials at the state level do not look to
polls; rather they tend to rely on constituent letters, interest group and media
representations of opinion. Moreover, she found that the majority of officials
considered these “indicators” of opinion more meaningful than surveys, which they
view with suspicion. 63
Less is known about the sources of opinion knowledge at the federal level.
Although in studies of foreign policy-making, Philip Powlick, Steven Kull and M.
Destler found that officials do not rely on polls, but the media and members of
Congress to assess opinion.
64
If political actors use sources other than polls to gauge
opinion, they may be relying on biased information. The danger is that this may lead
them to support policies that are not reflective of mass preferences.
62
Critiques of The American Voter model include, but are not limited to: Nie, Verba, and Petrocik, The
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Hite Manipulation and Management of Opinion. The most significant
challenge to the large effects” school comes from those who argue that even if the
public has consistent views and political actors rely on unbiased surveys to assess
them, opinion can still be managed, changed, or manipulated. As Kathleen McGraw
writes,
research providing support for... a systematic relationship between
public opinion and policymaking, such that public opinion exerts a
substantial influence on policy - is plentiful and increasingly sophisticated,
yielding a portrait of representation that is generally consistent with normative
theories of democratic responsiveness
.
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Nevertheless, what McGraw refers to as evidence of the “presence of democratic
responsiveness - public officials responding to the will of the people when
formulating policy” - does not preclude another possibility, that political actors can
“manage or manipulate” opinion in order to “move” it closer to their desired policy
goals .
66
There are several formulations of the management/manipulation argument.
Some like Benjamin Ginsberg argue that the increase in polling allows public
officials to “manage” citizen demands and prevent the full public discussion and
emergence of contentious politics that might otherwise erupt. He supports this
argument with evidence such as the government’s reaction to a federal conservation
program that was largely opposed in the South. According to Ginsberg, rather than
open the program to debate or engage directly with citizens’, the government used
64
Philip J. Powlick, “The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials,”
International Studies Quarterly 39 (1995): 427-52; Steven Kull and M. Destler, Misreading the
Public: The Myth of a New Isolationism (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1999).
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polling to pinpoint the root of the public’s concerns and then employed propaganda to
assuage them
.
67 He concludes that, “in essence, polling allowed officials a better
opportunity to anticipate, regulate, and manipulate popular attitudes .”68
Others have emphasized politician’s attempts to “manufacture consent” by
seeking public support for their policy initiatives
.
69
Samuel Kemell described this as
going public
. a class of activities that presidents engage in as they promote
themselves, and their policies before the American public .”70 According to Kemell,
presidents rely on various communication strategies such as press conferences, radio
and television addresses, interviews, personal appearances, in order to mobilize
opinion in support of his positions and increase his chances of success in Washington.
While Kemell’s work focuses specifically on presidential strategies, others have
expanded his thesis to examine the activities of public officials in other arenas, such
as the U.S. Congress .
71
More recently, Jacobs and Shapiro argue that far from being responsive to
public preferences, officials often seek to change opinion in order to find support for
favored policies. The benefits of changing rather than responding to opinion can be
enormous. This strategy allows officials to maintain a fairly high level of public
support, while at the same time pursuing policies that they and a small group of
activists, interest groups, and donors, favor. According to Jacobs and Shapiro,
66
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Timothy Cook, for instance, examines how other officials, particularly members of Congress, have
come to recognize the importance of seeking public support for their policy initiatives. See Timothy E.
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officials achieve this win-win situation by pursuing a strategy of “crafted talk”: using
polls to identify arguments that the public finds most appealing and then molding or
shaping opinion to support favored policies
.
72
While these are not the only formulations of the management/manipulation
argument they are the most compelling
.
73
All three suggest that a high degree of
correspondence may not be the result of responsiveness per se, but rather of elite
management or manipulation of opinion.
Current State of the Literature: Mixed Findings
A thorough review of the literature shows that, despite the amount and quality
of the work in this area, there is still little consensus on the nature and extent of
governmental responsiveness. As Manza and Cook note, “a considerable body of
research and theorizing about the impact of public opinion on policymaking.
. . has
produced decidedly mixed views.”74 Similarly Burstein argues that the
responsiveness literature is best characterized by widespread disagreement over basic
questions such as: “how much impact does public opinion have on public policy?”
and “have democratic governments been getting more responsive to public opinion or
less?”
75
Cook, Making Laws and Making News: Media Strategies in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989).
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It is also important to note that unlike the responsiveness model, which treats opinion as the
independent variable, Jacobs and Shapiro show that the relationship is more complex than that. Jacobs
and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander. See also, McGraw, “Manipulating Public Opinion,” 268-69.
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Burstein focuses on additional questions as well, such as: “How much is the impact of public
opinion on public policy enhanced by democratization?; How much does the impact of public opinion
on public policy increase as the importance of an issue to the public increases?; To what extent do
interest groups, social movement organizations, political parties, and political and economic elites
69
The implications of this lack of consensus should not be overlooked. Those
who find that the government is generally responsive tend to see this as a sign that the
democracy is healthy and thriving. Whereas those who find a lack of responsiveness
tend to argue that the system is in danger of collapse. As Burstein writes, “what
distinguishes those who believe democracy works well... from those who believe it
works badly is thus a disagreement over matters of degree: how much impact does
public opinion have on public policy?”76
Even more important in the context of this study, however, are the
implications of these findings as they relate to opinion use. Researchers working
within the “large effects school” have used findings showing a high degree of
correspondence as a basis for inferring that public officials tend to bow or pander to
opinion. Those working within the “small effects” school have argued to the contrary
that officials use polls primarily to manipulate or change opinion. Interestingly, few
researchers within the contingency school have focused on poll use or considered the
possibility that the impact of opinion on policy may be contingent on how officials
use poll data.
As this review shows, despite the enormous amounts of research in this area
over the last half decade, there has been surprisingly little direct focus on how elites
use opinion. Instead of studying use, researchers within the small and large effects
schools have been content to draw inferences about how officials use opinion. These
conclusions are suspect because they are based on research that is not designed to
influence policy even when opposed by public opinion?; How generalizable are our conclusions about
these relationships across issues and polities (nations and subnational political units)?” “The Impact of
Public Opinion on Public Policy,” 2-4, 7, 11-12, 16-18.
76
Ibid., 3.
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examine use directly. A high degree of correspondence between opinion and policy
outcomes does not support the conclusion that officials pander to opinion, because it
cannot rule out other possibilities, namely elite manipulation or non-use. Similarly,
the fact that modem presidents engage in activities to promote themselves and their
policies, for instance, does not support the notion that they primarily use polls to
manipulate or change opinion because it fails to consider that they may use survey
data in other ways as well.
This review also highlights another problem that is relevant to this study.
Much of the responsiveness research does not meet the basic criterion of non-
spuriousness. While a number of studies find high degrees of congruence between
opinion and policy, this may be the result of unexamined ‘third’ variables. None of
the methods currently used can, as Alan Monroe notes, “rule out the possibility that
some other variables may have caused the apparent relationship between opinion and
policies .”
77
Elite control of the news media is, as Monroe suggests, just one additional
factor that may be responsible for the relationship between opinion and policy.
Another of direct relevance to this study is how public officials use opinion. Just as
elite control of the news media may be in part responsible for the relationship
between opinion and policy, so too may elite use opinion. If officials use polls to
pander, craft rhetoric, or legitimize, for instance, this may have a profound impact on
the nature of the relationship between opinion and policy and the extent of
governmental responsiveness.
71
Agenda
The current state of the literature in this area underscores the need for new
approaches designed to understand the relationship between opinion and policy-
making and the nature of governmental responsiveness. One such approach is to
examine how officials use opinion data. Consequently, one of the primary goals of
this study is to show that how officials use opinion is important not only on its face,
but because it can aid in addressing some of the primary questions raised in the
responsiveness literature, namely: how does opinion impact policy-making? And
what is the nature and extent of governmental responsiveness?
The following chapter focuses on how sociologists and political scientists
have examined use. It then builds on this literature to define and develop several
models of poll use. The subsequent chapters apply these models to several cases of
policy and decision-making during the Clinton administration, the most recent White
House for which we have a complete record.
77
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CHAPTER 4
DEFINITIONS AND MODELS OF OPINION USE:
LESSONS FROM THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE APPLICATION
More than forty years ago, V.O. Key Jr. published what many still consider the
preeminent work on public opinion and American democracy.
1
Because the study of
public opinion at that time was focused on methodological issues, sophisticated data
analysis, and the collection of facts and figure, Key expressed concern that “relevance”
was being sacrificed on the altar of method.” He urged researchers to broaden their
focus. In particular, he advised them to “view public opinion from the other end of the
telescope - to focus not only on the public and the message they send, but on elites and
the messages they receive/ According to Key, opinion matters because elites take it
seriously.
3 As he wrote, “[t]he missing piece of our puzzle is the elite element in the
opinion system.”4 Consequently, he ended his monumental work by stating that until we
assess what types of messages “elites” receive, how they learn about and assess opinion,
how they use and respond to opinion, and with what effect, we will not understand the
linkage between popular opinion and democracy. 5
As the previous chapter showed, however, few scholars have heeded Key’s
advice. There is still very little research on the elite element of the opinion system and
Ann G. Serow, W. Wayne Shannon, and Everett C. Ladd, eds., The American Polity Reader (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1990): 385; Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy.
2
Gunn, ‘“Public Opinion’ in Modem Political Science,” 112-17.
3 Serow et al., The American Polity, 385.
4
Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, 536.
Key’s focus on the elite element of the opinion system and his insistence on more research regarding how
officials use and respond to opinion is in keeping with his definition of public opinion as: “those opinions
held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed.” Gunn, “‘Public Opinion’,”! 12; V.O.
73
the use of opinion specifically. The dearth of research in this area is not difficult to
understand. Despite methodological advances, it remains as difficult today as it was
when Key was writing to discern “what goes on in the minds of public men as they
ruminate about the weight to be given to public opinion in governmental decisions.”6
While these methodological difficulties may help explain why researchers have
shied away from these questions, several scholars have echoed Key’s concerns about the
lack of research in this area. As Dom Bonafede writes,
Besides published reports of outrageous pollster fees confirming that presidents
purchase public opinion data and pollster analysis on a yearly basis, we
do not know how presidents and their staff utilize this source of information. 7
Similarly, Diane Heith argues that while, “[i]nterviews with the president, his staff, and
the pollsters hint at the possibilities for poll usage, ... several nagging questions persist:
How do poll data ‘focus discussions,’ who uses them, and when are they used?”8
Most recently, Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro confirmed that there has been
“relatively little investigation of how politicians actually use polls and interact with
pollsters.”
9
Key was the first to recognize this gap in the literature. He was also, to a certain
extent, prophetic. In the early 1960’s, political polling was still in its infancy and not
widely utilized. In the ensuing years survey research has grown exponentially. This
development makes the question of how officials use poll data that much more important
today.
Key, “Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy,” Virginia Quarterly Review 37 (Autumn 1961), 488-
512; Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy, 24, 24n, 535-38.
6
Key, Public Opinion and the Decay of Democracy,” 490.
7 Dom Bonafede quoted in Heith, “Staffing the White House Public Opinion Apparatus,” 166.
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Speculation, Inference, and Opinion Use
Popular Literature. The increase in polling and the lack of research regarding
how it is used have not been without consequence. With little direction from social
scientists, journalists witnessing the growth in polling have been forced to speculate
about how it is used. Journalistic accounts of poll use tend to gravitate towards the
untested notion that politicians “pander” to opinion
.
10
In an effort to protect their image
as principled leaders, politicians have responded to this charge in several ways.
Presidents from Kennedy to Bush Jr. have attempted to both hide and deny their use of
polls .
1
1
When their ability to conceal the use of pollsters and polling began to wane in
the glare of the media spotlight, Clinton and Bush Jr. adopted a new strategy. They
attempted to counteract charges of pandering by claiming that while they use polls, they
do not use them to follow opinion, but rather to determine the best way to market their
policies. The problem, however, is that there is little empirical research to support their
claims.
10
While the full extent of these claims is beyond the scope of this study, the following examples are
instructive. During the Clinton administration, for instance, the New York Times ran an editorial deploring
President’s Clinton’s reliance on polls and suggesting that “polling has turned leaders into followers
There will never be such a thing as greatness with a three-to-five point margin of error.” Similarly, Frank
Lutz argued, ‘ Clinton does polls to decide what to do.” The Wall Street Journal declared, “Clinton uses
polls not just to promote his policies, but to decide them.” Finally, the Akron Beacon Journal ran an
editorial entitled “Foreign Poll-icy,” which began: “[T]he name Stanley Greenberg may not be familiar to
most Americans. It should be. He is Bill Clinton’s pollster and for all intents and purposes he conducts the
country’s foreign policy.” Dowd, “Liberties: Leaders as Followers,” 17; Lutz, quoted in Cannon, “Hooked
on Polls,” 2441; Frisby, “Clinton Seeks Strategic Edge with Opinion Polls,” A 16; Asher, Polling and the
Public
,
22. For similar arguments, see also: Shribman, “Leadership by the Numbers,” 67; Harris, “Policy
and Politics by the Numbers,”; Drew, Showdown
,
103; Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, 3-4,
302; Mclnturff and Weigel, “Servants of the People,” 32; Morris, Behind the Oval Office
,
583; Geer, From
Tea Leaves to Opinion Polls, 2.
1
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See Chapter 1 for a more complete discussion of attempts by several presidents to hide and deny their use
of public opinion polling.
12
See Chapter 1 for a more complete discussion of how President Clinton and President George W. Bush
have denied pandering and argued instead that they use polls primarily to “craft rhetoric” or sell favored
policies.
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Academic Literature. It is not only journalists who have been prone to speculate
about how public officials use opinion. In the absence of direct measures, researchers
within the large effects school have relied on correspondence studies to draw inferences
about opinion use
.
13
These studies are designed to measure the degree of correlation
between opinion and policy, not how opinion is used. As a result, none of these methods
“can completely rule out the possibility that some other variables may have caused any
apparent relationship between opinions and policies .” 14 Nor can they rule out other
possibilities, such as manipulation or non-use. Consider, for instance, the contention that
polls are used to help determine marketing strategies. If accurate, this would be a case in
which opinion and policy outcomes might appear consistent even though the data was
used not to pander, but rather to mold or change opinion . 15
Renewed Interest in Use. While the correspondence research is not a sound basis
for drawing inferences about poll use, it is partly responsible for renewed interest in this
area. This research has generally shown a high degree of correlation between opinion
and policy. Recently, however, a small number of scholars have identified a decline in
correspondence. As Jacobs and Shapiro write, “the influence of public opinion on
There has been a tendency to use studies showing a high degree of correlation between opinion and
policy outcomes as a basis for claiming that politicians tend to follow public opinion. In their study on
“dynamic representation,” for instance, James Stimson, Michael MacKuen, and Robert Erikson conclude
that public officials regularly bow to opinion. They liken the behavior of politicians to “antelopes in an
open field” and suggest that “[wjhen politicians perceive public opinion change, they adapt their behavior
to please their constituency.” Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson, “Dynamic Representation,” 545, 559.
14
Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1980-1993,” 12.
15
Just as those within the large effects school have used this research to draw inferences about how opinion
is used, so too, have those working within the small effects school. Like their counterparts, these scholars
have used indirect measures as a basis for concluding that far from pandering, officials use poll data to try
to manipulate or change opinion.
16
In several reviews of the correspondence literature, for instance, Jacobs and Shapiro, find that “[t]he
overall evidence from these very different research traditions has increasingly suggested that public opinion
has had a substantial impact on policy making in the United States.” Similarly, they note, “[OJverall, in our
judgment, these studies tend to show that public opinion has affected policy making in the United States.”
And once again, “[WJhat is striking is that these very different research approaches have led to very similar
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government policy is less than it has been in the past.” 17 To support their argument they
cite “a growing body of evidence” that suggests “since the 1970s the policy decisions of
presidents and members of Congress have become less responsive to the substantive
policy preferences of average Americans.” 18
In a recent review of the correspondence literature, Paul Burstein challenges this
claim. Burstein argues that Jacobs and Shapiro do not provide enough “evidence to back
up” their argument. 1
J
Alan Monroe’s replication of his earlier consistency research is the
only study that “clearly supports]” their argument. 20 In addition to Monroe’s work,
Jacobs and Shapiro cite only two other studies —one by Stephen Ansolaberhere, James
Snyder, and Charles Stewart, that contains no direct measure of public opinion or policy,
and their own work, which they describe as “preliminary.”21 Consequently, Burstein
findings - sizeable statistical relationships between measures of mass public preferences and policy
making.” “The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Public Policy,” 150, 161; “Public Opinion,
Institutions, and Policy Making,” 9. See also the previous chapter of this study for a more complete
discussion of the extent of the “large effects” argument.
Italics in original. At the same time, however, they acknowledge that they had previously argued that
opinion has a substantial impact on policy. Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don ’t Pander, xvi, 360 n. 2.
For a sampling of these earlier claims see, for instance: Jacobs and Shapiro, “Public Opinion, Institutions,
and Policy Making”; Shapiro and Jacobs, “The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Public Policy”;
Page and Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on Policy.”
18
Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, 4.
19
Burstein, “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy,” 17.
20
In updating his research, Monroe finds that the consistency between opinion and policy declined from 63
percent in the 1960s and 1970s to 55 percent in the 1980s and 1990s. Monroe also finds that there was a
slight decline (to 53 percent) in the period between 1992-1999. However, several factors lead him to
basically discount this drop and conclude that “opinion-policy consistency has been lower since 1980 than
in the preceding twenty years, [but] there has been little or no change since 1980.” For a more extensive
discussion of his findings, see Monroe, “Public Opinion and Public Policy, 1960-1999,” 6-8; Burstein,
“The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy,” 17.
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Ansolabehere et al., compare congressional district votes for president as an indirect measure of ideology
and congressional roll call votes as opposed to actual policy decisions. Stephen D. Ansolabehere, James
M. Snyder, and Charles Stewart III, “Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections, ” American Journal of
Political Science 45 (2001): 136-59. Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “Debunking the
Pandering Politician Myth,” Public Perspective, 8 (April/May 1997): 3-5. See also Jacobs and Shapiro,
Politicians Don ’t Pander, 4 n. 3, n. 5, where they cite a published study of opinion and policy on a single
issue (intervention in Bosnia), an unpublished lecture, and a text on state politics. They also point to an
earlier study by Page and Shapiro that contains data only through 1979 and thus does not support their
claim of a decrease in responsiveness since the 1980s. Page and Shapiro, “Effects of Public Opinion on
Policy”; Burstein, “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy,” 16-18.
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concludes that the data still show “more evidence of increase than decline.
. . At this point
there is little evidence that responsiveness has declined.”22
Despite Burstein’s well-founded reservations, the “decline in responsiveness”
argument has had one important effect: it prompted Jacobs and Shapiro, two of the most
prolific scholars working in this area today, to begin focusing on how officials use
opinion in policy-making. As they note, the fact that the decline appears to have occurred
at the same time that there was a dramatic increase in political polling raises a profound
question: How do public officials use poll data? If there has been a decline in congruence
and opinion no longer appears to “drive policy decisions, why do political leaders
continue to stock a veritable warehouse of information on public opinion?”23
Problems of Conceptualization. Jacobs and Shapiro address this question in their
recent book Politicians Don 7 Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of
Democratic Responsiveness. As the title indicates, the major goals of the book are to
account for the decline in correspondence and dispel the myth of pandering. They are
correct that there is little empirical evidence to support the claim that politicians regularly
pander to opinion. But the study is flawed to the extent that they never define what they
mean by “opinion use.” Moreover, instead of considering all the ways in which elites use
opinion data, they focus on two - pandering and crafted rhetoric. Consequently, while
their study goes a long way towards moving beyond the singular notion of pandering and
does a good job of focusing attention on the use of poll data, it suffers from a basic
problem of conceptualization.
22
Burstein, “The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy,” 16-18.
23
Lawrence R. Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “The Crisis in Polling.” Available:
http://www.polsci.umn,edu/faculty/ljacobs/rollcall.html (accessed May 1 1, 1999). These findings have also
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Another prominent scholar who has recently focused on opinion use is Susan
Herbst. Herbst interviewed state-level policy makers to determine if and how polls are
used in policy development. While she concludes that polls are not used, her findings are
suspect because she never defines what she means by “use.” Instead she allows
respondents to supply their own definition, leaving open the real possibility that various
respondents may define “poll use” in different ways. It is akin to asking a respondent if
they are active in politics without first defining what it means to be politically active.
The findings themselves do not meet basic standards of validity because respondents may
have different ideas about what it means to be politically active.
Lessons From the Sociology of Knowledge Application
The fact that both of these studies suffer from the same basic problem of
conceptualization is not surprising. Nearly thirty years ago, a small group of sociologists
studying how policy-makers use social science research confronted a similar dilemma.
These researchers recognized that, while mundane and challenging, defining “use” is an
essential first step towards understanding the intersection between research and policy
making. 25
Political scientists examining opinion use can find some guidance in this body of
research, known as the “sociology of knowledge application.” This field emerged in the
1970s amidst growing interest in applied sociology. 26 Burkart Holzner, the “father” of
prompted researchers to ask other questions, such as: what accounts for variations in responsiveness over
time? See for instance, Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don ’t Pander, 5.
24
Herbst, Reading Public Opinion.
25
Carol Weiss suggests that, “how much use governmental decision-makers make of social research is
largely a matter of definition.” Weiss, Using Social Research in Public Policy Making, 213.
2(1
Burkart Holzner, “The Sociology of Applied Knowledge,” Sociological Symposium, no. 21 (Winter
1978): 8-19; For a more complete discussion of applied sociology and the sociology of knowledge
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knowledge application, differentiates it from both “applied sociology” and the more
obscure sociology of knowledge.”27 He defines the former as “the use of sociological
knowledge and method for the purpose of solving someone’s practical problem. The
result of the sociologist’s work is useful information and sometimes advice .”28 Whereas
the ‘ classical sociology of knowledge” is a broad intellectual tradition “which studies the
social sources and social consequences of knowledge - how, for instance, social
organization shapes both the content and structure of knowledge or how various social,
cultural, political conditions shield people from truth.”29
To the contrary, the sociology of knowledge application is the “sociological study
of knowledge production and use [i.e.] sociology of knowledge turned upside down .”30
Whereas the classical sociology of knowledge is “concerned with the social basis of
intellectual production, a sociology of knowledge application would be concerned with
the social consequences of knowledge. It would investigate the conditions under which
knowledge is produced, diffused and applied .”31 Unlike its more esoteric predecessor,
the sociology of knowledge application focuses not on the social bases of belief, but
rather on the production, dissemination, use, and “consequences of knowledge.”32
Carol Weiss was among the first to suggest this field may have implications
beyond sociology. As she noted, “perhaps it should be an interdisciplinary application,
application, see Holzner and Marx, Knowledge Applications-, Weiss, “Broadening the Concept of Research
Utilization,” 20-33.
27
“It has been argued that the concept of knowledge is to sociology as the notion of attitude is to
psychology: a notion so central that, in many ways, it is the foundation for the entire discipline.” “The
Sociology of Knowledge,” A Sociological Tour Through Cyberspace
http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/knowledg.html (accessed August 8, 2000).
28
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since it might have psychological, economic, and political science dimensions as well .”33
The “political science dimensions” are evident in Weiss’s research because she
concentrates on the production, diffusion, and utilization of social science research in the
public policy arena. Weiss’s work includes a massive study of the “usability of social
research in mental health decision making at the national level .”34 Another notable study
in this area is Nathan Caplan’s survey of federal decision makers, which was designed to
find out what social research was used, by whom, when, for what purposes, and with
what effect. In addition, Karin Knorr conducted a similar study of how governmental
officials in Vienna employ research in their daily activities
.
36
While this literature speaks to the use of all forms of social science research, the
findings can be applied to studies that focus on a single method such as polling. Contrary
to some working within the field, I argue that efforts to understand research use are
hampered by a failure to focus on various techniques in isolation from one another
.
37
Despite their similarities, social science techniques differ in ways that are critical to any
discussion of use. A unique characteristic of survey research, for instance, is that it
produces, specific types of data: facts, descriptions of respondents, subjective attitudes,
orientations, past and prospective behavior . 38 While often overlooked, this is important
33
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International Social Science Journal 28, no. 1 (1976): 187-94.
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because the type of information produced, impacts, limits, and to some extent dictates
how this data is used.
Nevertheless, the knowledge application literature is relevant to this study for
three reasons. First, it underscores the challenge and necessity of defining use. I quote
Weiss at length, because she has articulated this forcefully:
Much of the sogginess in the whole discussion of policy use
of social research derives from conceptual ambiguities. Upon
examination, research utilization is an extraordinary complicated
phenomenon... It is now apparent how much use government
decision-makers make of social research is largely a matter of
definition.
. . The extent of research hingefs] on the conceptualization
of “use”. 40
In addition, this research contains numerous discussions of how sociologists have defined
use. With some modification, these definitions can aid political scientists engaged in the
process of defining opinion use. Finally, the knowledge application work includes several
models of research use that can serve as the basis for models of opinion use.
The knowledge application research informs the remainder of this chapter, which
is devoted to defining use and developing several models of poll use. The goal is to
address the question that Key raised so many years ago - how does popular opinion
impact policy and government? And it does so by focusing on what Key referred to as
“the missing piece of the puzzle,” the “elite element in the opinion system.” Once public
39
Political scientists should not rely on sociologists to address these issues because, as Paul Burstem notes,
“[T]he struggle for democracy, central to Western politics for hundreds of years, is predicated upon the
belief that democratic institutions give citizens considerable powers over their government. Whether this
belief is correct is a key question in the study of democratic politics. .
.
[however] this question is
neglected by sociologists who examine the determinants of public policy; they neither address theories of
democratic responsiveness nor assess the impact of public opinion on public policy. This neglect is
problematic for two reasons: there is much evidence that public opinion strongly influences public policy,
and there is reason to believe that adding public opinion to sociologists’ empirical analyses of policy
change would undermine some of their conclusions about the influence of other factors.” Burstein,
“Bringing the Public Back In,” 27-62.
82
officials become cognizant of opinion, how do they apply this knowledge in policy and
decision-making?
Defining Survey Research and Public Opinion. Weiss argues that it is important
not only to define use, but “social scientific research” as well. As she notes, “the
extent of research use hinges on the conceptualization of ‘use’ and ‘research. ”’41
In the context of this study the terms “survey research” and “public opinion” do
not present as many conceptual difficulties as “use”.42 The focus here is on a particular
technique of data collection, survey research. The terms “survey research,” “public
opinion polling,” and its variants are used to refer to a “data collection technique that
involves a questionnaire administered to a group [sample] of individuals”.43 While the
term poll is sometimes used to refer to studies done by commercial and media outlets,
and “survey” is reserved for more comprehensive academic and governmental studies,
the terms are often used interchangeably
.
44
The focus on polling is not meant to suggest that it is the only way political actors
gain knowledge of mass preferences. As Herbst notes, survey research is just one of the
ways that public officials can assess opinion. Others include: elections, media and
interest group representations
.
45
Nor is the focus on survey research meant to imply that
this technique should be used in policy making. In short, I am not advocating the broad-
based use of polling. The policy arena is “a busy place,” and opinion data is just one type
of information that plays a role in policy-making. While survey research data “does not
40
Weiss, Using Social Research in Public Policy Making
,
11,213.
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Traugott and Lavrakas, The Voter’s Guide to Election Polls, 2.
44
Ibid., 2. In addition, Jacobs and Shapiro note that they “treat the terms ‘poll’ and ‘survey’ as synonyms,
recognizing that the quality of research associated with them can vary.” See for instance, Jacobs and
Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, 359 n. 3.
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rise up and carry all before it, neither is it totally irrelevant... what happens between
these extremes,” how officials use opinion data is the focus of this study
.
46
Similarly, the perennial challenge of defining “public opinion” does not arise
because the focus is on how data produced by survey research is used . 47 While the goal
of survey research is to measure the opinions, attitudes, beliefs, or behavior of a
representative sample, by focusing on the use of polling data, we are spared the difficult
task of defining public opinion
.
48
Defining Opinion Use
Unfortunately, the term use is not as easily dealt with . 47 A common refrain in
the sociological literature is that numerous and conflicting definitions of this term have
hampered work in this area/ The application research discusses several important
components of any definition of use, two of which are crucial to this study.
First, “use” can be said to have occurred regardless of whether the attempt to
apply poll-based knowledge is successful . 51 Use is not restricted only to those instances
45
Herbst, Reading Public Opinion, 152-64.
46
Weiss, Using Social Research in Public Policy Making, 1
.
Throughout the study the terms “opinion,” “public opinion,” and “mass preferences,” are used
interchangeably or as synonyms.
As Erikson and Tedin note, “[PJublic opinion is notoriously difficult to define.” Erikson and Tedin,
American Public Opinion, 6-8. Herbst addresses some of the difficulties associated with defining “public
opinion” and concludes that “the meaning of opinion is contingent.” Herbst, Reading Public Opinion, 1-3;
13-45. See also Herbst, Numbered Voices. For a sampling of some of the potential definitions of public
opinion, see Childs, Public Opinion -, Ulrich Strauss, “Some Definitions of Public Opinion,” in Public
Opinion and Propaganda, ed. Daniel Katz, Dorwin Cartwright, Samuel Eldersveld, and Alfred McGlung
Lee (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954), 50-51; Winkler, “Public Opinion,” 1031-33.
I follow those working within the sociology of knowledge application school who tend to use the terms
“utilization,” “use,” and “usage” interchangeably. When citing authors, I “have been faithful to their
particular conventions.” Karapin, “What’s the Use of Social Science?,” 261 n. 1.
0
Karapin, “What’s the Use of Social Science?,” 237-39; Judith K. Larsen, “Knowledge Utilization:
Current Issues,” in The Knowledge Cycle, ed. Robert F. Rich (London: Sage, 1981), 49; Laura C. Leviton
and Edward F. X. Hughes, “Research on the Utilization of Evaluations: A Review and Synthesis,”
Evaluation Review 5, no. 4 (1981): 525-48.
51
Caplan et al., The Use ofSocial Science Knowledge, xii.
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in which the application of knowledge results in the successful passage, implementation,
adoption, or enactment of a particular piece of legislation, policy, or governmental action,
or serves to guide a particular decision.
Second, “use” must be differentiated from “production”, “dissemination”,
transmission
,
and “application”. As Caplan, Morrison, and Stambaugh note, “in the
literature dealing with utilization, certain important conceptual discriminations are
ignored, and others are not made explicit, particularly differences between such terms as
dissemination, utilization, and application.”52
The knowledge application literature conceptualizes the interaction between
social research and governmental decision-making in terms of three interconnected
spheres or “loosely coupled systems.” Table 4.1 illustrates these systems: research
production, transmission, and policy-making. 53
Table 4.1 : Three Interconnected Spheres: From Research Production to Policy-
Making54
Research “production” refers to the “system that produces” survey research data.
It is composed of pollsters, or those practicing survey research and generating data. The
data is then transmitted or disseminated via the “linkage system” to the “policy-setting
52
Ibid.
53
Weiss, Social Science Research and Decision-Making, 16-23.
54
Ibid., 16, 23.
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and administrative system that potentially uses” the research “composed of government
agencies and officials [elected and appointed] who make consequential decisions” based
in whole or part on this data. Consequently, “dissemination” and “transmission” are
synonyms that refer to instances in which the decision-maker receives data.55
As Table 4.2 shows, the Bush administration’s production and linking system is a
good example of this type of three-sphere system at work. The administration relies on
two principal pollsters who are under contract to conduct surveys for the White House —
Jan van Lohuizen of Voter/Consumer Research and Fred Steeper of Market Strategies.
On occasion, the White House also purchases data from “boutique polling firms” as
well.
56
Like many of his predecessors, George W. Bush has developed strict guidelines
for the transmission and dissemination of polling data. Lohuizen and Steeper report to
the President’s Chief of Polling, Matthew Dowd who presents the findings to the
administration via Senior White House advisor Karl Rove. Rove is responsible for
reporting the results to the President and other key staff members during weekly strategy
meetings.
Table 4.2: Bush Administration’s Three Interactive Spheres: From Research
Production to Policy-Making
55
Ibid., 16.
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This study concentrates on the later sphere, the point after which the information
was produced and transmitted to potential users. It is at this point, however, that the
distinction between “use” and “application” becomes crucial. Differentiating between
these terms raises a question: should “use” be restricted to instances when a decision-
maker attempts to apply the data to a policy-relevant issue or decision?
There are essentially two options - one entails an attempt at application, the other
does not . 57 It is possible to argue that use occurs only when a politician attempts to apply
knowledge gained from the data. In short, use entails an attempt at application or an
effort to produce an impact, influence or modify a policy, program, or decision. Some
argue to the contrary, that use occurs merely when decision-makers are familiar with the
information. While they may not attempt to apply the knowledge, they are familiar with
the information and reserve the right to apply it at some point in the future . 58
The way in which this problem is dealt with has an impact on how opinion use is
defined and measured. As a result, the ramifications of adopting the conservative
definition (wherein use entails an attempt at application) should not be underestimated or
ignored. This is particularly important given the findings within the knowledge
application literature, which show that more diffuse and circuitous forms of use that do
not entail the application of knowledge may be the mode . 59
56 Dowd, “Addicted to Addition”; “Devil in the Details.”
57
Caplan et al., The Use ofSocial Science Knowledge
,
xi-xii; Caplan, “Social Research and National
Policy,” 1 87-88; Weiss, Social Science Research and Decision-Making-, Weiss, Using Social Science
Research.
58
See for instance, Caplan et al., The Use ofSocial Science Knowledge.
59
See for instance, ibid; Caplan, “Social Research and National Policy”; Weiss, Using Social Science
Research-, Weiss, Social Science Research and Decision-Making-, Weiss, “Broadening the Concept”; Carol
Weiss, “Research and Policy-Making: A Limited Partnership,” in The Use and Abuse ofSocial Science, ed.
Frank Heller (London: Sage, 1986), 214-35.
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Nevertheless, Karapin makes a compelling argument against this approach. As he
argues, definitions that fail to "distinguish between policy-makers’ thinking which affects
their organizational tasks and that which does not” are problematic because “in the
absence of any way of measuring it, the definition[s] are very vague and tend to exclude
the important possibility that the research is not utilized at all.”60
The three most widely accepted definitions of “research use” are those by Caplan,
Morrison, and Stambaugh; Leviton and Hughes; and Rich. 61 With some modification,
they serve as the basis for the following definitions. The definitions differ primarily in
terms of the issue of application - whereas the first requires an attempt at application, the
second does not.
Definition 1. Application as a Component of Use. Those adopting the more
conservative notion that use does not occur unless an official attempts to apply the
information would probably be more comfortable with a definition that meets the
following criteria. 6 ' First, the potential policy making implications of the data must be
clear. Second, use can be said to have occurred regardless of whether the attempt at
application, or the attempt to produce an impact, influence or modify a policy, program
or decision, is successful. Third, while the process is by no means linear, survey research
use should be differentiated from production, transmission and dissemination. Fourth,
use occurs when a policy maker is familiar with the research data and attempts to apply
the knowledge to some policy-relevant issue or decision (i.e. by application). Finally,
60
Karapin, “What’s the Use of Social Science?,” 238.
61
Caplan et al., The Use ofSocial Science Knowledge ; Caplan, “Social Research and National Policy”;
Robert F. Rich, “’’Uses of Social Science Information by Federal Bureaucrats: Knowledge for Action
Versus Knowledge for Understanding,” in Using Social Research in Public Policy Making
,
ed. Carol Weiss
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977), 199-212; Leviton and Hughes, “Research on the Utilization of
Evaluations.”
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survey research information must make a difference to the actions or behavior of the
policy-maker.
Given these criteria, survey research use can be defined as instances in which a
decision-maker receives policy or decision-relevant poll data (i.e., by dissemination or
transmission) and attempts “to put that knowledge to use, even if this effort to produce an
impact (i.e., by application) is unsuccessful.” Thus, use of survey research knowledge
occurs when a decision-maker is “familiar with relevant research, gives careful
consideration to and attempts to employ that knowledge to some policy-relevant issue” or
professional decision.
63
Definition 2: Use Without Application
. The second definition differs from the
first insofar as it pertains to the issue of application. In this case, any instance of survey
research use should meet the following criteria. 64 First, the potential policy making
implications of the data must be clear. Second, survey research use can be said to have
occurred regardless of whether there is an attempt at application. Third, while the
process is by no means linear, survey research use is what occurs loosely after the
production, transmission, and dissemination of data. Fourth, use occurs when a decision-
maker is at least somewhat familiar with the research findings. The official may not
attempt to apply the knowledge either immediately or at all, but reserves the right to do
so in the future. Finally, the data must make a difference to either the thoughts or actions
of the decision-maker.
62
Karapin, “What’s the Use of Social Science?,” 237-39; Leviton and Hughes, “Research on the Utilization
of Evaluations.”
63
Caplan et al., The Use ofSocial Science Knowledge, xii.
64
Karapin, “What’s the Use of Social Science?,” 237-39; Leviton and Hughes, “Research on the Utilization
of Evaluations.”
89
Given this second set of criteria, survey use is defined as instances in which the
decision-maker receives policy or decision-relevant survey data (i.e., by dissemination or
transmission). The decision-maker may not attempt to apply the information to impact a
policy-relevant issue or professional decision either immediately or at all. But
nevertheless, reserves the right to do so in the future
.
65
Models of Opinion Use
While mundane, defining “use” is an essential first step in the process of
understanding how public officials use public opinion. The sociology literature makes
clear that it is possible to develop models and study “research use” only after the term has
been fully defined
.
66
The following section builds on this research to construct several
models of opinion use . 67 These models differ from those in the knowledge application
school to the extent that the object is to develop models of poll use as opposed to models
of research use. The goal is to simplify and approximate how White House officials use
polls in policymaking. Once constructed, case studies will be used to test the utility of the
models.
bS
Caplan et al., The Use ofSocial Science Knowledge, xii.
Carol Weiss, for instance, discusses both conceptualizing use and develops six potential models of
“research use”: instrumental, knowledge-driven, interactive, political ammunition, miscellaneous, and
conceptualization. To the contrary, this chapter describes eight models of opinion use. Using Social
Research in Policy Making
,
11-16.
The “models” should be seen as pictorial and verbal abstractions, simplifications of, and approximations
to, the reality of survey research use during policy/decision-making. The development of pictorial, verbal,
and algebraic models has been the goal of many political and other social scientists attempting to abstract
features of the reality they are discussing. One of the most famous models in political science is David
Easton’s simplified model of a political system. For instance, Easton’s model is commonly cited in
introductory political science texts. See for instance, Thomas M. Magstadt and Peter M. Schotten,
Understanding Politics: Ideas, Institutions, and Issues, 5 th ed. (New York: Worth Publishers, 1999), 15-16.
Others include various models of presidential power, congressional behavior, and realignment that are
commonly referred to in the literature. The knowledge application literature includes several models of
research utilization, which inform this discussion. Weiss, Using Social Science Research, 11-17.
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Table 4.3 lists six models of opinion use that meet the criteria associated with the
first, more conservative definition of use: instrumental (problem solving), pandering,
parameter setting, rhetorical, legitimizing, and de-legitimizing. The table also includes
two types of use that meet the criteria associated with the second definition: reinforcing
and enlightenment.
Table 4.3: Models of Opinion Use
Application Models Non-application Models
(Use Entails Application - Use Without Application
Definition 1) (Definition 2)
Instrumental (problem solving) Reinforcing
Pandering Enlightenment
Parameter Setting
Rhetorical
Legitimizing
De-legitimizing
These models are restricted in several ways. First, while the terms ‘decision-
maker,’ ‘policy-maker,’ ‘political actor,’ ‘politician,’ ‘elites,’ ‘political elite,’ and ‘public
official’ are used interchangeably to refer to elected or appointed public officials who
use survey data, this is not meant to imply these individuals necessarily dictate or
determine policy, but rather that they are in policy influencing positions. 68
Second, while the decisions under consideration are of sufficient scope to merit
the term ‘policy’ or ‘decision-making’, there is no attempt to venture a formal definition
of these terms. The type of policy-making under consideration here has at least three
68
This study focuses specifically on the “use” of opinion in the White House. Nevertheless, the models
themselves are also applicable to officials in policy-influencing positions who operate in executive or
legislative settings. Caplan, “Social Research and National Policy,” 187.
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features: it is policy-making by elected or appointed officials in the White House
concerning matters of import on which public opinion exists
.
69
The sociology literature suggests that research may be “used” by policy-makers
at any point in a continuum of activities,” including “policy definition, analysis, design,
implementation, reinforcement, and evaluation .”70 The types of use considered here are
situated within the policy-formulation stage. The decision to focus on policy design is not
meant to endorse a “process” view of policy-making, imply a linear order to policy-
making, or suggest that there is a clear demarcation between various stages
.
71
Moreover,
the focus on policy development should not take away from the fact that opinion can also
be used during other stages in the policy process . 72
While the focus here is on developing models of opinion use, this should not
obscure the fact that there are likely many instances of non-use or situations in which a
policy-maker may disregard opinion altogether.
69
Again, it is important to reiterate that while this study focuses specifically on the “use” of opinion in the
White House, the models themselves are also applicable to officials in both executive and legislative
settings. Weiss, Using Social Research in Public Policy Making, 1.
™The stages in the policy-making process have been described in various ways. For instance, Cohen
describes the stages as: agenda-setting, formulation, legitimation, implementation, and evaluation. For a
description and discussion of the process, see James E. Anderson, Public Policymaking: An Introduction
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1990); Brannen, “Research and Social Policy,” 157-58; Jeffrey Cohen,
Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policy-Making : The Public and the Policies That Presidents
Choose (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997), 27-9; Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and
Public Policy.
71 As Jeffrey Cohen notes, “[S]everal criticisms have been leveled against the stages approach to the policy-
making process.” For a more complete overview of some of the “criticisms leveled against the stages
approach,” see Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policy-Making, 27-9; Weiss, Using Social
Research in Public Policy Making', Weiss, Social Science Research and Decision-Making', Weiss,
“Research and Policy-Making,” 220-23.
72
For a discussion of the use of survey research data during other stages in the policy-making process,
particularly agenda-setting, see: Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policy-Making, 1-198,
133-48; Cohen, “Presidential Agenda Responsiveness to Public Opinion”; and Light, “Presidential Policy
Making.”
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Finally, it is possible to conceive of various scenarios in which opinion may be
used in two or more ways simultaneously. A policy-maker may, for instance, use data
not only to set parameters but to craft rhetoric as well.
Model 1: Instrumental (Problem Solving) Use. The traditional concept of use is
one that stresses [the] application of specific research conclusions to specific decisional
choices.”73 This has been referred to as: instrumental, technical, socio-technological,
idealized, direct, problem solving, and linear. 74 Regardless of the term, the idea is the
same. It is the direct translation of research information into policy action (or the attempt
at such a linear translation). As Weiss notes,
[t]he model is a linear one. A problem exists; information or understanding
is lacking either to generate a solution to the problem or to select among
alternative solutions; research provides the missing knowledge; a solution
is reached.
75
When focusing on opinion use, it is important to differentiate between cases in
which data are used to find a solution to a particular problem (instrumental - problem
solving, Model 1) and instances in which it is used to choose among policy alternatives
based on the level of support they enjoy (pandering or parameter setting, Models 2 and
3). The distinction rests primarily on the type of data that is used.
Polling produces data that may be classified as: fact, description, subjective
attitudes/opinion, orientations, and behavior. 76 Earl Babbie defines each type as follows:
73
Weiss, “Broadening the Concept of Research Utilization,” 22.
74
It has also been referred to as engineering. See for instance, Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don ’t
Pander, xiv-xv; Knorr, “Policymakers’ Use of Social Science Knowledge,” 165-82; Pio D. Uliassi,
“Research and Foreign Policy,” in Using Social Research in Public Policy Making, ed. Carol Weiss
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books/DC Heath, 1977), 85-90; Weiss, Using Social Research in Public
Policy Making, 1 1-13; Weiss, Social Science Research and Decision-Making, 9-12.
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Weiss, Using Social Research in Public Policy Making, 1 1-12. See also, Weiss, “Broadening the
Concept of Research Utilization,” 22-4.
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facts are items that both the respondent and researcher generally accept as true (i.e.,
demographics); descriptions” are items that the respondent accepts as true but the
researcher may not (i.e., respondents view of whether God exists); “subjective attitude
and opinion data are items that both the respondent and researcher recognize as
subjective (i.e., rating of presidential job performance); “orientations” are composite
measures, indexes, or items that when combined suggest respondents orientation (i.e.,
how prejudiced a respondent is); while “behavior” covers items that detail past or
prospective behavior (i.e., whether a respondent voted in the last election or whether the
respondent will vote in a future election). 77
As Table 4.4 shows, instrumental (problem solving) involves the use of factual or
behavioral data to determine the content of a policy. It is the series of linkages described
below, from “problem/issue comes on to agenda” to the “attempt at application,” that
“marks” this type of use. 78
76
For a more in-depth discussion, see Babbie, Survey Research Methods, 123-35. Conversely, Alreck and
Settle differentiate between “basic topic categories” appropriate for survey research: attitudes (knowledge,
feelings, actions, tendencies), images, decisions, needs, behaviors, lifestyle, affiliations, and demographics.
See Alreck and Settle, The Survey Research Handbook, 13-29.
77 The fact that this and other forms of use require certain types of data (for instance, instrumental/problem
solving requires factual and/or behavioral data) means that one of the important questions that arises, and
may help researchers determine what types of use are common, is a fairly simple measure of the types of
data that decision-makers obtain access. For instance, if it was determined that decision-makers were
accessing subjective and opinion data more often than factual and behavioral data, it would be an indication
that instrumental usage is likely to be less common than other forms of usage such as pandering and/or
parameter setting.
8
Weiss, “Broadening the Concept,” 22.
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Table 4.4: Instrumental (Problem Solving) Use
Problem/ Identify missing -> Acquire survey
Issue knowledge/ research data
comes on information (factual or behavioral)
to agenda necessary to solve which fills in missing
problem knowledge/information
Interpret data ->
to solve problem
Policy choice -> Attempt at
application
Assume, for instance, that a policy-maker is faced with an issue such as increased
automobile fatalities among teens. He may consult survey data that gives information
about the behavioral patterns of this segment of the population, particularly as it relates to
alcohol or drug use and driving. 7
}
In addition to questions regarding past and prospective
behavior, the data may also include demographic information. The demographics may
indicate that there are important gender differences when it comes to drinking and driving
in that young men are three times more likely to engage in this risky behavior than young
women. Armed with this information, the policy-maker may generate solutions, such as
asking Congress to appropriate money for public service announcements aimed at
decreasing drinking and driving among young men or pushing for legislation that
increases federal highway aid to states that change the driving age to eighteen.
Model 2: Pandering. While the term “pandering” has been unduly stigmatized, it
accurately describes a type of use that is unique to survey research. 80 Pandering involves
the “use” of subjective attitude/opinion or descriptive data to choose among policy
79 As Babbie notes, while “[sjurvey research does not permit the direct measurement of behavior . .
.,
[it]
does permit the indirect measurement of behavior . .
.
[respondents can be asked to report on their past
behavior . .
.
[and] prospective behavior, either real or hypothetical.” In addition to the fact that polls can
be used only to measure behavior indirectly, questions regarding behavior are subject to problems such as
“recall” and “honesty.” In fact, while polls can be used to produce often informative measures of behavior,
researchers and analysts must be keenly aware of the limitations inherent in this technique. Survey
Research Methods
,
123-25.
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alternatives. If a policy option enjoys a certain level of support, the decision-maker
pursues it. As Table 4.5 demonstrates, pandering occurs when an official decides to
pursue a policy because it enjoys majority support. As opposed to instrumental (problem
solving) use, in this case the policy options are formulated before the data are collected.
Table 4.5: Pandering
Problem/ ->
Issue
comes on
to agenda
Potential policy
options/solutions
formulated/
considered
Acquire subjective ->
opinion/attitude or descrip-
tive data that indicates
levels of support for, attitudes
toward or opinion about policy
option/set of options
under consideration
Interpret data -> Policy choice Attempt at
(determine levels based on level of application/
of support, at- of public support attempt to pursue
titudes about, policy option(s) if
opinion towards it enjoys a certain
policy/set of
policy options
under consideration)
level of support
Assume once again that a policy-maker faces a problem of increased automobile
fatalities among teens. She may consider a wide variety of alternatives formulated both
within and outside the administration by think tanks, interest groups, legislators, state and
local officials, and activists. She may also access data showing public support for each
policy under consideration. If the majority of the public supports giving additional aid to
states that increase the driving age, she would attempt to pursue this option.
80
Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, xiv-xv.
Jacobs and Shapiro both discuss and a briefly trace the historical growth in the use of this term. See
ibid., 3-4, 359 n. 2.
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Model 3: Parameter Setting. Like pandering, parameter setting is unique to
survey research and requires subjective attitude/opinion or descriptive data. Unlike
pandering, however, opinion data are used to decide what not to do.
As Table 4.6 shows, in these instances, a decision-maker uses data to determine
support for a particular policy option or set of options. If the data reveal that the public
has mixed attitudes towards the measure or opposes it, the decision-maker uses this
knowledge as a basis for abandoning or modifying a course of action.
Table 4.6: Parameter Setting
Problem/^ Potential policy-> Acquire subjective Interpret data ->
Issue options/solutions opinion/attitude data (determine levels
comes on formulated/ indicates levels of of support, at-
to agenda considered support for, attitudes titudes about
towards, opinion about opinions towards
policy option/set of policy/set of
options under policy options
consideration under consideration
Do not pursue
policy option(s)
(in part or whole)
if opinion is mixed
or public disapproves
of measure
Parameter setting is loosely based on Key’s metaphor of “opinion dykes.”82 In
this conception, knowledge gained from polls is used primarily to set limits on policy
action and to determine what potential policy options, solutions, and steps should be
avoided because they lack support. As Key argues, in these instances, knowledge of
opinion “fixes a range of discretion within which government may act or within which
82
Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy
,
552-553.
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debate at official levels may proceed .”83 This can be seen most directly with “test
balloons” or studies done to determine what the public will and will not accept.
The beauty of Key’s ‘opinion dyke’ is that it “avoids the error of personifying
public opinion as an entity that exercises initiative and in some way functions as an
operating organism to translate its purposes into governmental action.”84 Moreover, it
speaks to the relationship between opinion and governmental action (particularly
important in a representative democracy) without suggesting that public opinion dictates
or determines policy, or that there is a direct, linear relationship between the two. As Key
notes:
The idea of public opinion as forming a system of dikes which channel
action yields a different conception of the place of public opinion than
does the notion of a government by public opinion in which by some
mysterious means a referendum occurs on every major issue. In the former
conception the articulation between government and opinion is relatively
loose .
85
Consider once again the example discussed earlier. In this instance, the policy-
maker would use subjective attitude/opinion or descriptive data to determine which
policy option not to pursue. Assume, for instance, that one of the more controversial
policy options under consideration is to hold parents criminally and civilly liable if their
teens drink and drive. If polling data show that this was unpopular, the official would
abandon this idea altogether. Alternatively, the data may show that the public supports
holding parents civilly liable, but opposes holding them criminally responsible. In this
instance, the policy-maker may opt to abandon the notion of pursuing legislation that
includes any discussion of criminal liability.
83
Ibid., 552.
84 t
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Model 4: Rhetorical. The fourth model of use is “rhetorical,” or what Jacobs and
Shapiro refer to as “crafted talk”:
[Politicians pursue a strategy of crafted talk to change public opinion in
order to offset the potential political costs of not following the preferences
of the average voters. Politicians track public opinion not to make policy but
rather to determine how to craft their public presentations and win public
support for the policies they and their supporters favor. 86
As Table 4.7 depicts, in this instance, knowledge is used not to change, shape, or
alter the substance or content of policy, but rather to shape rhetoric in the hopes of
changing or influencing opinion. This primarily involves the use of subjective
attitude/opinion and descriptive data (although it may in rare cases entail the use of other
types of data as well). The primary goal of rhetorical use is to craft rhetoric to influence,
modify, change, or alter public, interested, or elite opinion.
Table 4.7: Rhetorical
Problem/ ->
Issue comes
on to agenda
Potential policy ->
options/solutions
formulated/
considered
Acquire subjective ->
opinion/attitude or
descriptive data
Interpret data -> Use findings to help
craft rhetoric in order
to educate, impact levels of
support, influence or move
opinion in the desired
direction
When poll data are used in this way, it enables an official to accomplish a
multitude of tasks such as: educating, persuading or neutralizing critics; reducing
85
Ibid., 553.
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uncertainty; and engaging in a public relations campaign. The primary goal, however, is
to sway, change or influence opinion towards a policy which the public may otherwise
not endorse.
Assume once again that our hypothetical official favors asking Congress to
increase federal aid to states that change the driving age to eighteen. The data show,
however, that the public does not support tying the acquisition of highway money to such
a controversial proposal and feels that determination of the legal driving age is best left to
the individual states. At the same time, however, the data show that the public
understands the seriousness of the problem and wants the federal government to take
some action. As a result, the official may recognize the need to change how he speaks
publicly about the proposal. He may, for instance, decide to make a series of speeches
that stress the importance of dealing with this problem immediately, showcase experts
and provide studies that support the contention that increasing the driving age is the best
way to decrease fatalities, and stress that the decision will ultimately be left to each state.
What becomes clear is that it is not the policy that has changed, but the way in which the
policy is sold and perhaps, ultimately, public opinion itself.
Model 5: Legitimizing. Legitimation is the use of subjective attitude/opinion
survey data to publicly validate or endorse a policy option. Unlike in the previous
instances, the data are not used to determine what to do or what not to do (pandering and
parameter setting), to shape the substance of policy (instrumental), or to craft opinion
(rhetorical). Instead, the data are used to show that the policy-maker is not alone in
endorsing the proposal.
86
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As Table 4.8 indicates, in this instance data showing a favored policy option
enjoys a certain level of public support is publicized in hopes of increasing that support
or counteracting opposition.
Table 4.8: Legitimizing
Problem/
Issue comes
on to agenda
-> Potential policy
option/solution
is favored by
the policy-maker
-> Acquire subjective/ ->
opinion/attitude
data
Interpret data -> if policy is supported -> seek to increase/maintain
/determine levels by either mass, support or counteract
of support interested, or opposition by making the
for the policy
policy
elite public(s) findings public
Assume once again that a policy-maker faced with automobile fatalities among
teens favors asking Congress to increase federal funding to states that raise the driving
age. If poll data shows that the general public supports the proposal, the official may use
this to persuade opponents in Congress of the merits of the plan. Alternatively, if poll
data show that elite’s (such as members of Congress or activists) support the proposal,
but the general public does not, the policy-maker may use the data to educate the public
that the policy is endorsed by other elites.
Model 6: De-legitimizing. Conversely, subjective attitude/opinion data may also
be used to “de-legitimize” a policy option. In this case, the official publicizes data that
show a policy is unpopular in an effort to discourage others from pursuing it.
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As Table 4.9 shows, in this case, the data are used not to persuade others of the
merits of a proposal, but rather to convince them that a policy lacks support among a
significant segment of the population.
Table 4.9: De-legitimizing
Problem/ ->
Issue comes
on to agenda
Potential policy
option/solution
is opposed by
a policy-maker
Acquire subjective/ ->
opinion/attitude
data
Interpret data ->
to determine
level of
opposition to
policy
if policy lacks ->
either mass,
interested, or
elite support
seek to discourage pursuit of the
policy/altemative by making
findings public
Assume, for instance, a policy-maker strongly opposes holding parents liable for
the actions of their teenagers who drink and drive. Moreover, poll data shows that he is
not alone, vast segments of the general public also oppose this policy as well. The
official may then publicize these findings in order to discourage other elites from
pursuing the policy.
Use Without Application
Two types of use do not entail the immediate attempt at application: reinforcing
and enlightenment. In these instances, a decision-maker peruses data, but takes no
immediate, measurable action and makes no detectable decisions on the basis of this
knowledge. Rather, the official stores this knowledge, essentially reserving the right to
refer back to it either consciously or subconsciously in the future. While these types of
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use do not by definition lead directly to any measurable, immediate action on the part of
the decision-maker, there is the potential that they may influence a decision-makers’
thinking in such a way that it leads to policy action in the future.
The path by which poll-based knowledge used in this manner enters the policy
arena is generally diffuse and circuitous. While this type of knowledge may be diffused
into the policy arena directly, it is more likely to enter the policy arena indirectly, subtly,
or slowly over a long period of time, or not at all. These characteristics of reinforcing and
enlightenment use render them difficult to measure and detect. These are cases in which,
for instance, a decision-maker may recall reading or hearing about the information
somewhere, but be unable to cite a particular poll, study, or source. In short, the
knowledge gained was based on poll data, however because it did not prompt a specific,
immediate action, it is difficult for decision-makers to cite sources and difficult to
measure.
The fact that knowledge used in this way does not precipitate immediate,
discemable action does not mean that these types of use should be ignored or treated as
irrelevant. As Robert Rich argues, to do so “overlooks the significance of other political
and organizational functions that knowledge may serve (1) organization learning and
planning and (2) beginning to influence the way in which problems are defined and
specified at the level of individual administrators.”87
The fact that these forms of use are difficult to measure does not make them any
less important, relevant, or valid. To the contrary, taking into account the nature of
opinion, policy-making, and polling it is easy to conceive of knowledge gained from poll
data being used to either enlighten or reinforce. While difficult to detect, more diffuse
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and circuitous uses of opinion may indeed be, as Nathan Caplan, Andrea Morrison, and
Russell Stambaugh find, “the modal type of research use.”88
Despite this, Roger Karapin makes a compelling argument against defining “use”
in this way. As he notes, any definition of use that fails to include at least the attempt at
application is problematic because it raises significant methodological problems, not the
least of which is how to determine when the data are not used. 89
In an effort to develop a complete catalog of all the ways in which opinion is
used, these models are included in this chapter. Nevertheless, Karapin’s concerns are
compelling and part of the reason that these models are not the focus of the remainder of
the study.
90
This decision should not be taken as an indication that these types of use are
less important or consequential than the others, merely that they are more difficult to
measure and consequently beyond the scope of this study.
Model 7: Reinforcing. Table 4.10 illustrates the use of polls to strengthen a
decision-maker’s personal beliefs or commitment to a policy action. In these instances,
the knowledge gained from poll data is used to reinforce or bolster personal beliefs or
ideas, increase confidence, and reinforce commitment.
87
Rich, “Uses of Social Science Information by Federal Bureaucrats,” 209.
88
Caplan et al., The Use ofSocial Science Knowledge in Policy, Caplan, “Social Research and National
Policy.”
89
Karapin, “What’s The Use of Social Science?,” 238.
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Table 4.10: Reinforcing
Problem/ ->
Issue comes
on to agenda
Potential policy
options/solutions
formulated/
considered
Acquire survey ->
data
Interpret data -> Knowledge -> May or may not attempt
gained from to apply knowledge in the
data/information future either consciously
reinforces decision-
makers’ personal
beliefs/commitment
to a potential
policy option/
set of options/
decision(s)
or subconsciously
It is possible to conceive of situations in which all types of data may be used to
reinforce commitment to a policy option. It is important to note, however, that while
factual or behavioral data could certainly be used, the potential policy must be formulated
before the data are used in this way.
In this scenario, poll-based knowledge impacts a decision-maker’s thinking but
does not prompt any discemable, immediate action that is different from what might have
occurred in the absence of this knowledge. Nor is there any immediate attempt on the
part of the decision-maker to use the knowledge gained to try to sway opinion or
legitimize a policy, because this would entail taking positive action on the basis of the
information. In this instance, the knowledge impacts a decision-maker’s thinking, by
reinforcing his commitment to a policy option. This knowledge may (or may not) affect
the decision-maker’s actions at some point in the future, but in the present context, the
90 The other primary reason that these models are not examined in the remainder of this study is that they
are not amenable to the methodology used.
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decision-maker takes no steps that are different than what he might have done in the
absence of the knowledge.
Model 8: Enlightenment, The final type of use has been referred to as both
enlightenment and knowledge use. As Table 4.1 1 illustrates, in this instance, the data are
“used like the news;” they are perused and digested in an effort to stay abreast of and
monitor attitudes, behaviors, beliefs, and opinions on a variety of social issues and
concerns. As Caplan, et. al. write, much like reading the newspaper or watching the
evening news, “it allows users to feel that their awareness of social problems and
concerns does not lag behind the rest of society’s.”91 While the decision-maker takes no
immediate action on the basis of this knowledge, it has the potential to influence thinking
and it may become the basis for action in the future.
Table 4.1 1 : Enlightenment
At any point in process (i.e. before or after problem/issue comes on to agenda, etc. .
.). .
.
Acquire -> Interpret -> Digest all/ -> may or may not attempt to
survey data data part of apply knowledge in the
findings future either consciously
or subconsciously
Enlightenment use allows officials to accomplish a multitude of goals, including:
gaining information, expanding personal knowledge, filling knowledge gaps, increasing
awareness, keeping abreast of changing mores, opinions, attitudes, and beliefs,
monitoring changes over time, challenging their own opinions, ideas, and perspectives,
decreasing uncertainty, reinforcing their understanding of a situation, or checking the
91 Caplan et al., The Use ofSocial Science Knowledge, 19.
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validity of pre-existing beliefs. In the future, the knowledge may impact the premises of
policy arguments, provide concepts, sensitivities, theories, paradigms, influence which
issues are placed on the agenda, what policy options are considered, as well as impact
orientation and priorities, ranges of solutions, and the formulation of problems. The
knowledge may or may not precipitate action in the future, and may enter the policy
arena directly, subtly, or not at all.
Conclusion
These models reflect the major ways in which public officials “use” poll data
during policy and decision-making. A major theme of this study is that the tendency to
equate poll use with pandering or crafted talk is problematic because it ignores other
important ways in which opinion may be used. Jacobs and Shapiro are right to challenge
the “unquestioned assumption among observers of American politics that elected officials
‘pander’ to public opinion.” Their work falters, however, because as opposed to
considering all the other ways in which opinion may be used, they focus only on “crafted
talk.” The subsequent case studies show that while polls may be used to pander or market
policy, they can also be used in other ways as well.
The following chapters include a series of case studies designed to test how well
these models approximate the reality of poll use at the policy-making stage of the policy
process. The case analysis shows that studying how officials “use” opinion matters, both
“on its face” and because it is essential to understanding the nature and degree of
responsiveness. Use matters “on its face” because as political scientists have noted, the
rise in polling over the last several decades has not been matched by a similar increase in
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research regarding how this data is used, by whom, when, for what purposes, or with
what effect. We still know very little, for instance, about why officials spend so much
time collecting and analyzing poll data and how opinion is used in the policymaking
93
process.
Studying “use” is also important because it will allow us to gain new insights into
the nature of opinion, its relationship to policy-making, governing, and democratic
responsiveness. While researchers have spent a tremendous amount of time studying the
correspondence between opinion and policy outcomes, this study shows that important
new insights regarding the nature and degree of responsiveness can also be gained from
focusing directly on how officials use poll data.
92
Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, 3.
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Jacobs and Shapiro, “Presidential Manipulation of Public Opinion,” 4; Jacobs and Shapiro, I he C risis in
Polling”; Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander.
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CHAPTER 5
THE USE OF OPINION TO SET PARAMETERS & PANDER:
CASE STUDIES I
The models developed in the previous chapters suggest that public officials
use opinion in various ways during the development stage of the policy-making
process. They also demonstrate that the tendency to equate poll use with pandering
or crafted talk is misleading. 1 While opinion can be used to pander and market
policy, it can also be used in other ways as well.
In this and the following chapter, five models of poll use are applied to several
cases of presidential policy and decision-making. While the models are applicable to
public officials within a variety of executive and legislative settings, the constraints of
this study require focusing on one site. The decision to concentrate on the White
House is well founded in the literature. While poll use has increased among officials
within various branches of the state and federal governments over the last thirty years,
presidents and their staffs are still the primary consumers of opinion data. 2 Every
President since Franklin Roosevelt has relied on pollsters and polling data.
1 As suggested previously, most journalistic and academic accounts of poll use throughout the years
have focused on pandering as the primary way in which opinion is used. More recently, however,
Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro have suggested that as opposed to pandering, politicians
primarily use polls to craft rhetoric. See for instance, Politicians Don 't Pander. My study argues that
focusing solely on either one of these types of use is misleading because there are in fact several other
ways in which public officials can use polls during the policy-making stage of the policy process. The
goal of this and the next chapter is to find evidence of all of the types of use discussed in the previous
chapter.
2
See for instance: Euchner, “Public Support and Opinion”: Heith, “Staffing the White House”; Heith,
Presidential Polling”; Heith, “One for All”; Jacobs and Shapiro, “The Rise of Presidential Polling”;
Tenpas, “Campaigning to Govern”; Waller, “Presidential Leadership”; and Cannon, “Hooked on
Polls.”
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Moreover, the emergence of the White House polling apparatus has been well
documented
.
3
The case studies are designed to test the utility of the models as a means for
understanding how White House officials use opinion. The case analysis also has
another goal. It will be used to develop several conclusions about how opinion
operates, the way it intersects with policy-making, and the nature of governmental
responsiveness.
Methodology
The Logic of Case Studies. The use of case analysis is common in the
literature on the presidency . 4 Case studies are the “most widely used” method to
study “individual presidents, presidential decisions,” and “presidential involvement in
specific areas of policy and policy-making.” 5 As Noonan Thomas writes, “it is more
difficult to think of presidential scholarship that does not rely on case analysis than to
cite that which does .”6 The appeal of this method is due to its practical and
theoretical advantages. From a practical standpoint, case studies require less time,
money, and personnel than do other comparable methods. Case analysis is also a
“manageable way to present a wide range of complex information” about the
3
Heith, “Staffing the White House”.
4
Harry Eckstein discusses case studies and defines a case “technically as a phenomenon for which we
report and interpret only a single measure on any pertinent variable.” Harry Eckstein, “Case Study and
Theory in Political Science,” in Strategies ofInquiry, eds. Fred E Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-137. Norman Thomas takes exception to this “narrow” and
“technical definition” for several reasons. He then offers his own definition of case studies as
“narrative descriptions of a wide range of individual and collective behavior, such as decisions,
processes, and policies, that tend to be resistant to systematic analysis.” Norman C. Thomas, “Case
Studies” in Studying the Presidency, eds. George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne (Knoxville:
University of Tennessee Press, 1983), 51-52.
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behavior of the president and his staff
.
7
This is particularly important given the fact
that it is difficult to generate quantitative data on the presidency
.
8
Despite its advantages, however, case studies have been criticized for several
reasons. Some of the criticism stems from limitations inherent in the method .9 The
“idiosyncratic” nature of this approach, for instance, often makes it is difficult to
aggregate knowledge . 10 For the most part, however, the criticism stems from
problems, which while common are surmountable. Case studies are often criticized
for “their lack of utility for theory-building purposes” and their “descriptive rather
than analytical orientation.”
1
1
Despite these drawbacks, most scholars agree that case
studies are “worth doing” provided “one is aware of the limitations .” 12
There are two principal types of case studies involving the presidency. The
first are those that focus on presidential activity within specific areas, such as foreign
or domestic policy-making. The second are “decision-making studies”. The latter
include both “intensive case studies of specific decisions and studies of more than one
•
1 "3
decision” in which the cases are used to induce theory or test models. This study
5 George C. Edwards III and Stephen J. Wayne, Presidential Leadership: Politics and Policy-Making,
6th edition (Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2003), 523.
6 Thomas, “Case Studies,” 50.
7
Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 523.
8
For a more in-depth discussion of the advantages and limitations of using the case study approach see
Thomas, “Case Studies” and Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 428-29.
9 As Russell K. Schutt writes, every method of data collection has “different advantages and
disadvantages,” and “none . .
.
[is] foolproof.” Investigating the Social World: The Process and
Practice ofResearch, 2
nd
ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press/Sage, 1999): 382, 396. Edwards
and Wayne, for instance, review the advantages and disadvantages of several research methods
commonly used to study the presidency. Presidential Leadership, 5 1 8-27.
10
Thomas, “Case Studies,” 50, 52; Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 523.
11
Thomas, “Case Studies,” 50, 52; Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 523-24.
12 Thomas, “Case Studies, 52; Edwards and Wayne, Presidential Leadership, 523-24.
13 Norman Thomas discusses these two types of case studies at length and “uses examples of each” to
examine their “strengths and limitations for theory-building purposes.” See “Case Studies,” 57-78.
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falls within the second category because it focuses on presidential decision-making
within more than one area of policy-making.
This study also follows a long line of studies that have used this method to test
the utility of a single model or set of models. This includes “policy-area studies”
such as those by Samuel Huntington, Roger Hilsman, and Morton Halperin, and
“decision-making studies” such as those by Graham Allison, Leslie Gelb, and
Richard Neustadt. 14 Neustadt, for instance, used several case studies to test his model
of presidential power, while Allison conducted an in-depth study of the Cuban missile
crisis to test the validity of three conceptual models of policy and decision-making.
Case Selection . The theoretical question is whether White House officials use
public opinion in accordance with the models developed in the previous chapter. As
a result, the universe of potential cases is fairly large. Because case selection is a key
component of narrative studies, it is important detail the criteria used to select the
cases.
Because the primary question focuses on how polls are used, it is important to
“hold one variable constant - public opinion.”
15
Consequently, polls showing opinion
at the time of policy formulation must be available and accessible. This helps to
14 Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1977); Roger Hilsman, The Politics ofPolicy-Making in Defense and
Foreign Affairs (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); Morton H. Halperin, National Security Policy-
Making (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1975); Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, The
Essence ofDecision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2 ed. (New York. Longman, 1999),
Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” American Political Science
Review 63 (Sept. 1969): 689-718; Leslie H. Gelb, with Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The
System Worked (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1979); Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential
Power and the Modem Presidents (New York: Free Press, 1990); Thomas, “Case Studies,” 50-78.
15
Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policy-Making: The Public and the
Policies That Presidents Choose (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1997): 187.
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insure that public officials had access to public opinion during the policy-making
process. It also means that the cases are likely to be well known.
Second, because the focus is on policy development as opposed to issue
identification, agenda setting, or other stages in the process, the time frame of each
case is limited to the period when White House officials begin to consider policy
alternatives and ends when they decide to pursue a particular policy. Since opinion
use can be said to have occurred even if the attempt at application is unsuccessful, the
question of whether the administration succeeds in achieving its objectives is not a
primary concern.
Third, the cases focus on the use of opinion from 1993 to 2000. This covers
the Clinton administration, the most recent White House for which we have a
complete record. The Clinton administration’s polling apparatus and use of polling as
measured by the time and money expended is not unique. As chapters 1 and 3
showed, George W. Bush’s polling apparatus is comparable to Clinton’s.
Consideration of the Bush White House is difficult, however, because the record is
still incomplete. While the models are also applicable to previous administrations,
given that the primary goal of the study is to test their utility, there is little to be
gained at this point from concentrating on numerous administrations. If the study
shows that the models are beneficial, then it will make sense to extend the analysis to
other administrations.
Fourth, Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba argue it is sound
practice to select cases that “highlight certain expected theoretical relationships
because it is a “useful way of boosting the theoretical power” of the cases while still
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retaining their “richness and insight.” 16 In keeping with this, the cases selected are
those that the historical record indicated may contain elements of each type of use.
Another option might have been to choose cases randomly. This would make sense if
the objective of the study was to determine the modal type of use. It is not
recommended, however, when the primary goal is to test the utility of models,
because if less common types of use were not reflected in the sample it would be
difficult to achieve the research objectives.
Finally, chapter 4 detailed eight models of opinion use. Two of the models,
reinforcing and enlightenment, do not entail attempts at application. Because these
types of use do not lead to immediate action, they are not amenable to a case study
approach.
17 An additional model that is beyond the scope of this study is instrumental
use. Instrumental use differs from the five other types of use that entail application
because it requires factual and behavioral data, as opposed to subjective opinion or
descriptive data. Due to the limited availability of this type of data, as well as the
difficulty inherent in determining if and how it is used, instrumental use will not be
examined. The five remaining types of poll use that will be considered are those that
entail the attempt at application and require subjective attitude or descriptive data:
pandering, crafted talk, parameter setting, legitimizing, and de-legitimizing.
Given these parameters and the limitations of time and documentation, as
many cases as possible were chosen to insure variance in types of use, policy area,
16 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in
Qualitative Research (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Cohen, Presidential
Responsiveness, 186-87.
17
This does not mean that these types of use are unimportant or that they cannot be examined using
another technique. Carol Weiss, for instance, developed an experimental-interviewing technique that
may be useful in examining types of use that do not entail application. See Weiss, Social Science
Research and Decision-making.
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and other factors. Because of the length and number of cases, the material is
presented in two chapters, divided by type of opinion use. Cases that examine the use
of opinion to set parameters and pander are presented in this chapter. Cases that focus
on the use of opinion to craft rhetoric, legitimize, and de-legitimize are examined in
the following chapter. Table 5.1 lists the four cases that were selected to examine
parameter setting and pandering.
Table 5.1 Cases Selected for Study: Parameter Setting & Pandering
Parameter Setting:
1 . Value-Added Tax (VAT)
2. Federal Funding for Needle Exchange Programs (NEPs)
Pandering:
3. Tax Deduction for College Tuition
4. Constitutional Amendment Protecting Victims’ Rights
Variables and Evidence . Two independent variables are hypothesized to play
a role in determining how policy makers use opinion: the direction of opinion and the
official’s initial policy stance. Each variable contains three categories: favor,
mixed/uncommitted, and opposed. As the models show, the relationship between
these categories plays a key role in determining the dependent variable, how officials
use opinion. If, for instance, the public opposes and the official supports a policy
initiative, parameter setting, crated rhetoric, and elite legitimization are possible. If,
on the other hand, the public favors and the official is uncommitted to a policy
initiative, pandering is possible. Table 5.2 shows the types of use possible given the
relationship between the categories of these variables.
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Table 5.2: Direction of Opinion and Officials Policy Stance Hypothesized to
be Related to Each Type of Use
Direction of Public Opinion
Pro/Favor
Officials’
Pro/
Favor
Mixed Con/
Oppose
Public
Legitimization
[PL], & Crafted
Talk [CT] are
possible
Parameter
Setting [PS],
CT, & Elite
Legitimization
[EL] are
possible
PS, CT
& EL are
possible
Initial Not Pandering [P] PS is PS is
Policv Stance committed is possible possible possible
Con/Oppose P, CT, & CT & CT &
Elite De- EDL are Public De-
legitimization possible legitimiz-
[EDL] are ation
possible [PDL] are
possible
As a result, the case studies focus on both the direction of opinion and the
official’s initial policy stance. In order to understand how polls were used, it is also
important to determine whether the official’s policy stance, tactics, rhetoric, or
strategy changed as a result of the data. In cases of parameter setting and pandering,
it is hypothesized that the substance of the official’s policy stance will change as a
result of the data. In cases of rhetorical, legitimizing, and de-legitimizing use, it is
expected that the substance of the officials policy stance will not change, however the
data will impact the tactics, rhetoric and/or strategies employed.
Evidence from the historical record is used to determine both whether the
official’s policy stance, tactics, rhetoric, or strategy changed and whether those
changes were a result of poll data.
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Given this, the case analysis relies heavily on the statements of officials,
particularly White House pollsters and advisors, historical documentation, journalistic
accounts of the events, and an assortment of polling data. The Roper Center at the
University of Connecticut, which houses the largest archive of opinion data in the
world, made the task of retrieving these data much easier. 18
Parameter Setting
Case #1: Value-Added Tax (VAT). On September 23, 1993, President
Clinton unveiled his long-awaited health care plan in a televised speech delivered
from the floor of Congress. He began by describing a health care system that is
“badly broken,” “uncertain,” “expensive,” “bureaucratic,” and “wasteful.” 19 “After
decades of false starts,” he continued, “we must make this our urgent priority: giving
every American health security, health care that can never be taken away, health care
that is always there.”20 The plan the President proposed that night was, according to
many, the “most ambitious attempt at social engineering since the New Deal.”21
Initially it appeared that the President’s efforts to reform the nation’s health
care system might pay off. Polls taken immediately after his speech showed that the
administration’s “Health Security plan” was warmly received by the millions of
Americans who tuned in to watch his address. 22 Overnight polls conducted by the
18
Much, although not all, of the data discussed in this study is housed at the Roper Center. Other data
depositories were used whenever necessary to accumulate as much relevant polling data as possible.
19
“Clinton’s Health Plan; Transcript of President’s Address to Congress on Health Care,” New York
Times, September 23, 1993.
20
“Clinton’s Health Plan,” A24. See also, E. Eckholm, ed. Solving America ’s Health-Care Crisis
(New York: Times Books, 1993), 301-14.
21
“Clapping for Health Reform,” New York Times, 24 September 1993, A32.
22 Theda Skocpol, “The Rise and Resounding Demise of the Clinton Plan,” Health Affairs (Spring
1995): 67.
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White House showed that two-thirds of Americans supported the proposal
.
23
In the
wake of the President’s address, the New York Times proclaimed, “[t]the applause that
greeted President Clinton and his wife, Hillary, from both sides of the Congressional
aisle Wednesday night signaled more than mere politeness. It was the sound of an
emerging bipartisan consensus for health care reform .”24
Despite these early positive signals, almost a year later the President’s plan
died in Congress. Numerous scholars, including Theda Skocpol who describes it as
“one of the biggest turning points in twentieth-century American history,” have
analyzed the “rise and resounding demise of the Clinton plan.”25 Rather than
concentrating on the overall health care reform debate this study focuses on an aspect
of the case, the administration’s brief flirtation with the value-added tax (VAT). 26
The VAT is a European-style tax imposed on businesses during the
production process according “to how much value each business adds to the
product.”
27
It is often described as “invisible” or a “sales tax in disguise” because,
while consumers ultimately pay higher prices for goods and services, the tax is
included in the final retail price rather than tacked on visibly at the end like a sales
tax .
28 As economist John Qualls notes, the VAT is “sneaky.” “That’s one of the
23
Paul Starr, “What Happened to Health Care Reform,” American Prospect , no. 20 (Winter 1995): 21.
24
Similarly, The New York Times noted that “The Clinton Plan Is Alive on Arrival.” “Clapping for
Health Reform”; Skocpol, “The Rise and Resounding Demise of the Clinton Plan,” 6.
25
Skocpol, “The Rise and Resounding Demise,” 66-7. For another interesting perspective see Paul
Starr’s account of the events that transpired during his tenure as a member of the White House’s health
policy team. “What Happened to Health Care Reform?,” 20-3 1
.
26
in both polls and discussion, the VAT is frequently described as being the same as a national sales
tax.
27 Steven Greenhouse, “A Value-Added Tax; It Could Pay for a Health-Care Plan and Then Some, but
the Hurdles Are High,” New York Times, April 26, 1993. Judi Hasson, “Health-care Tax: Passage
‘Difficult’,” USA Today, April 12, 1993.
28
Jim Gallagher uses the following example to show how the VAT operates. If the VAT is set at 5%,
“a farmer who sells $100 of wheat to a miller would tack on a $5 VAT payment. The miller turns the
wheat into cereal and sells it for $200. He’ll pay $4.75 in VAT, which is 5 percent of the $95 in value
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arguments used against it,” Qualls adds. “Because a consumer doesn’t see the VAT,
government might be tempted to raise it now and then.”29
The idea of adopting the VAT was first broached publicly by the President in
February 1993. Less than four months later it was clear that the administration no
longer considered the VAT a viable means of funding universal health care. What
happened during this time period, why the VAT was initially considered, and what
role polling played in the White House’s decision to abandon the tax is the focus of
this case study.
After being elected Clinton immediately turned his attention to the economy
and budget, issues that would continue to consume him for most of his first year in
office. In the meantime, he established a Health Reform Task Force headed by his
longtime friend and business consultant Ira Magaziner and his wife, First Lady
Hillary Rodham Clinton. The Task force and its 500-member working groups, which
included government officials, health care professionals, congressional
representatives, state-level officials, and policy experts, conducted much of its
business in the first half of 1993.
30 The Task Force considered a variety of
controversial issues, including the very contentious question of how to finance
universal health care.
During a town hall meeting in late February of 1993, Clinton signaled
publicly for the first time that the White House was considering a VAT. The issue
he added to the product. Eventually the extra tax gets passed on to the consumer.”
“Clinton Stirs a
VAT: New Tax Enters Health Debate,” St. Louis-Dispatch, 25 April 25, 1993; Greenhouse,
‘ A Value-
Added Tax.”
29 Quoted in Gallagher, “Clinton Stirs a VAT
.’
30
Starr notes that the task force was “legally dissolved at the end of May,” and
most members ot the
working groups “actually dispersed weeks earlier.” “What Happened to Health Care
Reform?, 22.
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arose unexpectedly in a forum in Chillicothe, Ohio, when the President was asked
why his economic package included an energy tax as opposed to a national lottery or
sales tax. In a rather lengthy response, Clinton explained that many of America’s
closest trading partners, including Canada, Europe, and Japan, have VAT’s . 31 While
this would represent a “radical change in the tax system of the United States... it is
something I think we may well have to look at. . . maybe not too long in the future
[we] will debate whether we want to shift the nature of our tax system.”32 He went on
to note that manufacturers tend to like the idea “because it helps your exports and it
puts a burden on imports coming in, supports the job base of the country.”33
Clinton’s statement, which was the first public indication that the
administration was considering a VAT, seemed to catch even his closest advisors by
surprise .
34
Shortly after the meeting, Clinton’s Press Secretary Dee Dee Myers said
that the President was “just talking. . . in conceptual terms. .. There is no other
discussion of a broad-based tax at this point.”35 Myers comments, however, did little
to quell interest in the President’s remarks. Concerned that the issue might detract
from his economic program, Clinton emerged hours later and told reporters that
despite his remarks, the VAT is “not now under consideration” and promised that
Skocpol also found that “most of the work of the task force took place in the few frantic months from
January to May 1993.” “The Rise and Resounding Demise,” 70.
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“Wfwe start considering it. I’ll tell you .”36 It is still not clear whether the President
was floating a trial balloon or whether his statement was simply an off the cuff
comment in response to an unexpected question. Either way it lends credibility to the
argument that as early as February the White House was considering the VAT as a
potential funding option.
While brief, the President s statement was enough to elicit widespread interest
in the VAT. On the heels of the town hall meeting, the Kaiser Family Foundation
commissioned Louis Harris to conduct a poll measuring the level of public support
for a consumption tax. The poll, which showed that nearly six in ten Americans
would support a three percent VAT to pay for health care, seemed to surprise even
some within the administration .
37
Shortly after the data was released, however, White
House Communications Director George Stephanopoulos told reporters that the
administration’s official position had not changed. “The tax,” he stated, “would not
be in the” health care proposal expected in mid-May . 38
Because the health care task force tried to maintain some measure of
confidentiality, it is still not entirely clear what occurred during its deliberations . 39
Given the timing, however, it appears that members of the administration may have
been emboldened by the Kaiser study .
40
Just two weeks after the findings were
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released and despite earlier statements from the White House, Task Force members
began touting the VAT. In what was a public relations misstep of seismic
proportions, however, these reports surfaced on April 15. In an ill timed, but
seemingly coordinated campaign, Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary
Donna Shalala and the deputy director of the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), Alice Rivlin, both task force members, said publicly that the VAT was one of
the options being considered by the panel. As Rivlin told a breakfast meeting of the
National Association of Manufacturers, the consumption tax “is clearly a possible
candidate.” Universal coverage will “take some more resources,” she continued, “and
a VAT, or a general sales tax, has a good deal to recommend it.”41
At the same time, Myers and Stephanopoulus shied away from their earlier
statements. Speaking to reporters Stephanopoulus said that “certain things [had]
changed” and the VAT was once again one of the financing sources under
consideration by the administration.42 “The working groups are looking at it,” he
noted, “but the President has not made a decision.”43 When questioned by reporters
later that day the President said that while he had not changed his position, he had not
fully explored the matter either. He fueled further speculation when he added, “[a] lot
of business and labor people are for it.”
44
Hours later the President again stated that
he had “made absolutely no decision. . . on that or any other kind of tax.” He then
added that despite the growing controversy over funding, polls continued to show
41 Edwin Chen and Karen Tumulty, “Foley Sees Little Support for National Sales Tax; Budget: House
Speaker Says Congress Is Unlikely to Pass a Value-Added Levy To Finance Health Care Reform. Both
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widespread support for reforming the nation’s health care system .45 The President’s
intimate knowledge of opinion on health care reform is not surprising given the fact
that during this period he met with his in-house pollster Stanley Greenberg “at least
weekly to go over the data. As Greenberg stated, “the president [could] recite
minute details from surveys on health reform.”46
During a press conference days later Clinton reiterated that he had not decided
whether to include the VAT in his health care proposal. Once again, however, he
invited speculation when he added that “there are all kinds of arguments for it on
policy grounds.
. . we’ ve had a lot of people from business and labor come to us
saying they thought that that tax would make their particular industries more
competitive in the global economy.”47 Records show that members of the Task Force
and administration continued to deliberate about the VAT for several weeks. At the
end of April, for instance, Task Force Co-Chair Hillary Clinton told Senators that, “a
value-added tax is indeed being studied to finance health care.”48
Less than four months after Clinton’s initial statement at the Ohio forum and
two months after it resurfaced again, however the VAT was unceremoniously
dropped from consideration. This was confirmed by Magaziner who in early-May
stated that the VAT was no longer being considered .49 In a two-hour televised town
meeting just a few days later, Clinton reiterated that while the VAT is something that
“we may look at later on, [it is] such a big issue that it [has] to come after economic
44
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and health care reform .”50 Later that month when the Task Force’s work was all but
complete, it became clear that rather than a VAT, the administration would attempt to
fund health care with a combination of a payroll tax, paid for jointly by companies
and employees, and some minor “sin” taxes. Clinton’s comments and the fact that the
administration’s final “Health Security Plan” did not include a VAT seemed to put
the issue to rest. What remained unclear however, was just why the VAT was
introduced, dismissed, resurfaced, and then so hastily dropped?
The most coherent explanation came months later from an unlikely source, the
president’s pollster, Stanley Greenberg. In December, just three months after Clinton
unveiled his health plan Greenberg joined several former presidential pollsters and
scholars on an American Enterprise Institute (AEI) panel . 51 Throughout the
discussion, Greenberg was “remarkably candid” about the impact of polling on the
President’s health care proposal .
52 He spoke at length about the intersection between
health care policy and public opinion. In particular, he focused on the issue of
funding and the VAT. According to Greenberg, “the administration made a major
policy decision on how to finance its health care plan after officials examined private
polls showing that a new tax would be unpopular.
. . White House officials rejected a
49
Wolfgang Munchau, “Clinton Intends to Fund Health Care Reform from Payroll Tax,” The Times
(London), May 14, 1993.
50
Jurek Martin, “Clinton Defends Record in Office: A Few ‘Glitches’ Conceded - Trade Status for
China - VAT ‘Feasible’,” Financial Times (London), May 28, 1993.
51
The panel, entitled “Pollsters and Presidents - Polls, Presidents, and Campaigns,” was held in
Washington DC, December 9, 1993. In addition to Greenberg, the panel included several former
presidential pollster and scholars: Louis Harris (John F. Kennedy’s pollster), Patrick Caddell (Jimmy
Carter’s pollster), Richard Wirthlin (Ronald Reagan’s pollster), Karlyn Bowman (AEI), Ben
Wattenberg (AEI) and Norman Omstein (AEI). See Bennett Roth, “Pollsters take issue with Dictated
Policy; Clinton Administration Used Surveys to Revise Financing of Health Care Plan,” Houston
Chronicle
,
December 10, 1993; “A Good Word for Polls,” Washington Post, December 10, 1993; C-
SPAN 1 Daily Schedule; C-SPAN, Washington, DC, December 8, 1993; ET, [Radio TV Reports]
(accessed March 8, 2001). Available from Lexis-Nexis.
124
proposal to pay for [health care] coverage with a new value-added tax, or VAT, a
kind of national sales tax.”53 The decision was made in part, according to Greenberg,
because “the double digit VAT was a concept that the public wasn’t ready for.”54
“The administration decided,” he continued, “that the only alternative to funding
health care with employer contributions was a broad-based tax. They polled on what
most officials believed was the most viable possibility, the Value-Added Tax. [But]
[t]he result. . . was problematic.”55
This is a fairly clear case of parameter setting, the use of opinion to decide
what not to do, to set limits, or as V. O. Key wrote, to “fix a range of discretion
within which the government may act.”56 According to Greenberg, armed with
several funding options, one of which was the VAT the administration consulted
“private polls” that detailed the nature and level of opposition to the tax. As a result,
they determined that the VAT was not a viable alternative and elected to consider
other funding mechanisms.
The data support Greenberg’s conclusion that the VAT was not a “concept”
that the public was “ready for.” That is not to suggest that this is the only way in
which the data could be interpreted, rather that Greenberg’s interpretation is
reasonable given what we know about the state of opinion at the time.
The Roper Center archives contain fifty-eight questions regarding public
opinion about the VAT, some that date back to 1972. During 1993, six survey firms
52
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asked a total of nine separate questions about the establishment of a VAT; of these
four focus on whether the tax should be adopted to pay for health care reform. These
are the only questions archived that measure opinion on instituting the VAT to pay
for health care. Moreover, all four questions were conducted during April 1993, after
the President first raised the specter of the VAT and before the administration decided
to abandon it. Responses to these questions, plus the Harris survey conducted on
behalf of the Kaiser Foundation, are depicted in Table 5.3. As the Table shows,
levels of support for instituting a VAT to fund health care fluctuated from 38 to 60
percent between mid-March and late April.
Table 5.3: Percentage of Public who Support VAT to Fund Health Care:
Spring 1993 57
Date Favor Oppose DK, etc . .
.
Pollster/Sponsor
3/10/93 58 a a Louis Harris3
4/20/93 51 44 5 NBC/WSJb
4/24/93 46 49 5 CNN/USA Todayc
4/27/93 38 55 7 G. Blackd
4/29/93 60 36 4 Time/CNNe
a The exact percentage of respondents who oppose or had no answer is not available. The question
asks respondents whether they favor or oppose a three percent national sales tax or VAT.
b
Please tell me if you would favor or oppose [the following] tax if the money were to be used to pay
for a national health care system. ... A national sales tax, called a “Value Added Tax,” on most items
other than food, medicine, and housing.
c Some people are suggesting a national sales tax - sometimes called a “Value Added Tax” - as part of
a plan to provide health insurance for all Americans. Do you favor or oppose a national sales tax for
this purpose?
d
Are you familiar with what a Value-Added Tax is? (If not familiar) A Value Added Tax is a national
sales tax that is added to the cost of a product at nearly every step from manufacturing to the sale of the
product by a retail establishment. The tax might start at 3, 4, or 5 percent. . . . President Clinton has
suggested that we may need the Value Added Tax as a way to produce the revenue required to pay for
the new national health care program he will propose. Do you favor or oppose the Value-Added Tax
as a way to pay for a new national health care program?
e Suppose a value added tax were enacted specifically to pay for providing health insurance for many
Americans who do not currently have it. Would you favor or oppose a value added tax under those
circumstances?
-
57
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The variance in levels of support are due to several factors. Everett Carll
Ladd, for instance, argues that many of the polls taken throughout the 1993-1994
health care reform debate vastly distorted levels of support for and opposition to the
administration’s plan. This distortion was due primarily to variations in question
wording, timing, and a lack of knowledge about what was being proposed. In the
case of the VAT, there are elements of all of these issues. The highest level of
support, for instance, is in response to a leading question by Time/CNN, which asked
respondents whether they would “favor or oppose a value added tax... [if it] were
enacted specifically to pay for providing health insurance to many Americans who
don’t currently have it”? As Ladd notes, “[b]y linking a tax hike only to a good end,
and by not specifying the amount of the hike, the question became useless as a guide
•
co
to public sentiment.” Using a much different approach, Gordon Black asked
respondents whether they were “familiar with what a value-added tax is”? Those
who were not were read a short explanation, which included a brief discussion of
potential levels of taxation, before they were asked whether they favored or opposed
the VAT as a means of funding health care. In this instance, only 38 percent of
respondents said they favored the tax.
59
In addition to variations in the wording of questions, timing and levels of
knowledge may also explain differences in support. The first poll taken after Clinton
broached the topic of the VAT was the Harris study showing almost six in ten
Americans supported the tax. Taken on the heels of the President’s endorsement of
the tax as something “worth looking into” and given the fact that the question asked
58
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specifically about support for a three percent VAT, it is not surprising that many
respondents reacted positively. As debate over the VAT intensified and the public
learned more about the VAT, including that the Task Force was considering a twenty-
two percent (as opposed to three percent) tax, opposition to the measure grew. 60
Given the available data, the White House’s interpretation that the results
were “problematic” and the majority was not ready for the VAT is reasonable. The
more the public learned about the tax and the specifics of the proposal, the less likely
they were to support it. When considered in the most positive light, perhaps the best
that could be said about the state of opinion was that it was evenly divided, with
about 48 percent of respondents supporting and 48 percent of respondents opposing
the tax.
61
The focus on opinion use should not obscure the fact that it was just one of
several factors that played a role in the administration’s decision to abandon the VAT.
This finding is in keeping with all the models of use, which are built on the
assumption that while opinion may be one factor in a policy-makers decision, it is
seldom the only or most important factor. Policy-making is a complicated process and
as this and several of the other cases demonstrate, opinion is just one piece of
information or knowledge that may play a role in decision-making.
As Greenberg stated in regard to the VAT, “it would be wrong to say that we
were dissuaded only by the poll numbers. . . there were other reasons for the President
59
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to oppose a consumption tax .”62 Clinton hinted at one of the main reasons when he
said that the VAT would represent a “radical change in the tax system of the United
States .”
63
It would have been very risky for the President to attempt to overhaul both
the nation’s health-care and tax systems simultaneously. Had he decided to do so, he
would have risked alienating major segments of his constituency, many ofwhom
favored health care reform, but were less supportive of the VAT.
In addition, several other factors argued against the institution of the
consumption tax, including the fact that it would have been costly to administer and
complicated to establish .64 Moreover, even during the brief debate over the tax in
mid-April it became clear that members of both the administration and Congress were
deeply divided over the levy . 65 Both liberals and conservatives expressed doubt
about the tax, although for different reasons . 66 Many Democrats, for instance, felt
that the tax was regressive, inequitable, and likely to have a greater impact on the
poor and middle-class, who spend the greatest portion of their income . 67 Whereas
conservative Republicans opposed the VAT because they were concerned it would
result in an even larger and more imposing federal government. In addition, large
and small retailers from around the nation argued that the tax was not only anti-
62
Berke, “Clinton Aide Says Polls Had Role in Health Plan.”
63
“Sales Tax Remark Dogs Clinton’s Trail.”
64 Tom Raum, “Clinton Hints Sales Tax for Health Care,” Chicago Sun-Times, 16 April 16, 1993;
Steven Greenhouse, “A Value-Added Tax; It Could Pay for a Health-Care Plan and Then Some, But
the Hurdles Are High,” New York Times, April 26, 1993.
65 Raum, “Clinton Hints Sales Tax for Health Care”; Greenhouse, “A Value-Added Tax”; Dutt and
Kasindorf, “New Tax: VAT Chance?”; Chen and Tumulty, “Foley Sees Little Support”; Gallagher,
“Clinton Stirs a VAT”; Hasson, “Health-care Tax.”
66 Chen and Tumulty, “Foley Sees Little Support.”
67 Greenhouse, “A Value-Added Tax”; Ifill, “A Peek Inside”; Chen, “Value-Added Tax Is
Reconsidered.”; Dutt and Kasindorf, “New Tax: VAT Chance?”; Gallagher, “Clinton Stirs a VAT”;
“Americans Would Back New Taxes”; “Tax Balloons and Common Sense”; “Sales Tax Remark Dog’s
Clinton.”
129
growth and excessive, but that it would raise prices and cut sales.69 Given this, it is
clear that while opinion played an important role, it was not the only factor that had
an impact on Clinton’s decision to abandon the VAT.
Case #2: Federal Funding for Needle Exchange Programs (NKPsT During the
1992 presidential campaign then candidate Clinton promised that if elected he would
“move aggressively.
. . to tackle the AIDS [acquired immune deficiency syndrome]
crisis.” The pledge was part of an overall strategy to court the gay community,
which had become an increasingly important part of the Democratic base. In keeping
with this, the Democratic Party invited two people infected with HIV to speak at its
national convention and just days before the election Clinton made a major policy
speech outlining his approach to combating AIDS. 71 In that speech and throughout
the campaign Clinton pledged to take a number of steps to fight the AIDS virus. 72
68
Greenhouse, “A Value-Added Tax”; Gallagher, “Clinton Stirs A VAT,” IE; “Tax Balloons and
Common Sense,” A 18.
69
Iftll, “A Peek Inside,” A 14; Dutt and Kasindorf, “New Tax: VAT Chance?”; Gallagher, “Clinton
Stirs A VAT.”
70
Susan Yoachum, “Clinton Gambles With Speech on AIDS Epidemic,” San Francisco Chronicle
,
October 30, 1992.
71
Elizabeth Glazer and Bob Hattoy, both ofwhom were infected with HIV, the virus that causes
AIDS, were invited to deliver primetime television addresses at the 1992 Democratic Convention.
Both spoke on the evening of July 14. Jeffrey Schmalz, “Issues and Interests - Two Voices; Speaking
as One in Search of a Constituency to Combat AIDS,” New York Times, July 14, 1992; Chris Black,
“Clinton Bids for Support ofAIDS Activists; Campaign ’92,” Boston Globe, May 31, 1992; Yoachum,
“Clinton Gambles.”
72
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AIDS policy director or “Czar”; implement the recommendations of the National Commission on
AIDS; speed up the process of drug approval; promote national AIDS education and prevention; forbid
health insurers from denying coverage to HIV-positive applicants; provide healthcare coverage to
Americans with HIV as part of a national healthcare program; oppose mandatory HIV testing in
federal programs such as the Peace Corp, Foreign Service, and Job Corp; improve access to
experimental therapies; provide voluntary or anonymous testing and counseling for AIDS and HIV; lift
the ban on HIV-positive foreigners traveling or immigrating to the United States; support local efforts
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Among his many promises was a pledge made directly to New York AIDS activists to
end the ban on federal funding for Needle Exchange Programs [NEPs] ! ~
NEPs, which allow intravenous drug users to swap used syringes and needles
for new or sterilized ones, had been operating in several states since the mid-1980s.74
In 1996 almost seventy NEPs funded by state, local, and private sources were in
operation. Less than two years later that number had risen to over one hundred
programs in more than twenty states. 76 The programs were not without controversy.
In California, for instance, Governor Pete Wilson vetoed three bills passed by the
state legislature to legalize NEPs. Despite this, San Francisco was just one of many
communities which continued to operate its program. 77
At the federal level, Congress voted to ban federal funding of NEPs in the late
1980’s. The Health Omnibus Program Extension of 1988, stated that “[njone of the
funds provided under this Act.
. . shall be used to provide individuals with hypodermic
needles or syringes so that such individuals may use illegal drugs, unless the Surgeon
General of the Public Health Service determines that a demonstration needle
exchange program would be effective in reducing drug abuse and the risk the public
will become infected with” HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. 78 The legislation ended
all federal funding for NEP’s until the government could meet a difficult two-prong
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test. The Act required that the HHS Secretary provide Congress with scientific proof
showing that these programs not only reduced the spread of HIV, but also did not
increase drug use. 79 The test was designed in part to help insure the longevity of the
ban. Indeed throughout the early and mid 1990s the ban was renewed several times.
As early as 1993, however, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
[CDC] reviewed the results of a study by researchers at the School of Public Health at
the University of California at Berkeley and the Institute for Health Policy Studies at
the University of California at San Francisco. The 700-page California study
concluded that NEPs “decrease the rate of new infection with HIV and that there was
‘no evidence’ that the programs increase the amount of drug use.”80 After reviewing
the study officials at the CDC concluded that, “the ban on federal funding ofNEPs
should be lifted to allow communities and states to use federal funds to support NEPs
as components of comprehensive HIV prevention programs.”81 By the mid-1990s,
when findings such as these had begun to accumulate Congress took additional steps
to prevent the administration from lifting the ban. In 1996, for instance, the House of
Representatives included a provision in its version of the HHS budget bill nullifying
Secretary Donna Shalala’s power to lift the ban. In a compromise worked out with
78
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the Senate, however, the final bill prohibited the Secretary from taking action for two
O')
years.
The 1996 bill placed the Clinton administration in the position of having to
decide by April 1,1998, whether it would live up to its promise and attempt to lift the
federal-funding ban. As opponents of funding feared, throughout the 1990’s evidence
supporting NEPs appeared to be mounting. In February 1997, for instance, the
National Institute of Health [NIH] released another in a long line of reports stating
“there is no longer any doubt that these programs work to prevent the spread of
H I V... needle-exchange programs should be implemented at once.”84 The growing
evidence, along with the support of many in the Clinton administration including
White House Director of National AIDS Policy Sandra L. Thurman, Shalala, many
members of her staff, government scientists, and other public health experts gave
supporters of the programs confidence that the White House would act swiftly to
remove the ban. Throughout 1997 and early 1998, this appeared to be where the
administration was headed.
In February of 1998 Shalala announced that the administration had the
scientific evidence necessary to meet the first component of the two-prong test and
certify that NEPs reduce the spread of AIDS. 85 The announcement was taken by
many as a sign that the administration had enough evidence to meet the second
criterion and was poised to lift the ban on funding.
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While most administration officials supported lifting the ban, however, the
President’s well-respected Director of National Drug Policy, General Barry R.
McCaffrey, was firmly opposed to any government subsidy. His argument echoed
that of many opponents, including most conservatives and some leaders of the
African American community who argued that the program amounted to tacit
approval of drug use. 86 Throughout the winter, McCaffrey battled with Thurman, the
most vocal advocate ofNEPs in the administration. After much discussion
McCaffrey wrote Thurman a letter which stated in part, “[a]s public servants, citizens
and parents we owe our children an unambiguous ‘no use’ message.”87 Despite their
differences in late March they issued a joint statement saying that they had found
some common ground and were prepared to accept whatever decision the President
made. 88
Despite McCaffrey’s opposition, the President still appeared ready to lift the
ban. As John Harris and Amy Goldstein write, throughout the spring Clinton gave
HHS staff, White House officials, public health experts and AIDS activists the “clear
sense that he was ready to move forward with some kind of federal funding for needle
exchanges.” On April 9, just days before the President was scheduled to leave for a
summit in Chile, his Chief of Staff Erskine Bowles met with Shalala and told her “to
proceed on the assumption there would be some federal funding and to continue
86
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working on the details.”90 On the basis of this commitment, Shalala planned a major
news conference for April 20 during which she was prepared to certify that the
administration had the evidence necessary to meet the second prong of the test,
announce that the White House was [formally] lifting the funding ban, and introduce
eight to ten pilot programs using federal funds to showcase effective NEPs. 91 In a
talking points memo Shalala prepared to use during the press conference she wrote,
“the evidence is airtight”. In response to response to questions about why the
President decided to go ahead with federal funding she planned to state that, “from
the beginning of this effort, it has been about science, science, science.”92
On the morning of April 20 when Shalala and her staff were going over the
last minute details of the press conference, she received a call from Erskine Bowles,
the White House Chief of Staff, who told her that during his flight back from South
America the President had reconsidered and decided not to fund NEPs because it was
“too politically risky.”
93
The Secretary hastily cancelled the scheduled press
conference and replaced it with a small briefing at which no cameras and only a
handful of print reporters were allowed.
94 No one in attendance was surprised when
Shalala stated that the administration had met the second prong of the test. “A
meticulous scientific review has now proven that needle exchange programs can
reduce the transmission ofHIV and save lives without losing ground in the battle
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against illegal drugs.”’5 What surprised even NEP opponents, however, was
Shalala's announcement that despite the “science" the “ban on federal funds would
remain in place."” She added that she hoped the scientific evidence “would spur
state and local governments to pay for programs on their own,” because “studies
show that needle exchange programs work best when they are carefully designed
within local communities.”97
At the time, Shalala refused to discuss what caused the President to back away
from his pledge. 98 Given the historical record and the nature of opinion, however, it
appears that polls played at least some role in the President’s decision not to pursue
federal funding. Unlike the case of the VAT, however, officials have not been
willing to discuss the reasons for the President’s abrupt shift on this issue, beyond
saying that “politics” was a key factor. 99 As a result, researchers are left with the
historical record, which indicates that from the 1992 campaign up until his flight from
South America on April 19, the President favored removing the ban. Moreover,
much of the evidence suggests that he was inclined to take this action. To the surprise
ofmany even in his own administration, however, he opted for a last minute
compromise. In the end he decided to state unequivocally that NEPs reduce the
transmission of AIDS and do not increase drug use. Rather than lifting the ban to
allow federal funding of NEPs, however, he decided merely to encourage states and
localities to continue funding the programs on their own. What is interesting about
95
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this is that it reflects public opinion almost exactly, giving sway to the argument that
the President used polls to help set parameters and decide what policy action not to
pursue.
The Roper Center archives show that the first survey of a representative
sample of Americans regarding NEPs was conducted in 1994. 100 No other studies are
recorded again until 1997. Between April and November of 1997, when the issue of
lifting the ban was once again coming to the forefront, two organizations sponsored
three separate surveys designed to measure public attitudes towards NEPs. 101 The
studies appear at first glance to show that a majority of Americans supported NEPs as
a means of curbing the AIDS epidemic. The Human Rights Campaign, for instance,
released data in late April showing that 55 percent of registered voters favored
NEPs. While two separate studies by the Kaiser Family Foundation in September
and November showed 58 and 64 percent of respondents supported offering clean
needles to intravenous drug users.
103
In addition to these questions, the studies also included other questions that
are less reliable because of problematic wording. Not surprisingly, for instance, when
respondents were told that “several different government agencies and independent
scientific organizations, including the National Academy of Sciences, have concluded
that needle exchange programs are effective at reducing HIV infections among IV
100
In February 1994 Peter D. Hart Research conducted a survey of 1,100 adult Americans on behalf of
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[intravenous] drug users without increasing their drug use” only 20 percent of
respondents said they still opposed the programs. 104 These results, however, cannot
be taken as a fair representation of opinion because the question itself is terribly
leading. Rather than telling respondents why some people support and others oppose
NEPs and allowing them to come to their own conclusions, the question states only
the pro-NEP position. In another problematic measure of opinion on this issue,
respondents were asked whether the “law should stay as it is and federal funds should
not be used for needle exchange programs” or whether it “should be changed and
state and local governments should decide for themselves whether to use their” funds
for NEPs? 105 Not surprisingly, more than six in ten Americans stated that the decision
should be left to the states and localities, not the federal government. Given the
double-barreled nature of the question and the fact that it not only measures attitudes
toward the law, but whether respondents are comfortable with the federal government
tying the hands of states and localities, it is not surprising that a vast majority of
Americans supported some measure of state and local autonomy.
106
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These problematic questions aside, however, the previous questions do show
that there was some support for NEPs. Interestingly, however, additional questions
asked during the same time period show that opinion was more complicated than it
seemed at first glance. When respondents were asked whether they “favor” NEPs
because they “help to reduce the spread of HIV” or whether they oppose” the
programs because “they send the message that it’s okay to use drugs,” only 48
percent of respondents said they support the programs, and opposition climbed within
the margin of error to 46 percent. Moreover, when respondents were read elements of
both the pro-NEP and anti-NEP arguments support dropped to 43 percent and
opposition climbed to 53 percent.
107
Finally, when asked specifically whether federal
money should be used to fund the programs, only 44 percent said it should, while just
over a majority, 52 percent said it should not.
108
These findings are important because they show that opinion regarding NEPs
was more complicated than it first seemed. Despite numerous press releases from
AIDS activists stating that a majority of Americans support needle exchanges, the
reality of opinion was slightly different.
109 When reminded of both sides of the
argument, particularly the concern that NEPs amount to tacit governmental support of
drug use, opposition to the programs was either even with or outweighed support.
Moreover, when asked specifically about whether federal tax dollars should be used,
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a majority of Americans said they opposed the use of federal money to fund NEPs.
The President’s decision then to embrace the scientific evidence but to shy away from
lifting the ban is very much in line with opinion at the time.
As in the case of the VAT, this is not to suggest that public opinion was the
only or most important factor that played a role in the White House’s decision. In
this instance, it is important to remember it was not only a midterm election year, but
many in Congress, particularly in the House, opposed lifting the ban, as did at least
one key member of the President’s cabinet on substantive grounds, General
McCaffrey and other members of his staff, such as Rahm Emanuel, on political
grounds.
1 10 Given the historical record, however, which shows that the President
favored lifting the ban and the state of opinion, which all but mirrors the White
House’s final position, it appears that polls played a role in the President’s decision
not to take that action.
1 1
1
Eighteen months after leaving office, former President Clinton spoke publicly
for the first time about his decision not to lift the federal funding ban. In an interview
conducted after the close of the 14
th
International Conference on AIDS in Barcelona,
Spain Clinton said that he “erred in not supporting needle exchange programs.”"
2
“I
think I was wrong about that,” he said. “I should have tried harder to do that.”
1 13
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Clinton went on to explain that his decision was a result of pressure he received from
McCaffrey, division in Congress over the issue, and fear of “political disaster” if he
attempted to lift the ban . 114
Preliminary Conclusions: Parameter Setting
. Despite differences in terms of
the supporting evidence, these cases show that opinion does operate as a check on the
actions of officials and polls are used to set parameters or decide what not to do.
From an evidentiary perspective, these cases demonstrate that while
determining the official’s initial policy stance, whether and how it changed, and the
direction of opinion is not difficult, it is more complicated to determine whether
changes in the officials policy stance were a result, at least in part, of opinion polls.
In the case of the VAT, for instance, there is direct confirmation from Greenberg that
polls played an important role in the president’s decision not to pursue the tax. In the
case of NEPs, however, there is not official confirmation and researchers are left to
draw inferences from the historical record, which shows that Clinton initially favored
lifting the ban, but as a result of several factors, including the nature of opinion,
decided against pursuing this course of action at the last minute.
The case analysis also allows for several other preliminary conclusions. First,
while public opinion played a role in decision-making in both of these instances, it
was not the sole or most important factor in either case. This makes sense given the
nature of public opinion and policy-making. As Carol Weiss notes, the policy arena
is “a busy place” and public opinion is just one piece of information that may play a
role .
1 15
Second, the model suggests that in cases of parameter setting the
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administration will examine a number of potential policy options. While this was the
case with the VAT, it was not the case with NEPs.
Third, the two independent variables, the direction of opinion and of the
administration’s initial policy stance, were helpful in determining the dependent
variable, how officials use polls. The limited number of cases, however, made it
difficult to find evidence of parameter setting in all the instances hypothesized.
Whereas it was hypothesized that parameter setting could take place any time the
public opposed and the official favored or was uncommitted to a policy stance (see
Table 5.2), the cases analyzed did not lend support for this. Instead, as Table 5.4
shows, the cases in which parameter setting was evident were those in which the
public had mixed attitudes and the official either favored or was uncommitted to a
policy initiative. Consequently, while parameter setting may occur when the majority
opposes a proposal, finding support for this contention requires examining additional
cases in which public opposition is evident.
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Table 5.4: Direction of Opinion and Officials’ Policy Stance Necessary To Set
Parameters 16
Pro/
Favor
Direction of Public Opinion
Mixed Con/
Oppose
Officials
Pro/Favor Parameter
Setting [PS]
Ex. NEP's
Stance
On Policv
Not
committed
PS
Ex. VAT
—
Con/Oppose .... —
—
The fact that it is possible to find evidence of parameter setting when the
public has mixed attitudes and the official either supports or is not committed to a
policy suggests that there is a predictive quality to the way in which opinion is used.
Ann G. Serow, W. Wayne Shannon, and Everett C. Ladd are just some of the many
researchers who have described the nexus between opinion and policy-making as
mysterious.’ As they write, the fact that V.O. Key’s “last word” on the subject was
“in the form of a metaphor” is “a sure sign that there is no possibility of scientific
exactitude.” These findings, however, suggest that this is not necessarily the case.
Given the direction of opinion and the officials’ initial policy stance, it is possible to
determine how opinion may be used. This is not to suggest that opinion will always
or solely be used to set parameters in these instances, but rather that this is one way in
which opinion can be used. This means that advisors who rely on polling may be
more constrained in terms of how they counsel officials than previously suggested. It
also means that predicting when officials will set parameters may be a less arduous
116 The “—“ marking indicates that while other types of use may be possible in these instances,
parameter setting is not.
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task than often assumed. In order to find evidence of this type of use, it is important
to consider the direction of opinion and the officials’ initial policy stance. Parameter
setting cannot be said to occur, however, unless the evidence shows, as it did in both
of these cases, that polls played a role in the officials decision not to pursue a policy
option that he was initially favored (NEP’s) or was not publicly committed to (VAT).
Fourth, the use of polls to set parameters may not be as widespread as Key
suggested. Parameter setting is possible only in a limited number of instances,
specifically when the direction of opinion and the administration’s policy stance co-
vary as described previously. Moreover, even in these instances, parameter setting is
just one way in which opinion can be used. To this extent the independent variables
are not determinative, rather they help narrow the range of options available to policy
makers.
Fifth, when officials use opinion to set parameters, they are not always being
substantively responsive to the majority will . 118 Substantive responsiveness,
sometimes also referred to as governmental responsiveness, means that the “public’s
substantive preferences point government officials in specific policy directions.”
Substantive responsiveness was not present in either of the cases examined because
opinion was divided. If subsequent research shows that parameter setting also occurs
when opinion is opposed to a measure, this would be an example of substantive
responsiveness because in this instance the substantive preferences of the majority
would play a key role in the official’s decision not to pursue a policy initiative.
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Sixth, use must be considered apart from success. When an official uses polls
to set parameters, for instance, this does not mean that he will be successful. The
proposal may still be enacted over his objections. In a system of separated powers
where many actors have a role in policy making, the determination of one, even a key
actor such as the President, may not be enough to dissuade other segments of the
government from acting differently. In the case of the NEPs, for instance, Congress
could have passed legislation lifting the funding ban and put Clinton in the difficult
position of having to veto the bill. Even if the President decided to veto the bill,
Congress may have been able to gamer enough votes for an override.
Finally, these cases tell us something important about the power of opinion
that has long been overlooked. While the power of opinion has often been interpreted
as the ability of the public to exercise initiative or dictate positive action, this model
demonstrates that this is not always the case. Parameter setting shows that, to the
contrary, at least in some instances, the power of opinion is the power to set limits or
to say no. To this extent, opinion appears to act as a veto point or a check on policy
maker’s actions.
Table 5.5 shows how the model of parameter setting has been revised to
account for these findings.
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Table 5.5: Parameter Setting - Revised Model
Problem/ -> Potential policy -> Acquire subjective ->
Issue option or options opinion/attitude data
comes on are formulated; that indicates the level of
the agenda official(s) either public opposition to
favor or are the policy option or
uncommitted to options
the policy/ies
under consideration
Interpret data ->
(determine level
of opposition to
the policy option or
options)
Official does not -> Official attempts to
pursue policy (in set parameters of
part or whole) action, may or may
if the public is not be successful
divided on or
opposed to the
measure. Opinion
is seldom the
only determining
factor in this decision,
but rather one of several
variables.
in that attempt
Pandering
Case #3: Tax Deduction for College Tuition. Education reform was a
cornerstone of Clinton’s administration, beginning with his efforts to nationalize
testing and standards and to secure passage ofGOALS 2000 and the Improving
America’s Schools Acts.
119
This case focuses on a component of his post-secondary
education policy, the $10,000 tax deduction for college tuition, because it exemplifies
the use polls to “pander” to opinion.
119
H.R. 1804, GOALS 2000: Educate America Act, passed during the 103
rd Congress was designed to
“improve learning and teaching by providing a national framework for education reform, to promote
the research, consensus building, and systemic changes needed to ensure equitable educational
opportunities and high levels of educational achievement for all students; to provide a framework for
reauthorization of all Federal education programs; [and] to promote the development and adoption of a
voluntary national system of skill standards and certifications.” Available on-line at
http://www.ed.gOv/legislation/GOALS2000/TheAct (accessed 30 July 2003). H.R. 6 Improving
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To understand what role polling played in the development of the $10,000 tax
deduction, it is important to look back at the mid-term election of 1994. With all of
the seats in the House of Representatives and one-third of the seats in the Senate at
stake, Republicans tried an unconventional approach. As opposed to running
primarily on local issues, they nationalized their campaigns and ran on issues of
national import listed in the “Contract with America.” The tactic paid off. The
President’s party suffered its worst mid-term defeat since 1946, losing not only the
Senate, but the House as well.
Part of Clinton’s strategy in the post-election period, was to co-opt aspects of
his opponent’s plan. One aspect of the “Contract with America” that appealed to
Clinton was the tax cuts. He was particularly attracted to the $500 per child tax credit
the Republicans were proposing. The plan, first championed by Senator Rod Grams
of Minnesota and Tim Hutchinson of Arkansas in the early 1990s, eventually became
known as the “crown jewel” of the Republican Contract. 120 After the 1994 election
debacle, the President decided that he needed to present a tax cut program of his own.
As Secretary of Labor Robert Reich writes, in the post-election period much of the
debate in the White House concerned whether Clinton “should propose a tax cut. The
deficit hawks [were] against it, but B [Bill Clinton] want[ed] to match the five-
hundred-dollar per child tax credit the Republicans [were] offering.”
121 Tax cuts,
however, had become something of a sensitive issue for Clinton because in the 1992
campaign he promised both deficit reduction and a middle-class tax cut. Once in
120 Quoted from Senator Tim Hutchinson of Arkansas who in conjunction with Senator Rod Grams of
Minnesota spoke before the Minnesota Family Council Supporters on November 20, 1997. See Pro-
Family News http://www.mfc.org/pfh/97-12/senators.html (accessed July 30, 2003).
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office, however, it became clear that he could not achieve both simultaneously.
Consequently, he opted to cut the deficit and promised tax cuts once the economy
recovered. As of late 1994, however, he had still not been able to deliver on that
promise and after the election he began to fear that this might hinder his bid for
reelection. As a result, Clinton decided that it was not prudent to wait until the State
of the Union to unveil his tax cut plan. Instead he decided to go public with it in a
prime-time speech in mid-December. 122
The problem, however, was that the President was uncertain as to what types
of cuts to offer. Consequently, much of the debate in the Oval Office during that time
centered on what his plan should look like, how it could be accomplished without
raising the deficit or cutting key programs, and what types of cuts would appeal to the
• 1 1'l .
public. After considering several ideas, he asked his new pollster, Dick Morris, to
formulate a survey that tested public reaction to a variety of tax cuts, including a
capital-gains tax cut, an income tax cuts, a tax credit for parents with children under
thirteen, and a tax credit for families making less than $70,000 a year. 124 Just before
the survey was about to go into the field, Clinton asked Morris to include another idea
initially proposed by Reich, a tax deduction for college tuition. The survey,
formulated by Morris and conducted by Mark Penn and Douglas Schoen, showed that
“Reich’s idea for tax deductions for college tuition resonated deeply with the public
122
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at a visceral level” and enjoyed far more support than “any other tax cut proposal.
.
.
tested.”
126
Other polls taken at the time also show overwhelming support for the
proposal. In mid-December, during the same week that Morris’s poll was conducted,
the Gallup Organization asked a representative sample of American adults whether
they favored “allowing people to take a tax deduction for college tuition”? The
findings mirror those of the White House, with an overwhelming 84 percent of
respondents saying they “favored” the proposal. Moreover, just as the Morris poll
showed, the proposal was more popular than any other types of tax cuts tested,
including the Republican’s $500 per child tax credit and a capital gains tax cut. 127
Later polls continued to show high levels of support for the plan. A study conducted
by Louis Harris, for instance, found that almost eight in ten Americans support tax
•
• 1 28
deductions for college tuition.
Many of the surveys conducted from late 1994 through the 1996 election
examined the proposal in a different way. As opposed to asking solely about the tax
deduction, they juxtaposed the Clinton administration’s tax cut proposal with the
Republican plan, although none of the questions referenced Clinton, other presidential
candidates, or either party specifically. In each instance, the $10,000 tax deduction
126
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was listed as a prominent component of the President’s plan and in each case it
garnered a great deal of support. As Table 5.6 shows, between January 1995 and
September 1996, respondents said they favored it over the Republican offering by
substantial margins.
Table 5.6: Percentage of the Public who Favor Clinton’s Vs/, the Republicans
Tax Cut Proposals, in which the Tax Deduction is Listed as a Key
Component of Clinton’s Plan: January 1995-Novemberl996 129
Date Favor
Clinton Plan
Favor
Republican Plan
DK, Neither,
Other, Both.
Pollster/Sponsor
1/22/95 55% 23% 22% LATa
4/4/95 67 14 19 NBC/WSJb
9/17/96 47 39 14 NBC/WSJc
3
There are two proposals for cutting taxes being considered in Washington. One proposal would
provide families with annual incomes of up to 75,000 dollars with a tax credit for children under 13,
and families with incomes of up to 100,000 dollars with a tax deduction for their children’s college
tuition. The other proposal would provide families with an income up to 200,000 dollars with a tax
credit for all children, as well as a 50 percent cut in the capital gains tax. Which of these proposals do
^ou prefer. . . ?
b Now I am going to describe two proposed sets of tax cuts, and I would like you to tell me which one,
if either, you prefer. Proposal A includes a five-hundred-dollar per child tax credit for families earning
up to two hundred thousand dollars per year, a fifty percent reduction in the capital gains tax, and
reductions in corporate income taxes, but would require large spending cuts to avoid mcreasing the
deficit. Proposal B is a smaller set of tax cuts that includes a five-hundred-dollar per child tax credit
for families making up to seventy-five thousand dollars a year an tax deductions for college tuition
costs, and would require smaller spending cuts to avoid increasing the deficit. Do you prefer Proposal
A or Proposal B, or do you favor neither proposal?
c
Let me describe two proposals on the issue of taxes, and tell me which one you agree with more.
Proposal A includes major across-the-board tax cuts, such as a fifteen percent reduction in income
taxes and a fifty percent reduction in the capital gains tax, as well as a tax credit for parents of one
thousand dollars per child, for a total reduction of five hundred and fifty billion dollars. Proposal B
does not include across-the-board tax cuts, but includes targeted cuts, such as a tax deduction for
college expenses of up to ten thousand dollars and a tax credit for parents of five hundred dollars per
child, for a total reduction of one hundred and ten billion dollars. Which proposal do you agree with
more?
128 The Louis Harris poll, conducted November 19-23, 1997, found that 77 percent of Americans
support tax deductions for college tuition, 22 percent oppose the plan, and 2 percent “Don’t Know”.
The survey is housed at the Roper Center and available via the Lexis-Nexis system.
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These polls were conducted between January 1995 and September 1996. The first, just after the
president introduced his plan and directly before the 1995 State of the Union message. The second in
April 1995, and the third, just before the 1996 election. In each case the Clinton administration’s plan
was juxtaposed with the Republican plan, although no candidates or parties were specifically
referenced in any of the questions. Questions that did reference candidates and/or parties are available,
but were not included in this chart to avoid contaminating the results.
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After Morris shared the results of his December 1994 poll with the President,
he was tapped to help design Clinton’s upcoming speech. 130 Days later, in a televised
address to the nation, the President announced the college tuition tax deduction as a
key component of his “Middle Class Bill of Rights.” Speaking from the Oval Office,
he stated:
Fifty years ago an American President proposed the GI bill of rights
To help returning veterans from World War II go to college...
Tonight I propose a middle class bill of rights. There are four central
ideas in this bill of rights. First, college tuition should be tax
deductible. 131
Clinton went on to explain that under his plan “all tuition for college, community
college, graduate school, professional school, and vocational education or worker
retraining” would be “fully deductible up to $10,000 a year for families making up to
$120,000 a year.” 13 " He reiterated his proposal several times in the subsequent
months, including in his 1995 State of the Union address. 133
The way in which polls were used in this instance shows that this is a fairly
clear case of pandering. While Clinton favored tax cuts of some sort, he was not
130
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married to any particular proposal. Instead, he relied on polling to help determine
which of several potential tax cut alternatives was the most popular and then used this
as a basis for determining which policy option to pursue.
While the tax deduction floundered for some time amidst debate over how
large it should be the President, according to Moms, never forgot how much support
it garnered in initial polling. 134 Consequently, less than a year before the 1996
election, the President attempted to reinvigorate his proposal by tacking on a $1500
college tuition tax credit to help pay for the first two years of college. Despite strong
opposition from some of his closest aides and economic advisors, including National
Economic Adviser Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin,
Secretary Reich, Secretary Rivilin, and Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers Joseph Stiglitz, the President was determined to match the Republicans call
for tax cuts and determined to do so by pursuing a plan that resonated strongly the
public. Clinton unveiled his revitalized proposal in a commencement speech at
Princeton University on June 4, 1996. The goal of the program, he argued, was to
make the thirteenth and fourteenth years of education as accessible and affordable as
the first twelve. As he stated,
I have asked Congress to pass a $10,000 tax deduction to help families
pay for the cost of all education after high school... Today I announce
one more element to complete our college strategy... we will give you
a tax credit to pay the cost of tuition.
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President William Jefferson Clinton, “Remarks at the Princeton University Commencement
Ceremony in Princeton, New Jersey,” June 4, 1996. Available through The Clinton Presidential
Materials Project, The National Archives. Accessible on-lme at http://Clinton.archives.gov/project
(accessed July 30, 2003).
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He went on to explain that under his revitalized proposal, families earning up to
$100,000 a year could choose a “single $10,000 deduction for the whole family or a
direct $1,500 tax credit for each eligible child.” 136 As Table 5.7 shows, the tax credit
was just as popular as the tax deduction. Support for the tax credit was consistently
high, never dropping below 62 percent and at one point it reached 86 percent.
Table 5.7: Percentage of Public who Support Clinton’s $1500 Tax Credit For
College Tuition: November 1996-February 1997
Date Favor Oppose DK, etc... Pollster/Soonsor
11/4/96 86 11 3 Newsweek3
11/6/96 70 25 5 Kaiserb
2/22/97 62 31 c 7 Wirthlind
a
(I will read you some things Bill Clinton might try to do in a second term as President. As I read each
one, tell me whether you would like to see Clinton do this and whether you think he will try to do this
in a second term.) What about ... tax credits to help people pay for college tuition? Is this something
you would like to see Clinton try to do, or not?
° I'm going to read you some proposals concerning budgetary issues that were discussed during this
year's presidential and congressional campaigns. As I read each one, tell me if you generally favor it or
oppose it. Do you favor or oppose . . . providing tax credits for people who attend community
colleges?
c
Thinking about taxes and education spending for a moment, if one candidate running for Congress
advocated a $ 1500 tax credit for all parents of teenagers who go to college and another candidate for
Congress supported a $500 tax credit for all parents who have teenagers, regardless of whether or not
they go to college, based on these positions alone, which candidate would you vote for?
Case #4: Constitutional Amendment Protecting Victims’ Rights . Throughout
his presidency, Clinton came out strongly against a number of proposed constitutional
amendments. During the 1992 campaign, for instance, he refused to embrace calls for
a balanced budget amendment.
137 He took a similar stance in opposition the proposed
line item veto, term limits, flag desecration, abortion, and prayer in public schools
136 Todd S. Purdum, “Politics: The President: Clmton Proposes U.S. Tax Credits for College Aid,”
New York Times, June 5, 1996.
137 On June 10, 1992, five months before the election, then candidate Clinton said he opposed a
proposal before Congress calling for a balanced budget amendment in part because it placed “too
many
restrictions on government spending.” Gwen Ifill, “The 1992 Campaign: Democrats; Balanced Budget
Proposal Termed Harmful by Clinton,” New York Times, June 11, 1992.
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amendments. In each instance, Clinton said he opposed these efforts because
Framers such as James Madison argued that such action should be reserved for “great
and extraordinary occasions.” 139 On the issue of flag burning, for instance, the
administration argued that the problem should “be addressed by statute rather than a
constitutional amendment” and warned that it was “dangerous to tamper with the
Constitution.”
140
Speaking before a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on behalf of the
administration in June 1995, Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger III said that
despite supporting legislation to ban flag desecration at the state and federal level and
despite his opposition to the Supreme Court’s ruling striking down such legislation,
the President did not favor a constitutional amendment because he valued the
Constitution as written and thus tended to oppose amendments, even on issues he
agreed with.
141
The President has “always believed,” Dellinger continued, “that we
should be very careful about amending the Constitution. . . You have to be very, very
cautious about changing the actual wording.”
142
Despite the President’s eloquent defense of his position on flag burning, a
year later he surprised many in his own administration and the Justice Department by
138
“The Attack That Fizzled,” New York Times, October 17, 1996; Eric Pianin and Guy Gugliotta,
“Budget Amendment Gets Warmer Climate; GOP Pet Projects May Find More Favor in Senate,”
Washington Post, November 12, 1996.
139 Todd S. Purdum, “Politics: The Democrat; Clinton to Back Amendment on Victims’ Rights, Aides
Say,” New York Times, June 21, 1996.
140 Ruth Marcus, “Victims’ Rights Amendment Pondered: Clinton Advisers Seeking to Capture
Election Year Crime Issue,” Washington Post, June 21, 1996.
141
In the 1989 case of Texas v. Johnson the Supreme Court ruled that Gregory Lee Johnson’s
desecration of the American flag during the 1984 Republican Convention was political expression and
was protected by the First Amendment. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) In the aftermath of the
Court’s ruling, Congress passed the Flag Protection Act of 1989. In United States v. Eichman (1990)
the Supreme Court struck down this federal law as a violation of the First Amendment as well. See
United States v. Eichman 496 U.S. 310 (1990). See for instance, Lee Epsteinand Thomas G. Walker,
Constitutional Lawfor a Changing America : Rights Liberties, and Justice, 4 ed. (Washington, DC:
CQ Press, 2001), 251-57.
142
Pat Griffith, “Amendment on Flag Opposed by Clinton,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, June 7, 1995.
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coming out in favor of a constitutional amendment to protect the rights of crime
victims. Clinton’s stance on this issue can be explained by two primary factors: his
opponent’s position and public opinion polls.
On May 28, 1996, Republican presidential nominee Bob Dole endorsed a
constitutional amendment on victims’ rights proposed by Senator Jon Kyi, a
Republican from Arizona, and Senator Dianne Feinstein, a California Democrat.
Illinois Republican Henry Hyde also introduced a weaker version of the bill in the
House of Representatives. 143 “At least twenty states already have state constitutional
amendments protecting victims’ rights,” said Dole, a co-sponsor of the Kyl/Feinstein
amendment. 144 “Let’s extend those rights to every crime victim in America.” 145
Less than two weeks after Dole’s statement, White House advisor’s presented
Clinton with a briefing memo urging him to support the crime victims amendment. 146
The June 12 memo included detailed polling results that showed almost nine out of
ten Americans “supported] a constitutional amendment,” and 69 percent were
strongly in favor of the amendment.
147
Moreover, the memo showed that if Clinton
relied on his traditional argument against amendments and suggested that victims’
143
Marcus, “Victims’ Rights Amendment Pondered.”
144 The amendment was most recently re-introduced in the Senate by Kyi and Feinstein on January 7,
2003. The current version, S.J. Res. 1, contains five sections. Sections 1 and 2 read in part: “The
rights of victims of violent crime . . . shall not be denied by any State or the United States. ... A victim
. . . shall have the right to reasonable and timely notice of any public proceeding involving the crime
and of any release or escape of the accused; the rights not to be excluded from such public proceeding
and reasonably to be heard at public release, plea, sentencing, reprieve, and pardon proceedings; and
the right to adjudicative decisions that duly consider the victim's safety, interest in avoiding
unreasonable delay, and just and timely claims to restitution from the offender. These rights shall not
be restricted except when and to the degree dictated by a substantial interest in public safety or the
administration of criminal justice, or by compelling necessity.”
145
Marcus, “Victims’ Rights Amendment Pondered.”
146
Actual text of briefing material presented to the president by his aides on June 12, 1996, and
included in the Appendix of Morris’s, Behind the Oval Office , 572.
147
Ibid.
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rights should be protected by statute, 61 percent of the public would still favor an
amendment over legislation. 148
On June 21, less than ten days after being presented with the polling data,
Senior White House officials told reporters that the President was “weighing” his
options and considering supporting the amendment. They also admitted that Dole’s
backing of the issue just weeks before had “accelerated the review process.” 149
During an interview on CBS’s Face the Nation a few days later, White House Chief
of Staff Leon Panetta confirmed that the President was seriously considering backing
the amendment. 150
Then on June 25, in a Rose Garden ceremony attended by Kyi, Feinstein, Vice
President A1 Gore, members of the National Movement for Victims’ Advocacy,
parents of slain children, including Roberta and Vincent Roper, John and Pat Byron,
Marc Klaas, and the host of “America’s Most Wanted,” John Walsh, Clinton
announced his support for a constitutional amendment on victims’ rights. The
148
These findings comport with data from other state and national polls, all of which show a great deal
of support for this issue. A 1991 national survey, for instance, found that almost nine in ten (89
percent) of Americans would probably or definitely support amending their state constitution in order
to increase victims’ rights protections. Similarly, a state-specific poll taken in South Carolina in 1993
showed that eight in ten respondents (86 percent) would definitely or probably support a state
constitutional amendment to protect the rights of crime victims. Moreover, in early 1996, around the
same time that Clinton announced his support for the amendment twenty-one states had already ratified
constitutional amendments for crime victims’ rights. In November 1996, several additional states
(Connecticut, Indiana, Nevada, Nebraska, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and
Virginia) ratified similar amendments. Support for the amendments on election day 1996 was strong,
with an average of 80 percent of voters expressing support for the amendments. See for instance:
“1996 Victims’ Rights Sourcebook: A Compilation and Comparison of Victims’ Rights Laws,’’
accessible on a web site maintained by The National Center for Victims of Crime at:
http://wrww.ncvc.org/resources/reports/sourcebook/index.html (accessed August 6, 2003). In particular
see chapter 2, pages 2 and 8, as well as the Appendix, chapter 14, page 1. See also, America Speaks
Out: Citizens Attitudes About Violence and Victimization, National Victim Center, April 1991, pp. 5-7,
and South Carolina Speaks Out: Attitudes About Crime and Victims ' Rights, South Carolina [SC]
Victim Assistance Network, SC State Office of Victim Assistance, Crime Victims Research and
Treatment Center at the Medical University of SC, 1993.
149
Marcus, “Victims’ Rights Amendment Pondered.”
150
“Crime Victims’ Bill,” USA Today, June 24, 1996.
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President began by noting that while the criminal justice system “bends over
backwards to protect” the rights of those accused of crimes, it all too often ignores the
rights of crime victims. As a result he said, he had become convinced that,
the only way to safeguard the rights of victims in America is to
amend our Constitution. .. The only way to give victims equal and
due consideration is to amend the Constitution. 151
Two days later, the President issued a related memorandum on crime victims’ rights
to Attorney General Janet Reno. The memo directed Reno to take a three “important
steps” to “improve the treatment of victims... in the criminal justice system.” 152
In the wake of Clinton’s announcement, Dole expressed skepticism about his
motivation. As his Deputy Press Secretary Christina Martina stated, this seems to be
“the latest episode in his ongoing game of follow the leader.” 153 Dole’s support for
the amendment appears to have been a key factor in the President’s decision.
Clinton’s position on the amendment fits directly into his post- 1994 strategy of
preempting his opponents by favoring traditionally Republican issues.
Public support for the amendment also appears to have been a major factor in
the President’s decision. Clinton made the decision to come out in favor of the
amendment only after White House aides presented him with data that showing it was
popular and that there was comparatively little support for his argument against
151
“Remarks Announcing Support for a Constitutional Amendment on Victims’ Rights,” June 25,
1996, Rose Garden at the White House, pp. 976-78. “Clinton Presidential Materials Project,” The
National Archives: Public Papers of the President, accessible on-line at:
http://www.clinton.archives.gov/public-papers/punlic_papers.html (accessed August 2, 2003).
152
Por a review of that memo and the three steps Clinton directed the Attorney General to take in order
to protect the rights of victims see, “Memorandum on Crime Victims Rights, June 27, 1996,
Memorandum for the Attorney General, pp. 987-988. “Clinton Presidential Materials Project, The
National Archives: Public Papers of the President, accessible on-line at:
http://www.clinton.archives.gov/public_papers/public_papers.html (accessed August 2, 2003).
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Alison Mitchell, “Politics: The Democrats; Clinton Calls for Amendment Guaranteeing Victims’
Rights,” New York Times, June 26, 1996.
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tampering with the Constitution. If the public opposed the amendment it is far less
likely Clinton would have supported it, regardless of Dole’s position, for two key
reasons. First, this would have required Clinton to change his stance on amending the
Constitution, and in the absence of public support there would have been little
incentive for him to do this. Second, Clinton’s post-midterm election strategy
stressed the importance of pre-empting his opponents on traditionally Republican
issues, specifically those that were popular with the American people. Consequently,
it makes little sense to assume that polls were not important in this case and that
Clinton would have pushed for the amendment in the absence of public support
because this would have run counter to his election strategy.
Preliminary Conclusions: Pandering . These cases show that policy-makers use
polls to pander to the majority will. As with the previous model, however, several
caveats are in order.
First, as the models indicate, opinion was not the sole or even most important
factor in decision-making in either of these cases. Instead opinion was just one of
several factors that entered into the President’s decision to support tax deductions and
the victims’ rights amendment. Second, whereas the President considered numerous
alternatives before settling on tax deductions, in the case of the constitutional
amendment the administration relied primarily on polls showing high levels of
support for the proposal.
Third, the case studies support the hypothesis that pandering occurs when the
public supports and the official is either opposed or not committed to the policy.
158
Table 5.8 demonstrates that in cases of pandering, the categories of the two variables
co-vary.
Table 5.8: Direction of Opinion and Officials’ Stance Necessary in Order to
Pander to Opinion 154
Direction of Public Oninion
Pro/ Mixed Con/
Favor Onnnsp
Officials’
Pro/Favor Parameter —
Setting [PS]
Stance Not Pandering [P] PS
On Policy committed Ex. Tax deduction
Ex. Amendment 155
Con/Oppose P
Ex. Amendment
Unlike in the case of parameter setting, however, pandering does not occur
when opinion is mixed. One potential explanation as to why officials set parameters
but do not pander when opinion is mixed is a “40 to 50 percent opposition and a 5 1 to
60 percent plus support rule”: opposition of 40 percent or more may be enough to
consider parameter setting, while majority support is essential to pandering. As the
model hypothesized, officials may set parameters even when opinion is divided
because even though the majority does not oppose the proposal, at 40 percent or more
the level of opposition is high enough that pursuing the policy is too risky. Whereas
pandering will occur only when a clear majority favors a program (roughly 5 1 to 60
154 The “—“ marking indicates that while other types of use may be possible in these instances,
pandering is not.
155 The crime victims’ constitutional amendment case is placed in both this and the box below because
while there is evidence to suggest the White House/president initially opposed amending the
Constitution in this way, they/he remained officially uncommitted until the Rose Garden ceremony.
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percent or more) because without clear majority support the official has little
incentive to change his initial policy stance and support the measure.
There is some precedent for the “5 1 to 60 percent support” rule. Dick Morris,
for instance, has suggested that he would seldom encourage an elected official to
support an issue or proposal unless it enjoys at least 50 or 60 percent support. Morris
has been quoted as saying in terms of levels of support “anything under 40 percent
doesn’t work. Fifty percent is a possibility. Sixty or seventy and the President may
well use it.” There are some exceptions to this. In the case of teen pregnancy, for
instance, Morris found 60 percent of respondents favored condom distribution in the
public schools and 64 percent favored it when coupled with the promotion of
abstinence. Nevertheless, Moms advised the President before the 1996 election that
it would be risky to pursue the issue unless support reached at least 70 percent. This is
further evidence that the higher the level of support, the more likely the official is to
pander and that even when support is strong, the official may still decide not to follow
opinion.
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Once again, the evidence shows that there is a predictive quality to the way in
which officials use opinion. If opinion and the administration’s stance co-vary in the
way described in Table 5.8, officials can use polls to pander. This does not mean,
however, as the case of condom distribution suggests, that this is their only option.
They may also choose to ignore opinion or, as the following chapter shows, use it in
other ways.
What is noteworthy about this finding is that researchers can predict with
some regularity those instances in which officials may pander to opinion. In order to
160
find evidence of pandering, researchers need to find not only of a co-variance
between opinion and the official’s policy stance, but also the official needs to change
his initial policy stance and pursue an action that is supported by a sizeable majority
of the public.
This finding is also important because it means that it is possible to determine
with some regularity, what type of advice political consultants who rely on polls are
likely to give to officials. If, for instance, the public strongly supports a proposal and
the administration is either ambivalent or inclined to oppose it, a consultant should
advise the official that he has some potential options: pander, in certain circumstances
to craft rhetoric, de-legitimize, or ignore opinion at her own peril. 157
That said, however, pandering is likely to be fairly rare. As Table 5.8 shows,
just as in the case of parameter setting, it is possible only in two instances. As the
next chapter will show, there is less opportunity to use polls to pander and set
parameters than there are to use them in other ways. Moreover, while these are
instances in which it is possible to pander, it does not mean that it is going to occur in
every instance.
Fourth, unlike in the case of parameter setting, when an official uses polls to
pander to opinion they are by definition being substantively responsive to the
majority will. This does not guarantee, however, that the official will be successful in
his or her attempt to implement the policy. The victims’ rights amendment, for
instance, is a clear case in which Clinton’s endorsement had little impact and the
proposal ultimately stalled in Congress. In fact, in the five years since, the
156
Reich, Locked in the Cabinet, 271; Morris, Behind the Oval Office, 226-27.
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amendment has been re-introduced in Congress several times and each time it has
languished there. 158
Fifth, these cases show that the power of opinion is not only negative, but
positive as well. This is not to suggest that opinion exercises independent initiative.
Rather, when an overwhelming majority of the public endorses a proposal it may help
to encourage or persuade an official to pursue it. This is important because it
suggests that the power of opinion is more complex than often assumed and the way
in which it operates depends on how officials use it. When officials pander, the
power of opinion is positive; it operates to persuade an official to pursue a particular
course of action. When officials use polls to set parameters, however, the power of
opinion is negative and it acts as a veto point of sorts.
Table 5.9 shows how the model of pandering has been amended to account for
these findings.
157
In this instance, if elite or interested opinion is also opposed to the policy, it can be used to try to
sway public opinion.
158
See for instance, The National Victims’ Constitutional Amendment Project (NVCAP) at
http://www.nvcap.org (accessed August 6, 2003) for a more complete overview of the action that has
occurred in Congress regarding the constitutional amendment over the last several years. Most
recently, the Senate Judiciary Committee was scheduled to act on S.J.Res.l on July 24, 2003. The
162
Table 5.9: Pandering - Revised Model
Problem/ Potential policy Acquire subjective ->
Issue option or options opinion/attitude data
comes on are formulated; that indicates the level of
the agenda official(s) either public support for
oppose or are the policy option or
uncommitted to options
the policy/ies
under consideration
Interpret data ->
(determine level
of support for
the policy option or
options)
Official may pursue -> Attempts to
policy if a majority implement policy,
(5 1% or more) may or may not be
favors it. Opinion is
seldom the only
determining
factor in this decision,
but rather just one of
several variables.
successful
Conclusion
These cases show varying levels of support for the models of parameter
setting and pandering. The clearest case of parameter setting is the VAT because in
this instance there is confirmation by pollster Stanley Greenberg that opinion played a
key role in Clinton’s decision not to pursue the tax. Similarly, the clearest case of
pandering is the tax deduction for college tuition because in this instance Dick Morris
confirmed that Clinton was not even considering the initiative until polls showed it
enjoyed high levels of public support.
These cases were also useful in identifying aspects of each model that need to
be amended and in drawing conclusions about the nature of public opinion and poll
use. The same methodology is applied in the following chapter to examine three
additional types of use: crafted rhetoric, legitimizing, and de-legitimizing.
amendment had been scheduled several times previously, but each time the committee failed to take
action because it was consumed by other issues and tasks.
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CHAPTER 6
THE USE OF OPINION TO CRAFT RHETORIC, LEGITIMIZE, AND
DE-LEGITIMIZE: CASE STUDIES II
This chapter continues the analysis of the role of public opinion in presidential
decision-making. The previous chapter showed that in certain circumstances public
officials use polls to set parameters and pander. This chapter tests the utility of three
additional models: rhetorical, legitimizing, and de-legitimizing. The cases listed in Table
6.1 were selected using the criteria discussed at the beginning of chapter 5.
Table 6.1: Cases Selected for Study: Crafted Rhetoric, Legitimizing, and De-
Legitimizing
Rhetorical:
5. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass (DADT)
6. Bosnia/former-Yugoslavia
Legitimizing:
7. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
8. Health Care Reform
De-legitimizing
9. Medicare Cuts
10. Environmental De-regulation - Clean Water Act
These cases differ from those examined in the previous chapter in two ways.
Whereas in the previous cases the President pursued a course of action that was contrary
to his initial policy stance, in these cases the President remains partly or wholly
committed to his favored policy. Second, unlike in the previous cases, the President does
not use polls to shape the substance of policy. Instead polls are used to try to change
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opinion, simulate responsiveness, persuade reluctant lawmakers, and make tactical
decisions.
Rhetorical
Case #5: Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell (DADT). In October 1991, Bill Clinton spoke at
Harvard University. During the discussion he was asked whether he would issue an
executive order lifting the ban on gays in the military? In response he said, “Yes. ... I
think people who are gay should be expected to work, and should be given the
opportunity to serve the country.” 1 At the time, his statement encountered only
“scattered criticism” in part because it was not covered in the media. 2 An analysis of
major newspapers, magazines, and journal articles written in the month after the forum
reveals that only one newspaper even mentioned his promise. Even then, the Boston
Globe referenced it only briefly as part of an overview of several statements Clinton
made that evening. 3 While not widely reported, this pledge, along with several others,
helped Clinton secure more than seventy percent of the gay vote. 4
1
“Queer Activism: The Battle to Lift the Ban: A Chronology, 1991-1993,” Queer Nation
,
1993.
The article further states that the “muted reaction” to his initial promise may have convinced Clinton and
gay rights activists that lifting the ban would “meet with a similar response.” “Gay Rights: Overview,” CQ
Researcher
,
March 5, 1993. Accessed on-line at: http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher (accessed August
18, 2003).
3
Curtis Wilkie mentioned the pledge almost in passing in a short article on the forum. As he wrote, “he
[Clinton] elicited approving whoops when he said he would sign an executive order to eliminate
discrimination based on sexual orientation in the US military.” “Harvard Tosses Warmup Queries to
Clinton on Eve of N.H. Debate,” Boston Globe
,
October 31, 1991. The search was conducted using the
Lexis-Nexis database.
4
Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness, 222. Clyde Wilcox and Robin Wolpert, “President Clinton, Public
Opinion, and Gays in the Military” (paper presented at the 1995 Midwest Political Science Association
Meeting), 3. According to network exit polls, Clinton received 72 percent of the gay vote in 1992,
compared with George Bush and Ross Perot who both got 14 percent of the vote. Moreover, gay activists
are reported to have contributed approximately $3.5 million to Clinton’s campaign. As Bill McAllister
reports, in the wake of the election, leaders of the Gay and Lesbian Task Force said that they were going to
press the “president-elect to make good on some of his campaign promises. The group placed top priority
on abolishing the Defense Department’s ban on homosexuals serving in the military.” Bill McAllister,
“Gay Rights Groups Applaud Clinton’s Win; Arkansas Governor Said to Get 72 Percent Support of
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The ban on homosexuals serving in the military dates back to the early 1940’s
when psychiatric screening became part of the induction process. At that time, the
psychiatric establishment viewed homosexuality as a “psychopathology” and as a result
the military changed its focus from outlawing homosexual behavior to banning
homosexual individuals for medical reasons. In 1942, for instance, anny regulations
included a definition of “normal” and homosexual people, and specified “procedures for
rejecting gay draftees.” 5 In subsequent years, homosexuals were permitted to serve
during severe personnel shortages. This was, however, only a temporary allowance. In
the post-War period, mere acknowledgement of homosexual orientation was enough to
disqualify an otherwise fit person from military service. 6 In 1981, the Department of
Defense (DoD) issued a directive codifying the ban. 7 DoD Directive 1332.14 stated that,
“homosexuality is incompatible with military service.”
Homosexual Voters,” Washington Post, November 5, 1992; Gary Lee, “Gays Get Reassurance on Military-
White House Meeting Said to Ease Fears About Clinton Pledge,” Washington Post, March 27, 1993.
Gregory M. Herek, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Revisited: Lesbians and Gay Men in the U.S. Military:
Historical Background
. Available at http://psychology.ucdavis.edu/Rainbow/html/military history.html
(accessed August 17, 2003); Catherine S. Manegold, “The Odd Place of Homosexuality in the Military,”
New York Times
>
APnl 1 8, 1993; Lance Gay, “End the Military Gay Ban,” Atlanta Journal and
Constitution, December 26, 1991.
Allan Berube, Coming Out Under Fire: The History ofGay Men and Women in World War II (New York
Free Press, 1990).
7
See DOD Directive 1332.14, 32 C.F.R., Ch. 1, pt. 41, “Enlisted Personnel Separations,” (July 1, 1993
edition) Appendix A: Standards and Procedures,” cited as “Separation Regulations,” includes: Part I -
Reasons for Separation, Part II - Guidelines for Separation and Characterization, Part III - Procedures for
Separation. Only Part II was revised in 1993 (subpart H “Homosexuality”). Part 41, App. A, Part H, reads
in part “Homosexuality. 1 . Basis. A. Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. The presence in
the military environment of persons who engage in homosexual conduct or by their statements demonstrate
a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct, seriously impairs the accomplishment of the military
mission. The presence of such members adversely affects the ability of the Military Service to maintain
good order and morale; to foster mutual trust and confidence among service members; to ensure the
integrity of the system of rank and command; to facilitate assignment and worldwide deployment of service
members who frequently must live and work under close conditions affording minimal privacy; to recruit
and retain members of the Military Services; to maintain the public acceptability of military service; and to
prevent the breaches of security. In section b, “homosexual”, “bisexual”, and a “homosexual act” are
defined. Part c considers the “basis for separation.” 32 C.F.R., Ch. 1, App. A, Pt. 41, is accessible on-line
at “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue: A Digital Law Project of the Robert Crown Law Library at
Stanford Law School,” http://don’t.stanford.edu/doclist.htm (see under Part A2.) (accessed August 18
2003).
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As the struggle for gay and lesbian rights gained momentum in the early 1970’s
so too did the call to lift the ban. By the late 1970’s and early 1980’s reversing the policy
became a priority of the gay rights movement. At the same time, the number of service
people discharged under the regulation increased. A 1992 General Accounting Office
(GAO) report states that betweenl980 and 1990, 17,000 service men and women were
discharged under the regulation. 8 In response, a growing number of service personnel
began challenging their dismissals in court. This included such well-known cases as
those brought by: James Woodward, Miriam ben Shalom, Leonard Matlovich, Perry
Watkins, Joe Steffan, Tracy Thom, Tom Paniccia, Justin Elise, Keith Meinhold, Pam
Mmdt, and Margarethe Cammermeyer. 9 Consequently, by the time Clinton proposed
issuing an executive order to lift the ban, it had not only been in place for almost half a
century, but had become an increasingly contentious issue.
While Clinton’s pledge did not initially receive much media coverage, shortly
after he was elected it became front-page news. 10 A content analysis shows that in the
two months prior to the 1992 election only sixteen major newspapers referenced his
pledge.
1
1
In comparison, in the two months after he was elected, it was mentioned more
8
As David Burrelli notes, that amounts to approximately 1,500 discharges per year. For an overview of the
GAO data see: David Burrelli, “CRS Issue Brief: 96029: Homosexuals and U.S. Military Policy: Current
Issues,” updated December 12, 1996. Available on-line at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/96-029.htm
(accessed August 17, 2003). See also: United States, General Accounting Office, Defense Force
Management: Statistics Related to DoD's Policy on Homosexuality: Report to Congressional Requesters
(Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), 1992) and United States, General Accounting
Office, Defense Force Management: Statistics Related to DoD's Policy on Homosexuality: Supplement to a
Report to Congressional Requesters (Washington, DC: U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO), 1992).
Listed in Colonel Margarethe Cammermeyer, “Preface,” in Graig A Rimmerman, ed., Gay Rights,
Military Wrongs: Political Perspectives on Lesbian and Gays in the Military (New York: Garland
Publishing, 1996), xiv.
10
Craig A. Rimmerman, “Promises Unfulfilled: Clinton’s Failure to Overturn the Military Ban on Lesbians
and Gays,” in Rimmerman, ed. Gay Rights, Military Wrongs, 1 16.
1
1
This brief, unscientific search of Lexis-Nexis archives found that from September 4-November 4, 1992,
Clinton’s pledge to end the ban was mentioned just sixteen times. The search was conducted using the
following terms: “Clinton and gay or homosexual and ban and military.”
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than two hundred times
.
12
Toward the end of his presidency Clinton blamed
Congressional Republican’s for stirring up interest in the issue. “I tried to slow it down,”
Clinton said. “But the first week I was president, Senator [Bob] Dole - who, I think, saw
it as an opportunity - decided to push a vote in the Senate disapproving of a change in the
policy. The Republicans decided that they didn’t want me to have a honeymoon. They
wanted me to be the first president without one... Republicans made this issue their
opening salvo .” 13
Almost immediately after Clinton took office Senate Minority Leader Dole
announced that he would push for an amendment reaffirming the ban on homosexuals in
the military
.
14
As debate over the issue intensified, it became clear that Clinton faced
opposition not only from Congressional Republicans but top military leaders, including
former Joint Chiefs of Staff chairman Admiral William Crowe, his successor General
Colin Powell, the powerful Chair of the Armed Services Committee Senator Sam Nunn,
other moderate Democrats, and the public as well. Clinton Defense Secretary Les Aspin’s
first meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff was, for instance, largely “dominated by an
emotional two-hour discussion of their concerns that repealing the ban would wreck
morale, undermine recruiting, force devoutly religious service members to resign and
increase the risk of AIDS for heterosexual troops .” 15 Among the most forceful opponents
12
This brief, unscientific search of Lexis-Nexis archives found that from November 5, 1992 - January
5,1993, Clinton’s pledge to end the ban was mentioned 206 times. The search was conducted using the
following terms: “Clinton and gay or homosexual and ban and military.” Bruce Bawer finds that the issue
reached its pinnacle and became the dominant news story in the week after Clinton’s inauguration. See A
Place at The Table: The Gay Individual in American Society (New York: Poseidon Press, 1993), 59.
13
Interview with Jann S. Wenner conducted October 6, 2000, in the Cabinet Room of the White House.
See Jann S. Wenner, “Bill Clinton: The Rolling Stone Interview,” Rolling Stone, December 28, 2000-
January 4, 200 1,89,91.
14
“Tension Rises on Gay Issue; GOP Plans Measure on Reaffirming Ban,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
January 27, 1993.
15
Eric Schmitt, “Settling In: The Armed Services; Joint Chiefs Fighting Clinton Plan to Allow
Homosexuals in the Military,” New York Times, January 23, 1993.
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of lifting the ban was Powell who, like many uniformed officers, opposed the move on
the grounds that it would threaten order and discipline within the military ranks
.
16
While
the hostility and threatened resignations of members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was a
blow to the administration, even more critical was the opposition of Nunn, one of the
most powerful Democrats in the Senate
.
17
Just weeks after Clinton assumed office Nunn
challenged the President’s power to lift the ban unilaterally and vowed to join
Republicans in passing legislation to stop the President from issuing an executive order . 18
Clinton had hoped to use Harry Truman’s order fifty years earlier ending military
segregation as a model for his policy. “I wanted to do it the way Harry Truman
integrated the military,” he noted. “He issued an executive order and gave military
leaders a couple of years to figure out how best to do it.” 19 Clinton’s initial intention was
to follow a two-prong strategy. First, he intended to require that the Uniform Code of
Military Justice’s (UCMJ) criminal sanction against sodomy be applied equally to both
heterosexuals and homosexuals
.
20
Second, he intended to change the basis of discharge
from status to behavior. The goal was to ensure that homosexuals could serve regardless
of the sexual orientation, provided they did not engage in prohibited conduct . 21
Early on in the process, however, Senator George Mitchell informed the
administration that there were at least seventy votes in the Senate to overturn an
16
Ibid.
17
Aspin, for instance, noted that the ban could “be lifted only if America’s military leaders concurred,
which at the present time they emphatically do not.” Martin Fletcher, “Clinton Pledge to Lift Gay Ban in
Military Threatened By Pentagon Opposition,” The Times (London), January 25, 1993.
18
Maria Puente, “Nunn Ready to Do Battle to Keep Gays Out of the Military,” USA Today, January 26,
1993; Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness, 222; Pat Towell, “Nunn Offers a Compromise: ‘Don’t
Ask/Don’t Tell’,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report ( 1 993):5 1 : 226-9.
19
Wenner, “Bill Clinton,” 89.
20
See the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Section 925, Article 125, Sodomy (Appendix B). Accessible
on-line at http://dont.stanford.edu/casestudy/appendixB.pdf (accessed August 18, 2003).
21
Louis Cannon, “Discharged Gay Colonel Pins Hope on Clinton’s Promise,” Washington Post, December
29, 1992.
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executive order lifting the ban. 2 - As Clinton later said, “[w]e knew that at least seventy-
five percent of the House would vote against my policy. If I was going to be able to do
anything, I had to have a veto-proof minority in either the House or the Senate. But the
Senate voted sixty-eight to thirty-two against my policy, which meant that I could not
sustain my policy in either house .”23
Faced with mounting opposition and powerless to issue an executive order that
would not be overturned in Congress, Clinton abandoned his initial plan and announced
in late January that he would wait six months before making a final decision
.
24
The
President hoped this would give Aspin enough time to work out a compromise with
senior military leaders and members of Congress . 25
In the ensuing months, however, Clinton was widely criticized by members of the
left wing of his party and gay and lesbian activists for failing to live up to his promise and
by social conservatives for attempting to lift the ban in the first place . 26 The criticism
from the left seemed to reinforce in the public’s mind that the President was willing to
compromise his ideals. While the criticism from the right seemed to reinforce the notion
that Clinton was not the “new-Democraf ’ he claimed to be, but rather a McGovem-style
liberal. As Clinton later recalled, “I didn’t understand what I know now.
. . the message
— Jim Salzman, Janet Halley, and Stacey Sobel, “Teaching Notes for the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell Case
Study,” accessible on-line at: http://dont.stanford.edu/casestudy (accessed August 18, 2003).
23
Wenner, “Bill Clinton,” 89.
" 4 Greg McDonald, “Clinton Opts for Slow Approach to End Military Gay Ban,” Houston Chronicle
,
January 26, 1993; Wenner, “Bill Clinton,” 89.
25
This decision was announced publicly just after a heated two-hour meeting between the president and his
Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of whom opposed lifting the ban. Ann Devroy, “President Stands Firm on
Ditching Gay Ban,” Chicago Sun-Times, January 26, 1993; McDonald, “Clinton Opts for Slow.”
20
Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness, 222; Richard Berke, “A Gay-Rights President Is at a Loss for
Words,” New York Times, April 4, 1993; Jack Germond and Jules Witcover, “Clinton’s Gays-in-the-
Military Snare,” National Journal, April 3, 1993, 836.
27
Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness
,
221-2; Pat Towell, “Roles for Women, Homosexuals among
Clinton’s First Tests,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1992, 50: 3679; Germond and Witcover,
“Clinton’s Gays-in-the-Military,” 836.
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that was out in the country was, ‘We elected this guy to turn the economy around, and
instead his top priority is gays in the military.’ But that’s not true; it was Bob Dole’s top
priority,” he continued. ‘‘His top priority was making this the controversy that would
consume the early days of my presidency, and it was a brilliant political move. If it
happened to me again, I would say, ‘‘Why is this the Republicans’ top priority? 1 don’t
want to deal with this now. We can deal with this in six months.
. . lets take care of the
American people now.”28
Unable to issue an executive order and unwilling to go back on his promise,
Clinton instead waited for Aspin to work out a deal." 9 The compromise, which was
announced in mid-July, became known as “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t
Harass” (DADT). DADT is a complicated policy consisting of statues, regulations, and
policy memoranda. Nevertheless, the basic components of the policy are summed up by
its lengthy title: don’t ask or tell about sexual orientation except in limited circumstances
and specific ways, and don’t harass or tolerate harassment based on sexual orientation. 30
2*
Wenner, “Bill Clinton,” 91.
Clinton, for instance, told Wenner that because it was one of my campaign commitments, I refused to
back off.” Ibid.; Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness, 223.
For a more complete discussion of the policy see: “About Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell: What Is Don’t Ask,
Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass,” Servicemembers Legal Defense Network, accessible on-line at:
http ://www . sldn.org/templates/don ’ t/index.html (accessed August 18, 2003). The article includes the
following description of the final policy, quoted at length: “One way to understand the law, and
implementing regulations, known as DADTDPDH, is by breaking it down to its component parts. Don’t
Ask. Commanders or appointed inquiry officials shall not ask, and members shall not be required to reveal,
their sexual orientation. Don’t Tell. ‘A basis for discharge exists if
. .
.
[t]he member has said that he or she
is a homosexual or bisexual, or made some other statement that indicates a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts. . . .’ Don’t Pursue. More than a dozen specific investigative limits as laid out in DOD
instructions and directives comprise ‘Don’t Pursue.’ It is the most complicated and least understood
component of the policy. These investigative limits establish a minimum threshold to start an inquiry and
restrict the scope of an inquiry even when one is properly initiated. A service member may be investigated
and administratively discharged if they: 1 ) make a statement that they are lesbian, gay or bisexual; 2)
engage in physical contact with someone of the same sex for the purposes of sexual gratification; or 3)
marry, or attempt to marry, someone of the same sex. Only a service member’s commanding officer may
initiate an inquiry into homosexual conduct. In order to begin an inquiry, the commanding officer must
receive credible information from a reliable source that a service member has violated the policy. Actions
that are associational behavior, such as having gay friends, going to a gay bar, attending gay pride events,
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The basic elements of the proposal included the following: it barred military
recruiters from asking if prospective enlistees were gay or lesbian; it forbid homosexual
conduct on or off-base; it defined what constituted homosexual conduct, which included
not only same-sex marriage, hand-holding, kissing, and intercourse, but public
acknowledgement of homosexuality; it also defined what constituted pennissible activity,
such as telling a spouse, attorney, or member of the clergy about your homosexuality,
associating with open homosexuals, and marching in gay pride parades in civilian
clothes. The policy went on to state that military personnel found to engage in
homosexual conduct could be discharged. Military officials could not, however, launch
investigations of individuals to determine their sexual orientation unless they had clear
reason to suspect the person was engaged in prohibited activity. They were also
forbidden from “outing” suspected homosexuals without evidence or “blackmailing”
suspected gay or lesbian personnel. 31
Dissatisfied with the compromise, however, several members of Congress,
and reading gay magazines or books, are never to be considered credible. In addition, a service member’s
report to his/her command regarding harassment or assault based on perceived sexuality is never to be
considered credible evidence. If a determination is made that credible information exists that a service
member has violated the policy, a service member’s commanding officer may initiate a ‘limited inquiry’
into the allegation or statement. That inquiry is limited in two primary ways. First, the command may only
investigate the factual circumstances directly relevant to the specific allegation(s). Second, in statements
cases, the command may only question the service member, his/her chain of command, and anyone that the
service member suggests. In most cases of homosexual statement, no investigation is necessary. Cases
involving sexual acts between consenting adults should be dealt with administratively, and criminal
investigators should not be involved. The command may not attempt to gather additional information not
relevant to the specific act or allegation, and the command may not question anyone outside of those listed
above without approval from the Secretary of that Service. Such an investigation is considered a
‘substantial investigation.’ In order to request authority to conduct a ‘substantial investigation,’ the service
member’s command must be able to clearly articulate an appropriate basis for an investigation. As with a
‘limited inquiry,’ only a service member’s commanding officer has the authority to request permission to
conduct a ‘substantial investigation.’ By definition, a ‘substantial investigation’ is anything that extends
beyond questioning the service member, the service member’s immediate chain of command, and anyone
the service member suggests. Don’t Harass. ‘The Armed Forces do not tolerate harassment or violence
against any service member, for any reason.’ There are many regulations and laws that prohibit harassment
and can be applied to anti-gay harassment cases. Harassment can take different forms, ranging from a
hostile climate rife with anti-gay comments, to direct verbal and physical abuse to death threats.”
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including Nunn, continued to push for legislation. Under Nunn’s leadership, the Senate
Armed Services Committee held oversight hearings. The results became codified in the
National Defense Authorization Act of 1994. The legislation is historic because it
marked the first time the ban on gays in the military had ever been addressed by statute
and it meant that unlike in the past, congressional consent would be required to change
the policy. Section 571 of the National Defense Authorization Act read in part,
There is no constitutional right to serve in the armed forces...
Pursuant to the powers conferred by section 8 of Article I of the
Constitution of the United States, it lies within the discretion of
Congress to establish qualifications and conditions of service in the
armed forces...A member of the armed forces shall be separated from
the armed forces under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense
if one or more of the following findings is made.
.
.
(1 ) That the member
has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or solicited another to engage
in a homosexual act. .
.
(2) That the member has stated that he or she is a
homosexual or bisexual, or words to that effect.
.
.
(3) That the member
has married or attempted to marry a person known to be of the same
biological sex.
33
Clinton not only signed the legislation, but argued that it included most of the
specifics of his initial proposal. He said that the legislation insured soldier’s would be
judged on the basis of conduct not sexual orientation; no one would be asked about
sexual orientation during enlistment; and the UCMJ criminal sanction against sodomy
would be applied equally to both heterosexuals and homosexuals. Others, however, have
suggested that the statute and the DoD directives implementing it present a different
31
See for instance, Chris Bull, “Broken Promises,” The Advocate, August 27, 1993, 24.
32 Salzman et al., “Teaching Notes,” accessible on-line at: http://dont.stanford.edu/casestudy (accessed
August 18, 2003).
33 Appendix F, Section 571 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. 103-
160 (1993), accessible at: http://dont.stanford.edu/casestudy.appendixF.pdf (accessed August 18, 2003).
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picture
.
3 As Jim Salzman, Janet Halley, and Stacey Sobel write, “Clinton portrayed the
Congressional legislation as largely retaining his goals, but it doesn’t. There are no Don’t
Ask protections, no requirement of evenhanded enforcement, the Queen for a Day
defense is retained, and homosexual act is so broadly defined that status comes to qualify
as conduct .’’35
Despite the administration’s efforts to reach a compromise, the policy was widely
criticized by groups on both sides of the issue. Gay and lesbian activists complained that
the policy did not lift the ban and did little to secure their constitutional rights
.
36
Opponents argued that allowing homosexuals to serve, even under these restrictions,
threatened to undermine the sanctity and integrity of the armed forces.
In the aftermath, several researchers have asked why Clinton decided to
compromise on this issue and endorse what he later described as an unworkable policy?37
Scholars have offered a variety of explanations. Some, for instance, have focused on the
fact that even during his term as Governor of Arkansas, his approach to governance was
rooted in consensus building. Others have argued that he was motivated by political
considerations, in particular the fact that many of his closest advisors were urging him to
put the divisive issue behind him and move to the political center. Still others have
suggested he was committed to changing the policy and reasoned that, while he could not
get everything he wanted, it was better to make some headway on the issue. Another
34
Rimmerman, “Promise Unfulfilled,” 118; “The Legislative Word on Gays,” Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, July 31, 1993, 2076; Salzman et al., “Teaching Notes,” accessible on-line at:
http://dont.stanford.edu/casestudy (accessed August 18, 2003).
5 Salzman et al. write that “in practice, service members accused of sodomy [make] use of the so-called
‘Queen for a Day’ exception, arguing that their behavior was an aberration from their ‘normal’
heterosexual status.” See “Teaching Notes,” accessible on-line at: http://dont.stanford.edu/casestudy
(accessed August 18, 2003).
36
For a more thorough discussion of the response of gay and lesbian activists to Clinton’s compromise see
Rimmerman, “Promise Unfulfilled,” 1 19-21.
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potential explanation concerns the fact that while Clinton was unwilling to go back on his
campaign promise, he also did not wish to expend enormous political capital on a policy
that was not as important as his budget plan, education policy, NAFTA, and health care. 38
Whatever the explanation, the President’s initial policy stance and public opinion
on this issue were remarkably similar to the case of federal funding for NEPs. In both
cases, the President made a campaign pledge and in both instances the public was either
opposed or evenly divided on the issue. Opinion on gays in the military was also similar
to the case of the VAT. Although in the case of the VAT, the President did not promise to
institute the measure and instead merely signaled that it was something worth
considering.
The Roper Center Archives show that between 1977 and 2003 more than one-
hundred and fifty polls measured American attitudes towards homosexuals in the
military. Over the last twenty-five years, a number of researchers examined this data,
including: Paul R. Brewer, Jeffrey Cohen, Connie de Boer, William G. Mayer, William
Schneider and I. A. Lewis, Oscar Torres-Reyna and Robert Y. Shapiro, Clyde Wilcox
and Robin Wolpert, and Allan S. Yang. 39 In almost every instance, the research has
37
Wenner, “Bill Clinton,” 89.
38
For other potential explanations as to why Clinton chose to compromise on this issue, see Rimmerman,
“Promise Unfulfilled,” 118-19.
39
Paul R. Brewer, “Values, Political Knowledge, and Public Opinion About Gay Rights,” Public Opinion
Quarterly 67 (2003): 173-201; Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness, 221-25; Connie de Boer, “The Polls:
Attitudes About Homosexuality,” Public Opinion Quarterly 42 (1978): 265-76; William G. Mayer, The
Changing American Mind: How and Why American Public Opinion Changed Between I960 and 1988
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992); William Schneider and I.A. Lewis, “The Straight Story
on Homosexuality and Gay Rights,” Public Opinion (February/March 1984): 16-20, 59-60; Oscar Torres-
Reyna and Robert Shapiro, “The Polls - Trends: Women and Sexual Orientation in the Military,” Public
Opinion Quarterly 66 (2002): 618-32; Clyde Wilcox and Robin M. Wolpert, “President Clinton, Public
Opinion, and Gays in the Military,” in Rimmerman, ed., Gay Rights, Military Wrongs, 127-46; Alan S.
Yang, “The Polls - Trends: Attitudes Toward Homosexuality,” Public Opinion Quarterly 61 (1997): 477-
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concluded that opinion was either split or that there was slightly more opposition than
support for gays in the military. Given the amount of data available. Table 6.2 presents
just an assortment of polls taken between 1992 and 1993. 40
Table 6.2: Percentage of Americans who Favor Allowing Gays to Serve in the
Date Favor Oppose DK Pollster/
(allowing (allowing (Don’t Know, etc. •
•) Sponsor
gavs to serve! gays to serve)
12/11/92 50 44 7 ABC/WP3
12/12/92 46 49 5 NBC/WSJb
1/22/93 43 48 9 Time/CNNC
1/23/93 41 50 9 NBC/WSJd
1/26/93 47 47 6 ABC/WP3
4/17/93 43 47 10 NBC/WSJe
4/22/93 42 51 7 Newsweek 1
4/22/93 44 50 5 CNN/USA8
5/12/93 36 55 9 Time/CNNC
6/4/93 43 49 8 NBC/WSJ6
7/24/93 40 52 8 NBC/WSJ6
“ Do you think homosexuals should or should not be allowed to serve in the military?
Do you approve or disapprove
. . . allowing gays and lesbians to serve in the United States (U.S )
military?
c Do you favor or oppose Bill Clinton’s plan to allow gays and lesbians to serve in the U.S. military?
Do you approve or disapprove of Bill Clinton’s goal of allowing gays and lesbians to serve in the U.S.
military?
e Do you favor or oppose allowing openly gay men and lesbian women to serve in the military?
Cited in Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness
,
p. 224, Table 8.2
8 Do you favor keening this ban or ending this ban? f50% favor keening ban; 44% favor ending ban]
As Table 6.3 shows by definition crafted talk is possible in any instance in which
an official either supports or opposes a policy, regardless of the direction of opinion.
Given the state of opinion and his initial policy stance, in this case Clinton had three
choices: he could act in accordance with opinion and not pursue the policy (set
parameters in part or whole), pursue his initial policy and try to convince the public of its
40
Except where indicated, all the data presented in Table 6.2 is accessible at the Roper Center, and much of
it has been cited in various articles and texts dealing with this policy issue. This includes some of the
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merits (craft talk), or ignore opinion altogether. By definition pandering, legitimizing,
and de-legitimizing were not options. Pandering would require that the president initially
oppose or be uncommitted to the measure and that the public support it. Legitimizing
would require that either elites or the public support the measure so that the president
could use one or the other to try to gamer support
.
41
Similarly, de-legitimizing would
require not only that the public or elites oppose the measure, but the President did as well.
Ignoring opinion is possible although officials in a representative democracy are seldom
likely to find this an acceptable alternative. Consequently, the most likely courses of
action are to set parameters or craft rhetoric
.
42
The evidence shows that in this case
Clinton used opinion to craft rhetoric and market his policy to the American people
.
43
citations listed in the previous footnote. It is important to reiterate that this table presents only a small
portion of the data dealing with American attitudes towards gays in the military.
In this case, elite support for the measure came primarily from gay and lesbian activists as well as others
in the left wing of the Democratic party and thus publicizing their support would probably not have aided
Clinton in his efforts to increase public support for the policy.
42
If an official sets parameters in part, as Clinton did in this case, it is possible to craft talk as well.
In this instance, there is little direct evidence to support the contention that the president also used polls
to set parameters. This contention could be valid, however, given the fact that he ultimately decided not to
pursue his initial pledge to lift the ban and instead opted to compromise.
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Table 6.3: Options for Poll Use Given The President’s Initial Policy Stance and
Pro/Favor
Policv
Direction of Public Opinion
Mixed Con/Oppose
Policy
Officials’
Stance
Pro/Favor Crafted Talk
[CT] is
possible
Parameter
Setting [PS] &
CT are
possible
Ex. Gays in the
military’
44
Ex. NEP’s
PS* & CT
are possible
Ex. Gays
in the military
On Policv Not Pandering PS is possible PS* is
committed is possible Ex. VAT possible
Con/Oppose
1 . . __
Pandering
or CT are
possible
CT is possible CT is possible
^ i j • — ***^vx^*iit iu in nuiiu mat uuc iu me limiiea nuniDer o
cases examined, the previous chapter found evidence of PS only in cases in which the public opinion is
mixed or divided. This is true not only of PS, but as the following discussion shows, other types of use as
well. Consequently, the concluding chapter includes both a discussion of those “cells” or instances in
which certain types of use are hypothesized to be theoretically possible, but the limited number of cases
examined in this study does not support the finding. It concludes that in these instances, additional case
analysis is necessary.
Just why Clinton decided not to abandon his pledge altogether is still an open
question. It may be a result of the fact that an active and vocal portion of his
constituency supported the measure, as well as the fact that he made a campaign promise
The same could be said, however, of federal funding for NEPs. Late in his second term,
Clinton offered a more plausible explanation. During a wide-ranging interview in which
he discussed gays in the military he acknowledged that he did not handle the issue
44
The gays in the military case is placed in two boxes because the data can be read to suggest either that
opinion on this issue was divided or that there was slightly more opposition than support for gays in the
military.
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properly because it arose so early in his first term at a time when he was still learning. As
he noted, if the issue had arisen later he would have handled it differently. 45
Whatever the explanation, in the case of gays in the military, Clinton
compromised and then tried convince the American people to support his revised policy.
An examination of public opinion shows that this was not a wholly unworkable strategy.
Researchers have found that Clinton was somewhat successful in moving opinion on this
issue. Jeffrey Cohen, for instance, writes that while there was “not an across-the-board
surge in support for the president’s position.
.
.
[there was] a strengthening of support.
.
[t]hus there is some indication of presidential leadership effects in this case.” He
attributes the “source of this opinion change” to the fact that,
the way the issue was dealt with by Clinton shifted.
. . the issue
was redefined. Initially, public reactions were based on their feelings
toward homosexuals, which were in varying degrees, negative. Clinton
began to speak about the issue in terms of equality and civil rights, and
this resonated among those who were weak supporters of the policy.
.
.
those mildly supportive were open to this issue redefinition, and
consequently, their support for gay service increased. 46
Similarly, Wilcox and Wolpert find that
among those who were not disgusted by homosexuality and who did
not initially strongly support lifting the ban, nearly a third became more
supportive of Clinton’s policy in 1993. Why should opinion move so
sharply toward increased support for lifting the ban? First, it seems
likely that for many Americans, the issue was redefined during the
debate. . . the discussion itself focused attention to other values under-
lying the debate, including equality... results [of predictive models]
suggest that Clinton did have a persuasive effect on the attitudes of
citizens who were not strongly homophobic. . . Among those who were not
so homophobic, and especially among those with weak positions on the
issue, Clinton exercised a leadership effect. 47
45
Wenner, “Bill Clinton,” 89.
46
Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness. 225.
47
Wilcox and Wolpert, “President Clinton,” 139-42.
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The question here, however, is not whether Clinton succeeded in changing
opinion. Rather, the question is tf and how he used polls. The evidence shows that in
this case Clinton used polls to try to sell his revised policy. This is evident, as Cohen
notes, when you examine the shift in Clinton’s rhetoric as he attempted to redefine the
issue.
Clinton s rhetoric exhibits an in-depth understanding of the subtleties of
American attitudes towards homosexuality. As Tables 6.2 and 6.4 show, polls taken in
the early 1990s showed that the public was divided on lifting the ban and split or slightly
more opposed to making homosexual relations legal. Moreover, Tables 6.5 and 6.6
demonstrate the majority felt homosexuality was immoral and nearly three-quarters stated
that it was always or almost always wrong. 48
Table 6.4: Percentage of Americans who Favor Making Homosexual Relations
Legal: 1 989-1 99349
Date Should
(be leeal)
Should Not
(be leeal
DK
(Don’t Know. etc.
. .)
Pollster/
Sponsor
10/1/89 23 69 8 Gallup4
10/12/89 47 36 17 Gallupb
8/29/91 36 54 10 Gallup*3
6/4/92 49 44 8 Gallup b
8/20/92 41 44 15 CBS/NYT 1
2/9/93 46 43 10 CBS/NYT 1
a How about homosexual couples? Should they have the same legal rights as if they were husband and wife
when it comes to things like inheritance, the right to adopt a child and hospital visits?
Do you think homosexual relations between consenting adults should or should not be legal?
48 When viewed in their totality over time, there is somewhat more opposition to the idea of making
homosexual relations legal, although throughout the years, opposition to this does decrease somewhat.
49 Due to the enormous amount of data available, this table presents only a small portion of the data dealing
with American attitudes towards whether homosexual relations between consenting adults should be legal
during the time period in question.
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Table 6.5: Percentage of Americans who Believ e Homosexuality is Moral: 1991
1994
Date Immoral Moral
5/13/92
2/9/93
6/15/94
54
55
53
39
9
41
DK, Other Pollster/Sponsor
Yankelovich et. al. a
35' CBS/NYTC
Yankelovich et. al. aa Do you personally think that homosexual relations between consenting adults is morally wrong, or is not"a
moral issue?
b
Category includes both those who said they “Don’t Know” (2 %) and those who said they “don’t care
much either way” (33%).
c Do you think homosexual relations between adults are morally wrong, or that they are O.K., or don’t you
care much either wav?
Table 6.6: Percentage of Americans who Believe Homosexuality is “Wrong”-
1989-1994
Date Always/Almost
alwavs wrong
Sometimes
wrong
Not Wrong
at all
DK Pollster/
Sponsor
4/89 75 4 15 5 GSS/NORC3
4/90 78 6 12 5 GSS/NORC3
4/91 75 4 15 6 GSS/NORC3
4/93 67 7 21 5 GSS/NORC3
5/94 67 6 22 5 GSS/NORC3
7/94 68 6 18 8 GSS/NORC3
a What about sexual relations between two adults of the same sex - do you think it is
always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?
always wrong, almost
These Tables contain just a small portion of the data on American attitudes towards
homosexuals and homosexuality in the early 1990’s. Other polls show that the majority
viewed homosexuality as harmful to the American way of life, did not find
homosexuality acceptable for either themselves, their children, or others in the
community, were not sympathetic to homosexuals or their lifestyle, and did not think
gays and lesbians should be allowed to get married or adopt children. 51
50 Due to the enormous amount of data available, this table presents only a small portion of the data
dealing with American attitudes towards whether homosexual relations are moral or immoral during the
time period in question
51
See for instance Yang, “Poll Trends: Attitudes Towards Homosexuality”; Jeanne Zaino, “American
Attitudes Towards Homosexuality: A Picture of Stability and Subtlety,” 1992 (unpublished paper). Much
of the data cited in these studies is available at the Roper Center.
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At the same time, however, the data in Tables 6. 7-6.9 demonstrate that the public
approved of equal treatment for gays and lesbians in employment and housing and
supported basic civil liberties and rights for homosexuals, including a right to privacy.
Table 6.7: Percentage of Americans who Favor Equal Treatment for
Date Favor
(equal/fair
treatment of
homosexuals)
Oppose
(equal/fair
treatment of
homosexuals)
DK
(depends,
other, etc...)
Pollster/Sponsor
1/89 47 40 13 NESa
10/89 71 18 8 Gallupb
6/92 79 13 8 CBS/NYTb
1992 57 38 5 NES a
1/93 79 16 5 CBS/NYTb
2/93 78 15 7 CBS/NYTb
4/93 81 13 6 Gallupb
1993 60 35 5 NESa
2/94 74 19 7 Princeton6
2/94 81 14 5 Princeton c
b
In general, do you think homosexuals should or should not have equal rights in terms ofjob
opportunities?
c Do you think there should or should not be . . . equal rights for gays in terms ofjob opportunities
Do you think there should or should not be . , , equal rights for gays in terms of housing?
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Table 6.8:
4/89
4/89
4/90
4/90
4/90
1/91
4/91
4/91
4/93
4/93
5/94
5/94
76
64
53 c
74
64
50c
76
69
78
67
79
69
21
33
45
23
33
48
22
29
19
29
18
28
GSS/NORC a
GSS/NORCb
ICRd
GSS/NORC3
GSS/NORCb
MMRd
GSS/NORC3
GSS/NORCb
GSS/NORC3
GSS/NORCb
GSS/NORC3
GSS/NORCbAnd what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual?.
. . . Suppose this admitted homosexual
'
wanted to make a speech in your community? Should he be allowed to speak or not?And what about a man who admits that he is a homosexual?.
. . . If some people in your community
suggested that a book he wrote in favor of homosexuality should be taken out of your public library would
homosexuals?°
Vm8
[°PP°Se baS 'C ** homosexuals
J or not tsuPPort basic rights fZ
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Table 6.9:
Date
Percentage of Americans who Believe Homosexuals are Entitled to a
Right to Privacy; 1990-1 99^
1/11/90
12/13/92
1/93
Agree
(have a right
to privacy)
63
83 c
81
e
Disagree
(do not have
a right to privacy)
DK Pollster/Sponsor
35 a
13
c
14
e
1
4
5
Harrisb
Response Analysisd
Bama Research 1a
,T
hlS“ b
?
th thfe who said “homosexual relations in private between consenting adults should beallowed but regulated by law (8%) and those who said it should be “totally forbidden by law (27%).
.,
y
,°
U
,
S°me actlvlties that some People feel are matters of private choice that ought to be left tohe individual, that other people feel should be regulated by law, and that others feel should be forbidden bylaw altogether. Please tell me, for each one, how you feel that activity should be treated - should it be left
to the individuals, should it be allowed but regulated by law, or should be it totally forbidden by law?
Homosexual relations in private between consenting adults?
;7ragrf' c?4tegory includes those wh0 said they either “completely agree” (49%) or “mostly agree”(34 /o), and the disagree category includes those who said they either “completely disagree” (6%) or
“mostly disagree” (7%).
6 1 '
d
I am going to read some statements that express different views about homosexuality. For each statement
please tell me whether you completely agree with it, mostly agree with it, mostly disagree with it, or
completely disagree with it A homosexual relationship between consenting adults is their own private
matter. ^
agI
.
ee
u
category includes those who said they either “agree strongly” (61%) or “agree somewhat
(20 /o) and the disagree category includes those who said they either “disagree strongly” (5%) or
“disagree somewhat” (4%).
Do you agree strongly, agree somewhat, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with the following
statement: “Whether a person is homosexual or not is a private matter that is nobody else’s business?”
While supportive of equal treatment, the right to privacy, and basic civil liberties and
rights for gays and lesbians, Americans were less supportive of special treatment for
sexual minorities as a group. As Table 6.10 shows, when asked whether laws designed to
protect minority groups such as African Americans and women should be extended to
gays and lesbians, the public was divided and somewhat more likely to oppose such
legislation.
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Table 6.10: Percentage of Americans who Favor Extending Laws Designed to
Protect Minorities to Homosexuals: 1992-1994
Date Support/Favor
(extending legal
protection designed
for racial and
religious minorities
to homosexuals)
Oppose
(extending legal
protection designed
for racial and
religious minorities
to homosexuals')
DK
(not sure, etc.
Pollster/
..) Sponsor
8/92 44 47 9 Yankelovich3
1/93 48 43 9 Yankelovich3
4/93 46 48 6 Gallupb
2/94 48 46 6 Princeton"
6/94 47 45 8 Yankelovich3
7/94 26 66 8 LATd
9/94 39 58 3 GalluDb
a Do you think that the laws which protect the civil rights of racial or religious minorities should be used to
protect the rights of homosexuals?
As you may know, there are civil rights for blacks, other minorities and women. Would you
favor or oppose extending these civil rights laws to include homosexuals?
c Do you think there should or should not be . . . special legislation to guarantee equal rights for gays?
Do you think homosexuals should get protection under civil rights laws in the way racial minorities and
women have been protected, or should homosexuals get no civil rights protections?
Taken as a whole, the data show that in trying to sway opinion, Clinton had some
room to maneuver. In order to convince the public to support DADT he had to avoid
discussing the impact of lifting the ban on the armed forces, the legality, morality, or the
“rightness” of homosexuality and a homosexual lifestyle. Moreover, he had to be careful
not to focus on sexual minorities as a “group” deserving of special consideration or
treatment. Instead, he had to focus on a handful of fundamental principles: individual
rights and liberties, equal treatment under and application of the law, equal access, equal
opportunity, and non-discrimination. Most importantly he had to stress that the policy
not only insures equality, fairness, and individual rights, but that it does so without
undermining the integrity of the armed forces or the ability of service members to protect
and defend the nation. As the data show, if he could successfully craft his rhetoric to
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stress these key values and principles, he had a fairly good chance of gaining support
from those segments of the American public who were weakly opposed to the policy.
Clinton’s most important speech on gays in the military - his July 19
,
1993
,
address announcing his new policy - powerfully illustrates how the administration tried
to use opinion data to sell his policy. President Clinton spoke to an audience composed
primarily of members of the armed forces at the National Defense University at Fort
McNair. He appeared on stage surrounded by the nation’s top military officials,
including: Powell, members of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Kime, and base commander
Admiral Smith. The speech was directed at two audiences. First, there were the
members of the U.S. military to whom the President vowed repeatedly to do his best to
“uphold the highest standards of combat readiness and unit cohesion.” Second and more
importantly, there were moderate Americans who were initially, though weakly, opposed
to lifting the ban. Throughout the speech it is clear that Clinton was aware of the state of
opinion and as a result was not appealing to the entire nation, but rather those in the
center. He stated, for instance, that “[cjlearly the American people are deeply divided on
this issue” and noted that “people in this country who are aware of having known
homosexuals are far more likely to support lifting the ban.” Moreover, he echoed
research findings, stating that the policy will “not please everyone.
. . and clearly not those
who hold the most adamant opinions on either side of this issue.”
Given his two primary audiences, he made an effort throughout the speech to
strike a balance between what he described as his role as “Commander in Chief’ and his
role as “President of all the American people.” He did so by stressing both his
commitment to the armed forces and his commitment to constructing a policy that
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defends five key “American” principles: individual rights, the right to privacy, limited
government, equality, and equal opportunity. At the beginning of the speech, for
instance, he vowed to “balance the rights of the individual and the needs of our military
force,” as well as to “protect and promote individual rights.” Later he stated, “it is my
duty as Commander in Chief to uphold the standards of combat readiness and unit
cohesion... while doing my duty as President to protect the rights of individual
Americans.” He also stressed that the policy was designed to protect the “privacy of
individuals,” “limit.
. . the role of government over citizens’ private lives,” and insure
equality. As he noted, under the policy, the “provisions of the UCMJ will be enforced in
an even-handed manner as regards both heterosexuals and homosexuals,” they would be
applied “even-hand[edly] against everyone, regardless of their sexual orientation,” and
were designed to help insure “decent regard to the legitimate privacy and associational
rights of all service members.”
Clinton not only stressed the principles of individual rights, privacy, limited
government, equality, and opportunity, but on two different occasions he also attempted
to reassure the public that the policy was not designed to advance the cause of any group,
merely to insure the rights of all individuals. As he said, “this issue has never been one
of group rights, but rather of individual ones, of the individual opportunity to serve and
the individual responsibility to conform to the highest standards of military conduct.”
Later, he quoted former Senator Barry Goldwater saying: “Senator Goldwater’s
statement, published in the Washington Post recently, made it crystal clear that when this
matter is viewed as an issue of individual opportunity and responsibility rather than one
of alleged group rights, this is not a call for cultural license but rather a reaffirmation of
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the American value of extending opportunity to responsible individuals and of limiting
the role of government over citizens’ private lives.”52
Clinton’s Fort McNair speech is just one example of how he turned to crafted talk
after a difficult six months in office in an effort to convince moderate Americans to
support his policy. As Cohen, Wilcox, and Wolpert argue and Table 6.1 1 demonstrates,
the President was more successful in changing opinion than is often recognized. After
considering the President’s policy, moderate Americans tended to view DADT in a more
favorable light.
Table 6.11: Percentage of Americans who Favor DADT
Date Favor Oppose DK Pollster/Sponsor
7/19/03 58 37 5 Gallup3
1/15/94 50 47 3 Gallupb
1/28/94 60 36 4 Gallup3
6 / 1 v muuui^, i iv/oiuvm v^iuuuil lido dUUptCU d pidll CdllCCl
'Don't ask, don't tell.' According to that plan, the military would no longer ask personnel whether or not
they are homosexual. But if personnel reveal that they are homosexual, and they engage in homosexual
activity, they would be discharged from the military. Is that a plan you would support or oppose?/Do you
support or oppose that plan?
b
I'm going to read you a list of things that the (President Bill) Clinton Administration did in 1993. For each
one, please tell me whether you support or oppose it.)... The 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' compromise on
allowing gays in the military.
If the President attempted to increase public support without first examining the nature of
opinion towards homosexuals, he would not have had the success he did. If, for instance,
he had stressed the need to extend rights to gays and lesbians as a group, focused on
issues of legality or morality as opposed to individual rights, equal opportunity, and
limited government, it is unlikely that those in the center would have been moved by his
rhetoric.
52
All quotes come directly from a speech entitled “Remarks Announcing the New Policy on Gays and
Lesbians in the Military, which President Clinton delivered at 2:36 pm on July 19, 1993, at the National
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Case #6: Bosnia /former-Yugoslavia During the 1992 campaign Clinton
criticized the Bush administration’s policy in the Balkans for failing to support basic
human rights and democratic values. 53 Despite his rhetoric, however, throughout the
campaign Clinton was not clear on what he would do differently. In fact, the only
promises he made in regard to Bosnia were to support U.S. participation in United
Nations (U.N.) airlifts, to seek U.N. authorization and give U.S. military support for air
strikes to defend relief efforts. 54 Nevertheless, Clinton’s rhetoric left many observers
with the sense that once in office he would not shy away from using force to protect the
Bosnians from Serb aggression. As White House Communications Director George
Stephanopoulos writes, “[d]uring the campaign... [our foreign policy] amounted to little
more than a couple of speeches and a series of press releases. But winning the White
House added retroactive weight to everything we had said before... Besieged Bosnians
heard that [Clinton] had vowed to bomb the Serbs and they hunkered down with
heightened expectations waiting for the American cavalry.”55
Once in office, however, Clinton’s policy on Bosnia changed. Initially, he
continued his “get-tough” approach, stating that failure to act was tantamount to “giving
up American leadership,” going against the Pentagon to support air-drops to besieged
Bosnian towns, and sending Secretary of State Warren Christopher to Europe to press the
allies to support the White House’s “lift and strike” policy. In the Clinton
administration’s first comprehensive statement on Bosnia on February 10, 1993, for
instance, Christopher stated that the U.S. would oppose the spread of hostilities and the
Defense University at Fort McNair. A transcript of the speech is available on-line at:
http://dont.stanford.edu/casestudy/appendixD.pdf (accessed August 22, 2003).
53
Martin Walker, “Withdrawal Symptoms, ” The Guardian (London), May 7, 1994.
54
Peter Honey, “From A-Z, Here’s What Clinton Pledges to Do,” Baltimore Sun, November 8, 1992.
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flood of refugees in the region, and concluded that Bosnia was a test of how the world
will address the concerns of ethnic and religious minorities in the post-Cold War
world.”56
Nevertheless, Christopher’s unsuccessful trip to Europe in May 1993 to convince
the Europeans to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and support air strikes against the
Serbs (“lift and strike”) seemed to signal an end to the administration’s push for the use
of force in the region. 57 By the time Christopher returned the President seemed
disenchanted with the “lift and strike” strategy and despite his rhetoric, he was no longer
willing to champion military intervention in the region. 58 As Stephanopolous writes, after
a few months in office, the President’s Bosnian policy seemed to “stall.”59
Although it is difficult to know what accounted for the president’s retreat, some
have speculated that it may have been due to five interrelated factors. Clinton came to
office as the first post-War president not to serve in the military. This combined with the
fact that he was embroiled in the gays in the military controversy made his relationship
with the Pentagon and military leaders fragile, and left him unable to counter opposition
to sending troops to Bosnia. Second, some argue that Clinton’s early foreign policy
55 George Stephanopolos, All Too Human: A Political Education (Boston: Little Brown and Company
1999), 157.
56
Warren Zimmermann, “Yugoslavia: 1989-1996,” in Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin, eds. Center for
Russia and Eurasia: Conference Report: U.S. and Russian Policy Making with Respect to the Use of Force
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), chap. 1 1. Available on-line at:
http://www.rand.org/publications/CF/CF129/CF-129.chapterl l.html (accessed August 25, 2003).
57 Bob Adams, “U.S. Stepping Back on Bosnia Policy,” St Louis Post-Dispatch, May 19, 1993; William
Drozdiak, “Crisis in Bosnia; No Peace for Bosnia; European Allies Still at Odds with U.S. on Air Strikes,
Embargo,” Houston Chronicle, May 7, 1993.
58
In keeping with this sentiment, just a few months earlier in a meeting with senior State Department Staff,
Christopher reportedly laid out his vision of American foreign policy in some detail, saying in part, “The
US [did] not win the cold war in order to become a global super cop. . . . America’s allies [have] to be
encouraged to emerge from the shadow of American tutelage and ‘take the lead - and the credit - in
solving regional problems.” Walker, “Withdrawal Symptoms.” See also, “Crisis in Bosnia: Bosnia Is
‘Problem From Hell’; Christopher: US Will Not Act Alone,” Houston Chronicle, May 18, 1993.
59
Stephanopoulos, All Too Human, 157.
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reveals a discomfort with military solutions and a propensity to seek diplomatic solutions
even in the face of nearly impossible odds.60 Third, throughout the 1992 campaign
Clinton was critical of Bush’s focus on international affairs at the expense of domestic
issues. He campaigned promising that as president he would focus on domestic policies
such as health care, deficit reduction, education, and crime. Fourth, there was little
consensus among Clinton’s foreign policy team regarding the administration’s policy in
the Balkans. Vice President A1 Gore, U.N. Ambassador Madeline Albright, and National
Security Advisor Anthony Lake lined up on one side, pushing for a harder line approach
in the region. While Powell, Aspin, and Christopher tended to favor humanitarian and
diplomatic solutions. 61 In the wake of his ill-fated trip to Europe, for instance,
Christopher told reporters that the conflict in Bosnia stemmed from “ancient ethnic
hostilities” and was a “European issue.” As a result, he stated that the U.S. would “not
act alone” and seemed to imply that there was little more the U.S. could do. 62 Finally, as
Table 6.12 demonstrates, the majority of Americans at the time did not support the use of
troops in the region.
60 Zimmermann, “Yugoslavia.”
61
Ibid.
62
Drozdiak, “Crisis in Bosnia.”
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Table 6.12: Percentage of Americans who Support Committing Troops to Bosnia:
1992-1993
Date Support
mi192
8/19/92
12/4/92
1/3/93
1/3/93
1/12/93
1/14/93
2/25/93
4/22/93
4/28/93
5/18/93
9/10/93
10/6/93
30
24
57
34
32
30
31
23
30
36
34
36
23
Oppose DK
65
66
36
43
51
61
51
68
62
52
56
59
67
5
10
7
23
17
9
18
9
8
12
9
5
10
Pollster/Sponsor
Louis Harris3
LATb
Gallupc
Times Mirror 1
Times Mirror6
PSRA/U.S. News'
ABC/WP8
ABC/WP8
Gallup/CNN/USAh
Yankelovich 1
PSRAJ
Hart & Teeterk
NBC 1
I will read you a series of suggestions for ways to react to situations like those which we now have in
Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia (in what used to be Yugoslavia) where, in effect, one country has invaded
another. Please say for each one if you tend to support or oppose it.) Send U.S. (United States) troops
to support the country which is the victim of aggression to fight and repel the aggressor.
(As you may know, violence has erupted in the city of Sarajevo and the surrounding area called Bosnia
one of the new republics that used to be part of Yugoslavia.).
. . . Should the United States send troops to
end the violence in Sarajevo?
c
Thinking about the situation in the former Yugoslavian Republic of Bosnia, do you think U.S. (United
States) armed forces should go into Bosnia as part of a United Nations effort to deliver relief supplies there,
or not?
d Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. (United States) military force in Bosnia to prevent Bosnia
from being taken over by the Serbs?
e Would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. (United States) military force in Bosnia to help end the
fighting there?
(President Bill) Clinton will have to make decisions about some foreign policy issues when he takes
office. Which of the following comes closest to your own view about the decisions he should make?
B Do you think the United States should take military action against Serbia to stop it from supporting
Serbian fighters in neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina, or not?
As you may know, Serbian forces are attacking Muslim towns in the former Yugoslavian Republic of
Bosnia. Some people are suggesting that United States' planes conduct air strikes against Serbian military
forces, while others say we should not get militarily involved. Which view comes closer to your own?
' (Now I have a few questions about the war in Bosnia, one of the new republics that used to be part of
Yugoslavia.) .... Do you favor or oppose the United States using military planes to bomb Serbian forces in
Bosnia?
1 Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose . .
.
proposals for the U.S. to take an active
military role to stop the civil war in Bosnia?
k
The United States has offered to supply ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia, if all sides
agree to peace. Even with such a peace agreement, the U.S. forces could be subjected to sniper attacks or
other hostile action. Would you favor or oppose having the United States supply these forces?
1
The United States has offered to supply ground troops to enforce a peace agreement in Bosnia, if all sides
there agree to peace. Even with such a peace agreement, however, the U.S. forces could be subject to
hostile action. Would you favor or oppose having the United States supply these forces?
63
Roper Center Archives show between January 1, 1991, and January 1, 1994, more than 100 questions
were asked regarding this issue. This table depicts the results ofjust a portion of this data.
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Consequently, between mid-1993 and mid-1995 every time the use of force was
considered, White House officials found a reason to avoid military action. In July 1993
for instance, the DoD opposed the use of ground troops to relieve the suffering in
Sarajevo. A month later the administration once again considered the use of air strikes,
but rejected the idea when the Serbs acceded to U.N. demands for the creation of six
“safe areas.”
64
As a result, the President was increasingly criticized for his passive approach in
the region. The criticism mounted in early 1994 when the media began displaying
pictures of sixty-eight people killed and wounded in a Serb mortar attack on the Sarajevo
market. 65 The attack momentarily galvanized administration officials who, with the aid
of Russia, pushed NATO to issue an ultimatum compelling the Serbs to withdraw their
artillery from the city. 66 The threat seemed to work in the short term as none of the
weapons was used for over a year. 67 The attack also prompted the administration to
increase its efforts to seek a diplomatic solution. In mid- 1994, for instance, American
negotiator Charles Redman successfully brokered the creation of a Bosnian-Croatian
Federation. 68
NATO’s threats and inconsistent use of U.S. backed air strikes, however, did little
to quell Serb aggression in the long run. When at the U.N.’s request, for instance, NATO
64
Zimmermann, “Yugoslavia.”
65
John Pomfret, “U.N. Unclear Who Fired Deadly Shell; 120 Injured Are Evacuated to Germany While
Sarajevans Bury 68,” Washington Post
,
February 7, 1994; Roger Cohen, “Terror in Sarajevo; NATO to
Hold Emergency Talks on Sarajevo Attack,” New York Times, February 7, 1994.
66 Conor O Clery, “How Massacre Forced Clinton to Bite the Bullet,” Irish Times, February 15, 1994;
Andrew Higgins, “The Bosnia Crisis: Resurgent Russia: Yeltsin Triumphs on the European Stage,”
Independent (London), February 20, 1994.
67
David B. Ottaway, “NATO Gives Serbs Air Strike Deadline; Guns Must Be Moved By Feb. 21,”
Washington Post, February 10, 1994.
68
Steven J. Woehrel and Julie Kim, “CRS Issue Brief: 91089: Bosnia - Former Yugoslavia and U.S.
Policy,” Available on-line at http://www.fas.org/man/crs/91-089.htm (accessed August 25, 2003); Jonathan
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bombed the Bosnian Serbs to retaliate for the seizure of Muslim refugee safe havens, the
Serbs responded by capturing U.N peacekeepers, tying them to trees, and holding them
hostage near Bosnian Serb military instillations.69
In the wake of these increasingly embarrassing episodes that left America, its
allies, NATO, and the U.N. looking weak, Secretary of Defense William Perry surprised
nearly everyone, including the President, by stating publicly that U.S. ground troops
would have to be deployed in Bosnia in the near future. The President first learned of
Perry’s remarks on May 31, 1995 when he was headed to Colorado to speak at the Air
Force Academy. 70 To limit the damage done by Perry’s comments Clinton tried over the
next few weeks to specify the conditions under which the U.S. might be willing to send
troops to Bosnia. During a graduation speech at the Air Force Academy, for instance,
Clinton stated that the U.S. military’s role would involve only a “temporary use of our
ground forces” and would come “after consultation with Congress.”71 The President’s
statements, however, did little to quell protests, particularly those from lawmakers who
“promised hearings on what they saw as a significant change in U.S. policy.”72 As Dick
Morris writes, “the national storm” created by Clinton’s remarks was “savage. No
groundwork had been laid for this harried statement and the nation was not prepared for a
• • • .
*7T
military involvement reminiscent of Vietnam.” In the wake of his comments, the
President’s approval rating began to drop, and the downing of an American F-16 aircraft
piloted by Scott O’Grady over Bosnia in the days that followed only exacerbated the
S. Landay, “US Joins Western Allies and Russia in Backing Partition Plan in Bosnia,” Christian Science
Monitor
,
June 8, 1994.
69
Morris, Behind the Oval Office , 252; Zimmermann, “Yugoslavia.”
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Morris, Behind the Oval Office, 252-5.
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Clinton quoted in John F. Harris, “Clinton Vows Help for U.N. Troops in Bosnia,” Washington Post,
June 1, 1995; Bill Nichols, “U.S. Weighs Ground Force in Bosnia,” USA Today, June 1, 1995.
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situation. Consequently, at the urging of Morris and other advisors, the President used
his June 3 radio address to try to “quell a firestorm of Congressional and public
criticism.” During the address he focused on his “definition of the circumstances in which
American ground troops could be used to aid United Nations peacekeepers in Bosnia.”74
After saying that the prospect of committing U.S. troops to the region was “remote,
indeed highly unlikely” the President added “American troops would be used only if the
NATO allies became stranded and could not get out of a particular place in Bosnia’ in
which case the United States would help with ‘an emergency extraction.’”75
Despite Clinton’s reluctance to commit troops, events in mid-1995 seemed to
convince White House officials of the need to adopt a tougher stance in the region. In the
early part of the summer, the Clinton administration finally issued support for European
efforts to bolster U.N. forces in the area and the White House began pushing for more
intense NATO air strikes to protect Bosnian safe havens. With the help of French
President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister John Major, Clinton also succeeded
in developing a new policy on NATO air strikes. The policy ensured that NATO would
have the power to launch more blistering attacks when ever and where ever it chose. The
need for a tougher policy was further reinforced by two events that occurred in the
summer of 1995. 76
The first was the successful raid on Krajina, the second largest Serbian area of
Croatia, launched by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman. While it is unclear whether the
U.S. was complicit in the attack, its success and the fleeing of nearly all Bosnian Serbs
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from the area seemed to shift the balance of power and became a first step in Bosnian and
Croatian efforts to win back some of the territory they had lost during the War. The
second was the August 28 Serb attack on the Sarajevo market. In light of NATO’s new
policy the shelling, which left thirty-eight dead, triggered a massive and sustained allied
attack on Bosnian Serb communications and command centers. The bombing campaign,
which lasted from August 30 to September 14, helped convince the Bosnian Serbs to
negotiate a cease-fire agreement. The negotiations, which were led by Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Holbrook, resulted in the Dayton Peace Accords. 77 Among
other things, the agreement mandated establishment of a 60,000-man NATO-led
peacekeeping force. According to Dick Morris, the President recognized he had to
commit at least 20,000 peacekeeping troops to Bosnia even though polls showed the
public opposed the action. 78 As a result, Morris writes,
He [Clinton] set out to persuade America and was effective enough
to move the public to a 45-45 tie. As Americans saw the real difference
between war making and peacekeeping and as they saw few if any
casualties, public opinion gradually shifted even further. 79
As in all of the cases examined, whether the President succeeded in swaying opinion is
not a primary concern. What is important is the fact that Clinton used polls to craft
rhetoric in an effort to convince the American public of the necessity of committing
troops in the region. As Morris writes,
President Clinton recognized that he had to send troops to Bosnia if
peace was to have any chance there. Crude polls showed massive
public opposition to this action, but more thorough research suggested
76
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that he could win broad popular support if he could distinguish peace-
keeping from combat. His explanation of what peacekeeping entails
succeeded in securing public support. 80
The evidence supports Morris’s contention that Clinton used polls to determine
how best to increase public support for his policy. 81 As Tables 6.12 and 6.13 show,
while the public was generally opposed to sending troops to Bosnia, there was more
support for committing American troops to the region in order to insure peace.
Table 6.13: Percentage of Americans who Support Sending Troops to Bosnia to
Date Support Oppose DK Pollster/Sponsor
2/10/93 58 32 10 Yankelovich3
3/5/93 41 51 8 Hart & Teeterb
5/4/93 48 45 9 CBS Newsc
5/6/93 68 30 2 Gallupd
5/27/93 44 49 7 CBS Newsc
6/21/93 54 38 8 CBS/NYTC
9/23/93 57 36 7 Yankelovich3
10/8/93 40 52 8 Gallupd
11/27/94 34 58 8 CBS Newsc
9/19/95 50 44 6 Gallup6
9/22/95 52 43 5 Gallup6
10/19/95 49 44 6 Gallup6
11/6/95
a
47 49 4 Gallup3
Bosnia as part of an international peace-keeping force if the groups who are currently fighting in Bosnia
can agree to a settlement that would end the conflict there?
President (Bill) Clinton has said the U.S. (United States) would be willing to send some ground troops to
Bosnia as part of a peace-keeping force if a peace agreement is reached between the warring factions. Do
you favor or oppose using American ground troops in such an operation?
c
If the United Nations sent a peace-keeping force to Bosnia to enforce a cease fire agreement, would you
favor or oppose the U.S. sending ground troops as part of that peace-keeping force?
d
Finally, there is a chance a peace agreement could be reached by all the groups currently fighting in
Bosnia. If so, the Clinton administration is considering contributing 20,000 troops to a United Nations
peace-keeping force. Would you favor or oppose that?
80
Ibid., 339.
81
Even Stephanopoulos, a nemesis of Morris’s, has acknowledged that both the pollster and the data he
collected during this time period played a key role in the president’s attempts to sell his policy to the
American public. As Stephanopoulos writes, “The president was now prepared to do what had always
seemed unthinkable before: dispatch twenty thousand American ground troops to the Balkans, knowing
that any casualties could cost him his presidency.” All Too Human
,
380-84.
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^There is a chance a peace agreement could be reached by all the groups currently fighting in Bosnia If so
U S - (Unlled SMes
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The data in Table 6.14 also confirm a point that Clinton’s first in-house pollster
Stanley Greenberg had been stressing for more than two years: the American people
would support the use of ground troops in Bosnia if the President could make the case
that they were being deployed for humanitarian reasons. In mid- 1993 Greenberg showed
Clinton the results of a poll he conducted for Americans Talk Issues, a Washington-based
foundation. Greenberg reportedly urged the President to consider the poll because it
showed that he could send troops to the region in the name of basic human rights. 82 The
survey showed, for instance, that 84 percent of Americans would support the use of force
for primarily humanitarian reasons” as opposed to “vital military and economic
interests. While the study showed that there was less support for U.S. intervention in
Bosnia than in other international “hot spots” such as Somalia, Cambodia, Haiti, and
Afghanistan, Greenberg concluded that, “it’s one of the most dramatic findings we see.
If the president [decides] to go into Bosnia, there’s a stronger chance he’d gain support if
he addressed it from the standpoint of human rights violations than if he did it from the
standpoint of U.S. national interests.” Greenberg also drew a parallel between this study
and surveys taken in the months leading up to the Persian Gulf War. There was, he
claimed “ ‘very little response’... when Secretary of State James Baker appealed for
intervention on the ground of U.S. economic interest. When Baker and other reflamed
82
Americans Talk Issues Foundation and the W. Alton Jones Foundation sponsored the telephone survey,
which was conducted between March 23 and April 4, 1993, by Market Strategies and Greenberg Research.
The results of the “Americans Talk Issues #21 - Global Uncertainties” poll, which is available at the Roper
Center, are somewhat more involved than referenced here.
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the debate in terms of humanitarian appeals to help the people of Kuwait... public
attitudes began to shift.”83
Table 6.14:
Date
Percentage of Americans who Support the Use of Troops for
Humanitarian Missions
8/12/92
1/14/93
3/23/93
3/23/93
3/23/93
4/5/94
6/2/95
7/29/95
9/19/95
Support Oppose DK
54a
58 a
94d
79 f
84'
66 1
56
61
50
33
29b
5
20s
15 J
33m
33
27
44
13
13
1
1
1
2
11
12
6
Pollster/Sponsor
LATC
LATC
ATIe
ATIh
ATIk
PIPAn
NBC/WSJ0
NBC/WSJ0
Gallupp
Category includes both those who said they “agree strongly” (28%) and those who said they “agree
somewhat (26%). y 6
Category includes both those who said they “disagree somewhat” (15%) and those who said thev
“disagree strongly” (18%). y
Do you agree or disagree that the United States has an obligation to use military force in Bosnia (theformer Yugoslavian Province) if there is no other way to get humamtarian aid to civilians and prevent the
warring parties there from practicing atrocities. (If agree or disagree) Do you (agree/disagree) strongly or(agree/disagree) somewhat? 6 3
Category includes both those who said this is a “very preferable option” (62%) and those who said this is
a somewhat preferable option” (32%).
e As you know, there have been some recent conflicts, like the ones going on in Bosnia and Somalia, that
are much like civil wars in that a number of internal factions are fighting with one another. The results of
these wars have often been disastrous, as in the case of Somalia where millions may die of starvation or
illness. I am going to read a list of actions the United States and the United Nations could take to stop the
fighting in these countries. For each one, please tell me if you think it would be a very preferable,
somewhat preferable, or not at all preferable option?) Use enough military intervention to deliver food
and other supplies to the people. Is this a very preferable, somewhat preferable, or not at all preferable
option?
Category includes both those who said “as often as necessary” (35%) and “sometimes” (44%).
J
Category includes both those who said “hardly ever” (16%) and “never” (4%).
Some people say that there are other places in the world where U.S. (United States) military force should
be used for humanitarian purposes such as Haiti, Afghanistan and others, even though our vital military or
economic interests are not at stake. In general, how often do you think President (Bill) Clinton is justified
in using U.S. military force around the world for primarily humanitarian reasons?. ... As often as
necessary, sometimes, hardly ever, or never?
Category includes both those who said they “strongly approve” (56%) and “somewhat approve” (28%).
J Category includes both those who said they “somewhat disapprove” ( 8%) and “strongly disapprove”
The use of U.S. (United States) military force in Somalia represents something new in our foreign policy.
In the past, presidents have ordered military force to protect our vital military and economic interests. In
Somalia we are using military force primarily for humanitarian reasons—to stop the widespread starvation
3
Jon Sawyer, “Poll: Link Bosnia to Morality; Clinton Pollster Finds Support for Action on Humanitarian
Grounds,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch
,
May 1 1, 1993.
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there. Generally, do you approve or disapprove of the use of U.S. military force for primarily humanitarian
reasons? (If approve/disapprove, ask:) Would that be strongly or somewhat?
Category includes both those who said they “strongly favor” (32%) and those who said they “favor
somewhat” (34%).
m
Category includes both those who said they “somewhat oppose” (12%) and those who said they “strongly
oppose (21%). J
n
Although the Bosnian government and the Croats have come to an agreement with each other they have
not come to an agreement with the Serbs who still occupy more than 70 percent of Bosnia. The Serbs have
continued to try to take new territory, to attack civilians and to engage in ethnic cleansing. If the parties do
not come to an agreement in the near future and the attacks and ethnic cleansing continue, there are a
number of possible steps that could be taken. As I describe each alternative, please say whether you favor
or oppose it: .... At present there is a U.N. (United Nations) peacekeeping force in Bosnia delivering
humanitarian aid and monitoring safe havens. Until now the U.S. (United States) has not contributed any
troops to this force. The U.N. has asked the U.S. to contribute some troops. Would you favor or oppose the
U.S. doing so? (If Favor/Oppose, ask:) Would that be somewhat or strongly?
If Serbian forces continue to attack Bosnian cities or the United Nations peacekeeping troops in Bosnia,
who are trying to deliver humanitarian assistance, would you favor or oppose having the United States and
its European allies conduct air strikes against the Serbian military forces?
Morris confirms that these polls played a crucial role in the President’s efforts to
win public support. Clinton’s address to the nation on the implementation of the Dayton
Peace Agreement illustrates how the administration used this type of data to try to
convince the American people to support the use of troops to the region.
Throughout the speech the President repeatedly stressed the fact that American
troops were being sent to Bosnia not to engage in combat, but to establish and insure
peace. As he stated, “[l]et me say at the outset, America’s role will not be about fighting
a war. It will be about helping the people of Bosnia to secure their own peace
agreement.” Later he said, “[w]hen I took office. . . I decided that American ground
troops should not fight a war in Bosnia.” He continued to stress this point, noting, “I
refuse to send American troops to fight a war in Bosnia, but I believe we must help to
secure the Bosnian peace.” All together in the president’s brief address he stated that
American troops were going into Bosnia only after “the war [was] over” to “build” and
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“implement” a lasting peace more than nine times. Moreover, he concluded by stating,
“in the choice between peace and war, America must choose peace .”84
In addition, the President also attempted to gamer public support by focusing on
the human rights and humanitarian aspects of the mission. In an effort to make his case,
Clinton repeatedly stressed the degree of violence endured by innocent men, women, and
children throughout the Bosnian conflict. “In fulfilling this mission,” he stated, “we have
a chance to help stop the killing of innocent civilians, especially children.” He tried to
appeal to the public on these grounds repeatedly throughout his address. “For nearly four
years a terrible war has tom Bosnia apart. Horrors we prayed had been banished from
Europe forever have been seared in our minds again: skeletal prisoners caged behind
barbed wire fences; women and girls raped as tools of war; defenseless men and boys
shot down into mass graves, evoking visions of World War II concentration camps; and
endless lines of refugees marching toward a future of despair.” By “implementing the
agreement in Bosnia,” he continued, “we can end the terrible suffering of the people, the
warfare, the mass executions, the ethnic cleansing, the campaigns of rape and terror. Let
us never forget a quarter of a million men, women, and children have been shelled, shot,
and tortured to death. Two million people, half of the population, were forced from their
homes and into a miserable life as refugees. And these faceless numbers hide millions of
real personal tragedies, for each of the war’s victims was a mother or a daughter, a father
or a son, a brother or a sister. . . If we’re not there, NATO will not be there; the peace will
collapse; the war will re-ignite; the slaughter of innocents will begin again. A conflict
84
William J. Clinton, “Address to the Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-
Herzegovina,” November 27, 1995. The president spoke at 8 p.m. from the Oval Office at the White
House. A transcript of the president’s address is available on-line at:
http://www.gpo.gov/nara/pubpaps/photoidx.html (accessed August 26, 2003).
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that already has claimed so many victims could spread like poison throughout the
region. ’ The troops, he argued, will make it possible for “[c]ivilian agencies from around
the world... [to] begin a separate program of humanitarian relief and reconstruction...
this effort is also absolutely essential to making the peace endure. It will bring the people
of Bosnia the food, shelter, clothing, and medicine so many have been denied for so long.
It will help them to rebuild, to rebuild their roads and schools, their power plants and
hospitals, their factories and homes.’ 8 While quoted at length, this is just a small portion
of the excerpts from the speech that were designed to appeal to the public on
humanitarian grounds.
As this speech demonstrates and Morris confirms, Clinton attempted to use
opinion in this case to market his policy to the American people. Despite his efforts,
however, the President was not particularly successful in gamering public support. As
Table 6.15 shows, in the year after Clinton announced his decision, the majority of the
public continued to oppose the use of force in the region. Although a comparison of data
collected before (Table 6.12) and after (Table 6.15) the President attempted to sell his
policy shows that there was a slight increase in levels of support for the use of troops in
o s
the region.
85
Ibid.
86
Morris, Behind the Oval Office, 255-6.
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Table 6.15: Percentage of Americans who Support Clinton’s Policy in Bosnia:
November 1995-1996
Date Favor Oppose DK Pollster/Sponsor
1 1/27/95 46 40 15 Gallup3
1 1/27/95 33 58 9 CBSb
11/27/95 39 57 4 ABCc
11/29/95 38 58 3 ABCd
12/1/95 43 49 8 Hart & Teeter6
12/1/95 40 55 5 ABCd
12/6/95 38 55 7 Yankelovich 1
12/18/96 46 51 4 ABCd
a Now that a peace agreement has been reached by all the groups currently fighting in Bosnia, the Clinton
Administration plans to contribute U.S. (United States) troops to an international peacekeeping force. Do
^ou favor or oppose that?
Do you favor or oppose sending up to 20 thousand U.S. (United States) troops to Bosnia, as part of a
N.A.T.O. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) peacekeeping force, to enforce this peace agreement
between Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia?
c
President Bill) Clinton said now that a Bosnian peace treaty has been signed, he's sending 20,000 U.S.
(United States) troops there as part of an international peacekeeping force. Do you support or oppose
sending 20,000 U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of an international peacekeeping force?
d Now that a Bosnian peace treaty has been signed, (President Bill) Clinton is sending 20,000 U.S. (United
States) troops there as part of an international peacekeeping force. Do you support or oppose sending
20,000 U.S. Troops to Bosnia as part of an international peacekeeping force? [(If support or oppose, ask:)
Do you support/ oppose it strongly or somewhat?]
e
President (Bill) Clinton has proposed that the U.S. (United States) send ground troops to Bosnia as part of
a peacekeeping force that will supervise the peace agreement recently reached between the warring factions
there. Do you think Congress should or should not vote to approve sending American ground troops for
such an operation?
f Do you approve or disapprove of President (Bill) Clinton's decision to send 20,000 U.S. (United States)
troops to Bosnia as part of a N.A.T.O. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) peacekeeping force of 60,000
troops to enforce the peace agreement reached by the groups who have been fighting there?
Bosnia is not the only case in which the president crafted rhetoric in an attempt to
gamer support for the use of troops. Stephanopoulos confirms that the administration
engaged in a similar attempt to market their decision to send troops to Haiti as well.
Our polling showed that the American people were more moved
by altruism than naked self-interest. Since August, we’d been
quietly testing various arguments for the invasion [of Haiti].
Unlike foreign-policy elites who insisted that the United States
should deploy troops only when ‘vital’ economic or military interests
were at stake, the general public was more willing to use our power
to protect innocent civilians from torture and terror. ... A humanitarian
•
• 87
argument softened opposition.
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According to Stephanopoulos, White House officials spent a great deal of time trying to
determine how they could win public support for the invasion of Haiti on humanitarian
grounds. Administration officials, for instance, debated about “[h]ow to use evidence we
had - graphic photos of maimed children and mothers with slashed faces.” Whereas,
Clinton advisor David Gergen argued that “when the president met with.
.. reporters, he
should have the photos spread out on the table before him for the reporters to see.”
Stephanopoulos and others in the administration were concerned that this type of
“elaborate staging” would backfire and increase skepticism
.
88
Consequently, they
decided that Clinton should instead have the evidence in a folder ready to hand out to
QQ
reporters.
Preliminary Conclusions: Rhetorical . These cases confirm that Clinton used polls
to craft rhetoric. The evidence is stronger in the case of Bosnia because a White House
insider confinned that the President used opinion data to try to market his policy to the
American people. Contrary to expectation, however, Clinton appears to have been more
successful in moving opinion in the case of gays in the military than he was in the case of
Bosnia.
The studies also allow for the following preliminary conclusions. First, it was
hypothesized that officials can use opinion to craft rhetoric any time they are committed
to a policy, regardless of the direction of opinion. The only instance in which crafted
rhetoric is not an option in when the official is not committed to a policy and thus has no
interest in swaying opinion one way or the other. Both of the cases examined reflect
instances in which Clinton favored a policy that the public either opposed or was divided
87
Stephanopoulos, All Too Human, 309.
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on. Nevertheless there are other potential cases such as school vouchers, the
constitutional amendment to allow prayer in school, and affirmative action in which the
preliminary evidence suggests that Clinton crafted rhetoric to undermine public support
for a policy. The primary difference between these cases and those examined is that in
these instances the public favored a policy that the President opposed . 90
So
Ibld '
Dick Morris, for instance, lends support to the notion that these cases may be examples of the president
using polls to craft rhetoric in instances in which he opposed, but the public supported a policy action.
Morris writes, for example, that while the president opposed a constitutional amendment to allow prayer in
school, “the polls showed that the public supported the amendment.
. . . Our polling identified the specific
religious, spiritual, and moral activities the public wanted in schools, activities that had been subsumed
under the rubric of “school prayer.” But we found prayer itself was not high on the list; people really
wanted schools to teach values, ethics, and morals. Armed with this information, Clinton explained that the
First Amendment did not limit the teaching of any of these subjects and that there was therefore no
justification for tinkering with it.” In regard to conservative calls to end affirmative action, “the polls
showed that voters agree with the demand, yet the president decided to resist. His was not a hopeless cause
because the surveys also noted that what voters objected to were quotas, layoffs based on race or gender,
and unqualified people getting preference. Knowing this, Clinton proposed ‘mending,’ rather than ending
affirmative action so that the specific objections would be met while the principle would be retained.”
Finally, in the case of school vouchers, Morris writes, “my initial polls showed that voters backed Dole’s
plan [for school vouchers for private and parochial schools] by about 55 to 35. . . . The president thought of
flipping on the issue [parameter setting] and backing vouchers.
. . . We found that when voters realized that
the money for private and parochial schools would come from the elimination of the Department of
Education, voters rebelled and quickly turned against the plan. Voters felt that aid to Catholic schools and
other religious or private schools was fine as long as it didn’t come from funds that would otherwise go to
public schools. The president used this argument effectively in the second debate with Dole to answer the
voucher plan.” Behind the Oval Office, 228, 338-9.
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Table 6.16: Direction of Opinion and Officials Stance Necessary in Order to Craft
Rhetoric
Direction of Public Opinion
Pro/Favor
Policv
Mixed Con/Oppose
Policv
Officials’
Stance
Pro/Favor Crafted Talk
[CT] is possible*
Parameter
Setting [PS] &
CT are
possible
Ex. Gays in the
military
91 (CT)
Ex. NEPs (PS)
PS* & CT
are possible
Ex. Gays
in the
Ex. Bosnia
On Policv Not
committed
Pandering
is possible
Ex. Tax deduction
Ex. Victims rights
amendment92
PS is possible
Ex. VAT
PS* is
possible
Con/Oppose Pandering CT is possible*
or CT* are
possible
Ex. Victims rights
Amendment (Pandering)
Potential Ex 's.
ofCT: prayer
in public schools
amendment;
Affirmative action,
School vouchers
CT is
possible*
*PS and CT are included here only as a possibilities. It is important to keep in mind that due to the limited
number of cases examined, the case analysis found evidence of PS & CT only in those instances indicated.
The concluding chapter includes both a discussion of those “cells” or instances in which certain types of
use are hypothesized to be theoretically possible, but the limited number of cases examined in this study
does not support the finding. It concludes that in these instances, additional case analysis is necessary.
Table 6.16 shows that it is not only possible to predict how an official might use
polls, but that political consultants who rely on opinion data to advise their clients do not
91
The gays in the military case is placed in two boxes because the data can be read to suggest either that
opinion on this issue was divided or that there was slightly more opposition than support for gays in the
military.
92 The victims’ rights amendment case is placed in two boxes because while there is some evidence to
suggest the president initially opposed the amendment, he remained officially uncommitted until the Rose
Garden ceremony.
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have an innumerable set of options. When an official favors and the public is opposed to
a policy, for example, the official can either be counseled to ignore opinion at his own
peril or to use polls to set parameters, craft rhetoric, or both.
Second, unlike in the case of pandering and some instances of parameter setting,
when officials use opinion to craft talk they are not being substantively responsive to the
majority will. Instead they are using polls to sell or market a policy in the hopes of
simulating responsiveness or changing opinion to create the appearance of responsiveness
when in actuality, the substance of their policy initiative is not altered at all .93 The
argument here is not normative to the extent that it is not meant to suggest the absence of
substantive responsiveness is regrettable. While some scholars have made this argument,
there are others who see this as the exercise leadership
.
94
This study is not meant to
support either of these claims, merely to show that whether an official is substantively
responsive, attempts to simulate responsiveness, or non-responsive depends in large part
on if and how he uses opinion.
Third, unlike in cases of parameter setting and pandering, when officials use polls
to craft talk public opinion exercises little power. When officials craft rhetoric they are
using polls not to make substantive policy but marketing decisions. They are not being
substantively responsive to the majority will, but are trying to either move opinion or
simulate responsiveness. As a result, the majority will is rendered essentially powerless.
This finding is important because it not only challenges the optimistic views of the
earliest proponents of survey research, but it challenges the common idea that polls are a
93
See for instance, Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, 44-45, 66-67, 343, 348; Lawrence R.
Jacobs and Robert Y. Shapiro, “The Politicization of Public Opinion: The Fight for the Pulpit,” in Margaret
Weir, ed., The Social Divide: Political Parties and the Future ofActivist Government (Washington DC:
Brookings Institution, 1998): 83-125; Zaller, The Nature and Origins ofMass Opinion.
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vital linking mechanism and an important means by which the majority will is translated
into governmental action. While this is possible when polls are used to pander or in some
cases set parameters, when they are used to craft rhetoric, the public’s voice has no
impact on the substance of policy decisions.
This finding raises profound questions, such as whether the public should rely on
polls as a primary means by which to communicate with elected and appointed officials?
It also lends credence to the argument that the public may be better off choosing other
means by which to participate in the political process: becoming active in a political party
or interest group, marching or demonstrating, writing, calling, or visiting public officials.
If the public relies on polls to voice its opinion and impact decision-making, there are
only a limited number of instances in which this is likely to occur.
Table 6. 1 7 shows how the model of crafted talk has been amended to account for
these findings.
94
Jacobs and Shapiro suggest that the absence of substantive responsiveness is problematic. Others,
however, have taken the opposing view. See for instance, Politicians Don 't Pander, 302-3.
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Table 6.17: Crafted Talk - Revised Model
Problem/ ->
Issue comes
on to agenda
Potential policy ->
options/solutions
formulated/
considered
Acquire subjective ->
opinion/attitude or
descriptive data
Interpret data -> Use findings to -> Depending on the officials
help craft rhetoric success marketing his policy,
surrounding opinion may or may not
policy or set of
policy options in
order to change
opinion in the
desired direction,
strengthen support,
or opposition
move in the desired direction
Legitimizing
Case #7: North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTAL When Clinton
assumed office in January 1993, one issue that demanded almost immediate attention was
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). NAFTA originated as a result of
several interrelated factors, including the development of a European trading bloc,
declining American competitiveness in overseas markets, and trade agreements
negotiated by previous administrations. 95 In 1985, for instance, President Ronald Regan
signed a free-trade agreement with Israel. The agreement was historic because it marked
the first time the U.S. removed all tariffs on trade with another country. Three years
later, the U.S. signed a similar agreement with Canada, its primary trading partner. The
U.S.-Canadian Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which took effect in early 1989, required
the elimination of all tariffs between the countries over a ten-year period. Despite
widespread criticism, the agreement resulted in increased trade between the two
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countries. By 1994, for instance, U.S. exports to Canada had increased by 50 percent.
During that same period, Canadian exports to the U.S. grew at a somewhat slower, but
still impressive rate. 96
The success of the FTA prompted Mexican President Carlos Salmas de Gortari to
raise the idea of a U.S.
-Mexican free trade agreement with President George Bush. In
September of 1990, Bush notified Congress that the administration had begun
negotiations with Mexico, and in February of 1991 he announced that Canada was
joining the negotiations as well. 97 While the negotiations did not immediately draw fire
from critics, as the prospect of an agreement between the three nations drew closer,
opponents became more vocal. Despite this, in May 1991 Congress voted to authorize
fast-track negotiations giving the White House power to negotiate the pact and Congress
ninety days to vote the agreement up or down without amendments once it was signed
and submitted. Almost a year later the three countries reached a preliminary agreement
and on December 17, 1992, President Bush, President Salinas, and Canadian Prime
Minister Brian Mulroney signed the accord. Just weeks earlier, however, Bush had lost
his bid for re-election. Consequently, the difficult task of moving the agreement through
Congress was left to his successor.
There is no question that Clinton, like many “New Democrats” and members of
the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC), favored free trade. As Bob Woodward
writes, “Clinton believed in free trade, and as governor he had run personal campaigns to
attract foreign investors to Arkansas. In addition, the New Democrats generally favored
97
Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness
,
225-6.
Mary H. Cooper, “Rethinking NAFTA,” Congressional Quarterly Researcher, June 7, 1996.
Ibid.
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the agreement.” ,8 Despite this, as the Democratic party’s 1992 presidential nominee he
was in a difficult position vis-a-vis the pending agreement. The difficulty stemmed in part
from the fact that NAFTA was his opponent’s initiative and attacking Bush’s economic
policies was a major theme of Clinton’s campaign. More importantly, Mexico’s
involvement in the pact was sharply criticized by two of the Democratic Party’s main
constituencies, labor and environmentalists. Finally, the agreement was strongly opposed
by H. Ross Perot an independent presidential candidate who Clinton feared might draw
support from his base. n As a result, Clinton walked a fine line throughout the
campaign. As Patrick Marshall writes, “[djuring the 1992 presidential campaign Bill
Clinton treated foreign trade policy very gingerly, saying very little about what specific
actions he would take if elected.” 101 What little he did say, however, seemed to hold
promise for those on both sides of the issue. In an effort to counter charges of
protectionism that had plagued Democrats for years, he voiced his support for the concept
of free trade. lu In order not to alienate Democrats opposed to the pact, however, he
frequently complained about the trade practices of other nations and vowed to protect
American interests. As he stated “the issue here is not whether we should support free
trade or open markets. Of course we should. The real issue is whether or not we will
98 Bob Woodward, The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 55.
Bob Woodward writes, “Free trade . . . was a tough issue for any Democrat, but especially for Clinton.
. Clinton knew that backing it [NAFTA] would alienate organized labor, a key part of the Democrats’
constituency, and hurt his chances in big union states such as Michigan and Ohio.” Ibid.
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After his speech at North Carolina State University in Raleigh in early October 1992 endorsing NAFTA,
the Washington Post reported that the speech was “full of dire warnings about the damage the treaty could
cause if the nation did not change its overall economic policies.
. . . Clinton’s speech amounted to a
tightrope walk. ... As is his wont, he sought to define his as a third position on a polarized issue.” E.J.
Dionne, Jr., “Clinton Cautiously Backs Free-Trade Pact; Democrat Urges 'Supplemental' Agreements With
Mexico and Canada, Aid for U.S. Workers,” Washington Post
,
October 5, 1992.
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Patrick G. Marshall, “U.S. Trade Policy: Overview,” Congressional Quarterly Researcher
,
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Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness, 226; Bruce Stokes, “Mexican Roulette,” National Journal, May
15, 1993, 1 160-64; Bruce Stokes, “A Hard Sell,” National Journal, October 16, 1993, 2472-76.
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have a national economic strategy to make sure we reap the benefits, and the answer is
that today, we don t. 03 As a result, unlike Bush who strongly supported and Perot who
strongly opposed the pact, Clinton came down in the middle, noting that he would
support NAFTA provided it could be amended to meet the concerns of his constituents,
particularly labor and environmental groups.
Once he assumed office, Clinton continued to pursue this strategy. The
administration initiated supplemental negotiations with Mexico designed to produce side
agreements to ensure enforcement of environmental and labor laws. In the end, however,
the supplemental accords did little to quiet critics, particularly Democrats in Congress.
The fate ofNAFTA throughout Clinton’s first six months in office was further
complicated by the fact that it was not high on the administration’s agenda. During his
first year in office, Clinton was consumed with issues that he viewed as more important
than trade, namely the budget and health care reform. By the fall of 1993, however, with
the prospect of an upcoming vote in Congress, it became clear that he could no longer
neglect the issue. The problem was that the outlook in Congress at the time was not
promising. While the Senate was prepared to vote in favor of the agreement, many
leading Democrats in the House opposed the measure making the prospect of its passage
uncertain. As a result, White House officials began a coordinated campaign to move the
agreement through Congress. The administration’s efforts ultimately paid off. On
November 17, 1993, the House passed NAFTA by a vote of 234-200. On November 20,
NAFTA passed the Senate by a vote of 61-38 and two weeks later Clinton signed the
agreement.
103
Clinton’s speech at North Carolina State University in Raleigh on October 4, 1992, is quoted in part in
Hobart Rowen, “Clinton’s Approach to Industrial Policy,” Washington Post, October 1 1, 1992.
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The focus here is on one of the tactics the administration used to secure passage
of the agreement. In order to gamer public support, White House officials attempted to
legitimize NAFTA by focusing publicly on elite support for the agreement. By using
elites (opinion elites, public intellectuals, the epistemic community, and some policy-
makers) to increase public support the administration hoped to convince reluctant
Democrats in the House to vote in favor of the measure. Consequently, gamering public
approval was just one way in which the White House attempted to persuade members of
the House to vote for the bill. Clinton political consultant Mandy Grunwald refers to this
as ‘a bank shot,” a tactic that essentially amounts to mobilizing public support in an
effort to increase the administration’s leverage in Congress
.
104 To this extent,
legitimization is directly rooted in the literature on the presidency, most notably Samuel
Kernel l’s discussion of the modem president’s “going public” strategy. Kemell defines
going public as a class of activities that presidents engage in as they promote
themselves and their policies before the American public.” The president attempts to
bolster public support for a policy or proposal in an effort to increase his chances of
success in Washington. As a result, the ultimate target is not the American public, but his
fellow politicians in Washington . 105
104 Grunwald quoted in Woodward, The Agenda, 141; Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, 105.
Kemell is just one of several scholars who has done work in this area. The following list contains just a
small portion of other additional texts and studies. Grouping these together is not an effort to suggest that
there is widespread agreement among these authors or that their conclusions necessarily coalesce, but rather
to make an effort to provide a very brief overview of some of the well-known work in this tradition. Elmer
E. Cornwell Jr., Presidential Leadership ofPublic Opinion (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1965);
George C. Edwards, III, The Public Presidency (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1983); George
Edwards and Stephen Wayne, Presidential Leadership-, Michael Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt
Kumar, Portraying the President (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); Richard
Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents (New York: The Free Press, 1990); Jeffrey Tulis,
The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987); and Samuel Kemell, Going
Public, 3
rd
ed. (Washington
,
DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1997), ix.
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Gloria Borger confirms that in order to secure passage ofNAFTA, Clinton not
only had to “work the phones inside Washington” but “crowds everywhere” so as “to
convince members of Congress that he [was] not asking them to commit suicide ” 106 If
the President failed to gamer public support, it was unlikely that he could convince
House Democrats to support the measure. Even if he was able to push the bill through
Congress, however, without public support he might suffer the same fate as President
Carter did when he negotiated the Panama Canal Treaty. While the Treaty passed
Congress, Carter’s victory was hollow to the extent that “public outrage over the ‘elitist
giveaway’ became a defining issue” for his opponents in the next election. 107
While the goal of legitimization in this case is complicated, the practice itself is
not. Legitimization is the attempt to increase support for a policy or decision by focusing
publicly on the fact that the proposal is favored by either the majority, or as in the case of
NAFTA, others in positions of power. Unlike crafted talk where officials use polls to
determine how to market their policy to a mass audience, legitimization involves simply
stating publicly that the policy is favored by a certain segment of the population (either
elite’s or the public).
Table 6.18 shows that the public was almost evenly split on NAFTA, with a slight
edge for the opposition. The data also show, however, that large segments of the public
said they did not know enough about the pact to form an opinion. Between September
1992 and September 1993 more than four in ten Americans said that they had no opinion
on NAFTA.
106
Gloria Borger, “Clinton vs. the Populists on NAFTA,” U.S. News and World Report, October 1 1, 1993,
55.
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Table 6.18: Percentage of Americans who Support NAFTA: September 1992-
November 1993
Date Favor Oppose DK Pollster/Slnnncnr
9/12/92 27 34 40 NBC/WSJ 3
10/20/92 21 36 43 NBC/WSJ 3
1/23/93 28 31 41 NBC/WSJ 3
4/17/93 27 25 48 NBC/WSJ 3
7/24/93 31 29 40 NBC/WSJ3
9/10/93 25 36 39 NBC/WSJ3
10/22/93 29 33 33 NBC/WSJ3
11/14/93 36 31 33 NBC/WSJ3
The Bush Administration has negotiated a North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico to
eliminate nearly all restrictions on imports, exports, and business investment between the United States and
Mexico. Do you favor or oppose the trade agreement with Mexico? If you feel you have not heard enough
about this issue vet to have an opinion, please iust sav so.
After determining that mobilizing the public was essential to swaying undecided
legislators, White House officials attempted to use polls to legitimize. It is important to
note that this is just one of the many strategies administration officials employed in this
case. Beginning in Iate-Septemberl993, twenty White House staffers worked full-time to
try to move NAFTA through the House. As a result, White House officials not only
engaged in elite legitimization but used a variety of other tactics as well. 108
The tactic of concern in this instance, however, is legitimization. Faced with polls
showing the public either had no opinion or was somewhat more opposed to the
agreement, the administration attempted to use elite support as a means of convincing the
public of its merits. The White House was able to do this because despite lukewarm
public support, there was “broad support for the plan in the so-called Establishment...
108
For an overview of some of the other tactics used by the White House, see for instance: John Dillin,
“White House Hauls Out Heavy Artillery in NAFTA Battle,” Christian Science Monitor
,
October 21, 1993;
Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness
,
227-8; David S. Cloud, “As NAFTA Countdown Begins, Wheeling,
Dealing Intensifies,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, November 13, 1993, 3104.; David S. Cloud,
“Administration Pressed to Deal to Win NAFTA Converts,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report,
October 2, 1993, 2620; Joyce Barrett, “Clinton Sends Letter to Congress on NAFTA,” DNR, 23, no. 187
(September 30, 1993): 11; “Clinton Buys NAFTA Victory,” Human Events, November 27, 1993, 3;
Douglas Jehl, “President Begins Lobbying Blitz for Trade Accord,” New York Times, November 9, 1993.
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most businesses and economists were also supporters.” 109 As Kevin Phillips also notes,
elites were roundly supportive of the President on this issue. 1 10
Table 6.19 shows that officials can use public opinion or elite support to
legitimize a policy in cases in which they favor an initiative that the public supports,
opposes, or is divided on. When an official favors and the public either opposes or is
divided on a policy, as in the case ofNAFTA, the official can try to use some measure of
elite support to legitimize the policy. Alternatively, when an official and the public favor
an initiative, the official can use public support to try to pressure reluctant policy-makers
or other elites.
111
109
Cohen, Presidential Responsiveness, 227
.
110
Philips, quoted in Borger, “Clinton vs. the Populists,” 55. See also Woodward, The Agenda, 314.
111 While not the focus of this case study, there is also some evidence to suggest that Clinton used polls to
craft rhetoric as well.
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Table 6.19: Direction of Opinion and Officials Policy Stance Necessary for
Legitimization
Direction of Public Opinion
Pro/Favor
Policv
Mixed Con/Oppose
Policy
Officials’
Pro/Favor Legitimizing [L]
& CT* are
possible
Parameter
Setting [PS],
CT & L
are possible
Ex. NAFTA 112
PS*, CT,
& L are
possible
Ex. NAFTA
Stance Not
Policv Stance committed
Pandering [P]
is possible
PS is possible PS is
possible*
Con/Oppose P & CT*
are possible
CT is possible* CT is
possible*
*PS and are included here only as a possibilities. It is important to keep in mind that due to the limited
number of cases examined, the case analysis found evidence of PS & CT only in those instances indicatedThe concluding chapter includes both a discussion of those “cells” or instances in which certain types of
’
use are hypothesized to be theoretically possible, but the limited number of cases examined in this study
does not support the finding. It concludes that in these instances, additional case analysis is necessary.
Clinton’s use of elite opinion to legitimize is most apparent in his efforts to show
that NAFTA was supported by ex-presidents from both parties. This includes former
President s Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush, all ofwhom publicly endorsed the
pact. In mid-September 1993, when the administration launched its major push on
NAFTA, Clinton invited all five former living presidents to attend a White House signing
of environmental and labor side deals. By highlighting the fact that five former-President
from both parties supported the agreement, the White House hoped to increase public
support for the measure and boost its chances of passage in Congress. While in 1991 the
four former presidents all attended the dedication of Ronald Reagan’s Presidential
Library, the supplemental agreements signing ceremony marked the first time the group
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was ever asked to assemble in support of a particular piece of legislation. Due to
scheduling conflicts, neither Nixon nor Reagan was able to attend. Former Presidents
Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George Bush, however, all came to the ceremony and
spoke in favor ofNAFTA. 1 13 Clinton not only thanked his predecessors for their support
but he also focused on the fact that despite partisan differences, each believed strongly
that the agreement was good for the nation. As he stated, “[t]hese men, differing in party
and outlook, join us today because we all recognize the important stakes for our Nation in
this issue.”"
4
Administration officials continued to highlight elite support for NAFTA in the
months that followed. Speaking on NBC in mid-September, for instance, Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor stated that the White House signing ceremony boasted
“one of the most impressive coalitions I’ve seen.” He went on to note, that the agreement
is also “backed by former Presidents Reagan and Nixon, top congressional leaders, and
all living Nobel Prize-winning economists.” 115
The White House also released a letter signed by 283 of the world’s leading
economists, including Milton Friedman, James Tobin, and ten other Nobel laureates. The
letter stated that NAFTA “will be a net positive for the United States, both in terms of
employment creation and over-all economic growth.” “While we may not agree on the
112 NAFTA is placed in both this and the adjoining box because while opinion was divided, there was
slightly more opposition than support for the measure.
113
John Maggs, “Three Former Presidents to Attend NAFTA Ceremony,” The Journal ofCommerce,
September 14, 1993, 3A; John W. Mashek, “Ex-Presidential Support Sought for NAFTA Pact,” Boston
Globe, September 13, 1993, 17; Adam Nagourney, “Everywhere You Look, Presidents/For Twenty-Four
Hours a Packed White House,” USA Today, September 15, 1993.
114
President William Jefferson Clinton, “Remarks at the Signing Ceremony for the Supplemental
Agreements to the North American Free Trade Agreement,” September 14, 1993. Clinton spoke at 10:39
a.m. in the East Room at the White House. A transcript of the president’s remarks is available on-line at:
http://www.gpo.gov/nara/pubpaps/photoidx.html (accessed August 27, 2003).
115
Marshall Ingwerson, “Clinton Opens His Campaign for NAFTA,” Christian Science Monitor,
September 15, 1993.
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precise employment impact of NAFTA,” the letter continued, “the assertions that
NAFTA will spur an exodus of U.S. jobs to Mexico are without basis .” 116
In a mid-October statement on NAFTA Clinton once again stressed the level of
support for the agreement among leaders throughout the nation. As he stated, “I am very
pleased today to acknowledge the efforts of President Bush, President Carter, and
President Ford in convening a group of prominent citizens for NAFTA. Never before
have former Presidents joined forces to speak to the Nation about such a pressing issue.
This group includes distinguished Americans who have demonstrated achievement in
such diverse fields as government, industry, and civil rights. These individuals have
taken many paths to prominence, but they have come to a common conclusion that this
trade pact is good for America and good for America’s economic fortunes... When
thoughtful people look at the facts about NAFTA, they will come to the same conclusion
as this group of distinguished Americans. I am hopeful that this group will elevate the
debate about NAFTA and participate vigorously in discussion about which direction
America should take.” 117
White House officials continued to press their case throughout the fall. In
November, for instance, just weeks before the House was to vote on the pact, Clinton
assembled leading members of the nation’s trade and foreign policy establishment in the
East Room at the White House for a rally. The event was attended by the current and six
former secretaries of the Treasury, four former Secretaries of State, seven Nobel Prize
winning economists, former President Jimmy Carter, John Gardner, founder ofCommon
116
David Lauter, “Clinton Enlists Top Economists to Boost NAFTA,” Toronto Star, September 6, 1993.
117
William Jefferson Clinton, “Statement on Support for the North American Free Trade Agreement,”
October 12, 1993. A transcript of the president’s remarks is available on-line at:
http://www.gpo.gov/nara/pubpaps/photoidx.html (accessed August 29, 2003).
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Cause, former Chrysler Chairman Lee Iacocca, Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, and
Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker, among others. 118 The
administration also engaged the services of Iacocca and Microsoft Chairman Bill Gates,
both of whom made public appearances on behalf of the White House to speak in favor of
the agreement. 119
As Table 6.20 demonstrates, Clinton’s efforts to use elite support to sway opinion,
particularly the undecideds, paid off. Polls taken between October 1993 and January
1994 show levels of support for the agreement increased. Between late October and mid-
November, for instance, the NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found a seven percent increase
in support for NAFTA. By early December, support for the measure topped 50 percent.
Although it is important to note that levels of opposition remained largely unchanged and
the movement was primarily due to increased support among those who had previously
been undecided.
118
Michael Putzel, “Pro-NAFTA Gathering Stumps at White House,” Boston Globe
,
November 3, 1993.
119
Jessica Lee, “Iacocca Challenges Perot on NAFTA,” USA Today
,
September 24, 1993; Bill Montague,
“Pro-NAFTA Ads Enlist Celebrities,” USA Today, October 1 1, 1993; Douglas Turner, “White House Show
Gives Boost to NAFTA,” Buffalo News, October 21, 1993.
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Table 6.20: Percentage of Americans who Support NAFTA: October 1993-
Januarv 1994
Date Favor Oppose DK Pollster/Sponsor
11/8/93 34 38 29 Gallup3
11/14/93 36 31 33 NBC/WSJb
12/2/93 52 33 15 Times-Mirrorc
12/20/93 51 41 8 Harrisd
1/15/94 53 38 9 Gallup L
Do you favor or oppose the proposed North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States
and Mexico, sometimes known as N.A.F.T.A.?
The Bush Administration has negotiated a North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico to
eliminate nearly all restrictions on imports, exports, and business investment between the United States and
Mexico. Do you favor or oppose the trade agreement with Mexico? If you feel you have not heard enough
about this issue yet to have an opinion, please just say so.
How do you feel about N.A.F.T.A., the (North American) free trade agreement between the U.S. (United
States), Mexico and Canada? Do you favor or oppose this treaty?
* Do y°u favor or oppose N.A.F.T.A. (North American Free Trade Agreement)?
(I m going to read you a list of things that the (President Bill) Clinton Administration did in 1993. For
each one, please tell me whether you support or oppose it.). ... The North American Free Trade Agreement
with Canada and Mexico—also known as N.A.F.T.A.
Case #8: Health Care Reform
. A somewhat different example of the Clinton
administration’s efforts to legitimize a policy occurred in the context of health care
reform. Whereas in the case ofNAFTA the President supported and the public opposed
or was divided on the agreement, in the case of health care reform both the President and
public strongly favored change. While the President’s policy did not accord with public
opinion across the board, there was a significant amount of agreement on this point. As a
result, the administration used this fact in an attempt to pressure reluctant lawmakers,
interest groups leaders, and other elites to support the President’s health care reform
initiative.
As in the case of the VAT, the focus here is not on the overall health care reform
debate, but rather on how the administration used polls to legitimize its decision to
reform health care and in turn enhance its leverage with those in positions of power.
Health care reform consumed much of Clinton’s first two years in office. It was
such an enormous undertaking, that it is not surprising that the administration used polls
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in a variety of ways. The previous chapter showed, for instance, that with regard to the
VAT White House officials used polls to set parameters. Likewise, Haynes Johnson,
David Broder, Jacobs and Shapiro have demonstrated that the Clinton administration
used polls to craft rhetoric. They argue, for instance, that polls played a key role in the
President s decision to emphasize “security for all” as an overriding theme, particularly
in his September 1993 address to the nation. Similarly they find that polls played a role
in the President’s decision to focus on the “personal benefits” of his plan and to use terms
such as alliances to describe what are commonly referred to as health insurance
purchasing cooperatives (HIPCs) or “co-ops”. All of these are key examples of the
administration’s use of polls to craft rhetoric and market the health care proposal to the
public.
120
What has not been as widely recognized, however, is that the administration also
used polls to legitimize its plan. The evidence shows that White House officials not only
believed this strategy would work, but that they pursued it, particularly during the
President’s first year in office.
121
Almost a decade before Clinton assumed office Louis Harris Associates began
tracking how Americans felt about the state of the U.S. health care system. As Table
120
See for instance, Haynes Johnson and David S. Broder, The System: The American Way ofPolitics at
the Breaking Point (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1996), 17; Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't
Pander, 109-12.
121
It is important to note that much of the research has shown that while the president used polls
throughout the health care reform debate, he did not use them, as is often suggested, to pander to opinion.
There is, in fact, little evidence to suggest that Clinton was following public opinion when he placed health
care at the top of his agenda or that his health care reform proposal/package merely reflected the public’s
wishes or desires. As Jacobs and Shapiro conclude, “Bill Clinton’s policy preferences, philosophy toward
government, and political judgments about the policy goals of his potential supporters drove the
formulation of his health care plan . .
.
polls and focus groups did not.” Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians
Don 't Pander, 102, 1 19. Moreover, based on the discussion in the previous chapter, it is fair to conclude
that pandering was not an option in this case because in order to pander the president would have to have
been opposed to, or not committed to, health care reform, which was clearly not the case in this instance.
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6.21 shows, attitudes remained remarkably stable overtime. Between 1982 and 1996,
those saying that the health care system “works pretty well” and “needs only minor
changes were in the minority. In 1982, nineteen percent said they felt this way, ten
years later during the height of the health care reform debate that number dropped to four
percent, but rose to eleven percent by the end of 1996. Consistently between 1982 and
1996, the vast majority of respondents said that the health care system should either be
“fundamentally changed” or “completely rebuilt.” In 1982, for instance, three-quarters of
Americans felt that way. That number increased to 94 percent a decade later and
remained fairly stable until late 1996. What is most telling about the data is that, over a
fourteen-year period, between 70 to 90 percent of the American public stated that the
health care system was in disrepair and should be either fundamentally or completely
overhauled.
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Table 6.21: Percentage of Public who Support Reforming the Nation’s Health
Care System: 1982-1996
Date
Minor
Changes
Needed
Fundamental
Changes Completely
Needed Rebuild Not Sure Pollster
5/10/82 19 47 28 6 Harris3
5/13//83 21 50 25 4 Harris3
9/5/84 16 49 31 4 Harris3
1984 26 49 21 4 Harris3
1987 29 47 19 5 Hams3
11/11/88 10 60 29 1 Harris3
1990 16 59 24 1 Harris3
11/13/91 6 50 42 2 Harris3
12/92 4 45 49 2 Harris3
8/6/93 13 49 35 3 Harris3
4/4/94 14 54 31 1 Harris3
6/10/94 18 53 28 2 Harris3
9/18/94 20 44 35 2 Harris3
1/18/96 16 59 24 1 Harris3
12/12/96 11 52 35 1 Harris3
Which of the following three statements comes closest to expressing your overall view of the health care
system in the United States?. ... On the whole, the health care system works pretty well and only minor
changes are necessary to make it work better. 2. There are some good things in our health care system, but
fundamental changes are needed. 3. Our health care system has so much wrong with it that we need to
completely rebuild it. . . .
Public dissatisfaction with the health care system is further reflected in data
collected by the Gallup Organization. 122 Table 6.22 shows that between 1991 and 1994,
80 to 90 percent of Americans agreed that the U.S. health care system was in a state of
“crisis”.
Table 6.22: Percentage of Americans Stating the U.S. Health Care System is in
Crisis: 1991-1994
Date Yes/In Crisis No/Not in Crisis Don’t Know Pollster
6/26/91 91 8 1 Gallup
3
5/10/93 90 9 1 Gallup
3
1/15/94 84 15 1 Gallup
3
a
In vour opinion. is there a crisis in health care in this country today, or not?
122 Johnson and Broder, for instance, write that in the early 1990s, “two-thirds of voters surveyed were
dissatisfied with the health care system as a whole.” See The System, 18.
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When Gallup reworded the question to determine whether Americans felt the system was
in crisis, problematic, or fine the way it is, the number of respondents stating that there
was a health care crisis decreased. Nevertheless, as Table 6.23 shows, 80 to 90 percent of
Americans continued to state that the system was either in crisis or problematic and in
need of repair. As Johnson and Broder write, “from beginning to end,” surveys found “a
strong climate for change.” 123
Table 6.23: Percentage of Americans Stating the U.S. Health Care System is in
Crisis Or Problematic and in Need of Repair: 1991-1994
DK Pollster
Gallup 2
Gallupb
Gallup3
Gallupb
Gallup 3
Gallupb
Gallup3
Gallupc
In Crisis Problematic Not Problematic
1/28/94 50 48
1/28/94 63 35
2/26/94 45 54
2/26/94 69 38
6/26/94 35 61
6/25/94 55 41 1
9/6/94 53 43 2
9/6/94 17 81 1 ^
Which of these statements do you agree with more—the country has a health care crisis, or the country has
health care problems, but no health care crisis?
Which of these statements do you agree with more—the country has health care problems, but no health
care crisis, or the country has a health care crisis?
Which of these statements do you think best describes the U.S. (United States) health care system today—
the health care system is in a state of crisis, it has major problems, it has minor problems, or it does not
have any problems?
The fact that the majority of Americans felt the health care system was in need of
reform should not be misinterpreted to suggest that the public favored the specifics of the
Clinton administration’s proposal or that the majority were dissatisfied with their own
health care coverage. Polls show that important components of the plan such as
governmental regulation, managed competition, and employer mandates were not widely
123
Ibid., 629.
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supported.
'~ 4
Moreover, while perceptions of the health care system as a whole were
negative, significant numbers of Americans were satisfied with their own health care
coverage and their ability to get the type of care they desired (non-catastrophic, family
practice, etc. .
.). This data may explain in part why the administration’s efforts at health
care reform ultimately failed: large numbers of Americans were not, in the end, willing to
support a costly and massive overhaul of a system that was generally working for them
personally. The Clinton administration did not use this data in pressing its case, however,
because it did not serve its purposes or ultimate goals. In order to convince elites of the
necessity of reforming the system, the administration instead trumpeted data that showed
overwhelming majorities of Americans felt the system as a whole was in need of repair.
It can be argued that the administration’s failure to address the fact that a significant
portion of the population was generally satisfied with their own coverage was a key
reason the plan ultimately failed. This argument is, however, outside the scope of this
study. The primary goal of this analysis is to determine how the administration used polls
and in this case there is ample evidence to suggest that for better or worse, the
Clinton White House chose to focus on data depicting widespread dissatisfaction with the
system in an effort to convince reluctant lawmaker’s to support their initiative.
In early 1995, the Clinton administration abandoned its efforts to keep the records
of the Health Care Reform Task Force sealed.
125 The memos confirm that legitimization
was a tactic used in the battle to win elite support for the president’s proposal. At least
six strategy and communication memos written by various members of the Task Force
124 CBS/NYT polls taken between October 1990 and January 1993 showed that two-thirds of the American
public consistently supported a payroll tax as opposed to the employer mandate, which the administration
adopted. See for instance, CBS/NYT surveys dated October 1990, June 1991, August 1991, January 1992,
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and administration and distributed to the President, First Lady, and others in the White
House in 1993 suggest that overwhelming public support for reform would enhance the
White House’s leverage with legislators and interest groups, and give Congress the
“necessary comfort level and support to pass a plan.” 126
On July 1, 1994, when it was becoming increasingly apparent that the
administration’s plan might not pass Congress, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell
met with the President, First Lady, congressional leaders, and several administration
officials. During the meeting, Mitchell argued that it was time for the administration to
abandon its efforts to get a bill guaranteeing universal coverage. Instead he urged the
President to “reach out to moderates, form a consensus, and bring the new compromise
bill to the Senate for a vote.” In making his case, Mitchell said that the White House
strategy of using public opinion to pressure members of Congress was no longer
workable. The administration, he argued, “should not count on the public influencing
their congressional members by pressing for reform when they meet with constituents
over the holiday recess, as some in the White House [have] urged.” 127
Mitchell’s statement confirms that legitimization was a key component of the
administration’s strategy. The White House tried to use “supportive public opinion as an
‘ally’ and ‘tool’ to counteract political rivals and to draw Congress and interest groups
July 1992, and January 1993. For an overview of polls showing American attitudes towards governmental
regulation of health care see also, Johnson and Broder, The System, 205-6, 371.
125
See for instance, Byron York, “The Health-Care Paper Trail,” American Spectator, March 1995.
126
Appendix 2 attached to Memo to Distribution from Chris Jennings and Steve Richetti, April 14, 1993,
regarding “Congressional Update and Strategy for Health Care Reform”; “A Winning Strategy for Health
Care Reform” for Hillary Clinton by Ira Magaziner, Jeff Eller, and Bob Boorstin, July 1993; Memo to the
President and Hillary Clinton from Ira Magaziner, Walter Delman, and Lynn Margherio regarding
“Positioning Health Reform Introduction,” July 30, 1993; Memo to the Communication Team from Stanley
Greenberg, October 12, 1993; Memo to the President and Hillary Clinton from Ira Magaziner, regarding
“Health Care Reform and Economic Package,” March 7, 1993; Memo to Hillary Clinton from Bob
Boorstin and Lois Quam, February 6, 1993, Regarding “Health Care Communications 100 Day Strategy.”
Memo’s cited in Jacobs and Shapiro, Politician 's Don 't Pander, 130-5.
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towards the president’s policy goals... on health care reform the White House banked on
creating a legislative push because of public support.” 128
An analysis of the President’s public statements on health care reform during his
first year in office also show that legitimization was a major part of the White House
strategy. The decision to focus on Clinton’s statements from early 1993 to early 1994
stems from the fact that by January 1994 public and elite support for his plan had begun
to decrease and the President s window of opportunity to reform the nations health care
system had begun to close. Consequently, Clinton’s 1994 State of the Union is often seen
as his final attempt or “last chance to draw public attention back to health reform.” 129
Polls taken after, however, show that public reaction to the address was “anything but
positive.”
130
While the President did engage in “short bursts of activity” to sell his health
care plan in the winter and spring of 1994, “the public campaign declined further during
the summer” and “none of the activity in 1994 even approached its 1993 peak.” 131
Consequently, it is the President’s statements on health care reform between January
1993 and January 1994 that are mostly likely to contain evidence of the White House’s
legitimization strategy.
The public papers of the President compiled by the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA) made the task of accessing and analyzing Clinton’s
statements during this time much easier. The archives show that on at least eighty-
three days between January 25, 1993 and January 25, 1994, Clinton made one or more
127
Johnson and Broder, The System, 439.
128
Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don ’t Pander, 103-4.
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Johnson and Broder, The System, 264.
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Ibid., 268.
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Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don ’t Pander, 1 14.
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public statements regarding health care reform. Due to the fact that he often made two or
more statements in a single day, this amounts to more than one hundred and ten
statements over a three hundred and sixty day period. A content analysis shows that 41
percent of these statements contained at least one or more reference to the fact that there
was public consensus on the need for health care reform. The vast majority of these
statements were made between early September and November 1993, when the
administration first introduced its plan in Congress. Over a two-month period, beginning
on September 16, almost seventy percent of his statements contained at least one or more
reference to a ground swell of public support for reform.
In coding the content of the Clinton’s statements, any reference to public support
for reform or attempt to show levels of frustration with the current system and the need
for change was treated as an example of legitimization. The analysis shows that Clinton
relied on four tactics to legitimize his efforts at reform.
First, on several occasions he recounted stories of individuals who had been
victimized by the health care system. The vignettes are too numerous to review at length.
Nevertheless, one example occurred during his September 22 speech when he spoke
about Kerry Kennedy, a small business owner from Titusville, Florida, who became
unable to provide health care for the seven workers in his small furniture store after two
reach advanced age and developed pre-existing conditions. Similarly in an exchange
with reporters on April 29 he told the story a woman from Columbus, Ohio, who was
forced to go on Medicaid after leaving her $50,000 a year job to care for one of her seven
children who had a terminal illness. These are just two of the personal stories he repeated
132
The following references to particular statements by Clinton are all contained in the public papers of the
president compiled by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). These records are
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frequently in an effort to draw attention to the fact that Americans were dissatisfied with
the system.
Second, Clinton met with members of the public and those involved in the health
care system, such as doctors and nurses, to allow them to give voice to their own
experiences and frustrations. During the twelve months he held numerous town meetings
and question and answer sessions with people who like the patients, doctors, nurses and
administrators he met with at the Children’s National Medical Center in Washington on
September 17, all had personal problems with the current system. The doctors, for
instance, spoke of spending two million dollars a year on paperwork and being forced to
stop seeing an average of five-hundred terminally ill children a year in order to fill out the
overwhelming paper work required by insurance carriers.
Third, the President frequently referenced the number and content of letters
received by the White House from people demanding reform. On September 16, for
instance, he met publicly with a small portion of the more than seven hundred thousand
people who wrote asking the government to “give them” the health “security all
Americans deserve.” Speaking to Small Business Leaders later that day, he cited the
more than “seven hundred thousand Americans have written us about their personal
situations.” His references to this correspondence continued through the fall and
eventually found its way into his January 25, 1994, State of the Union where he noted
that the administration had received “almost a million letters from people all across
America and from all walks of life.” During the speech he reiterated the plight of one in
particular, Richard Anderson of Reno, Nevada, who lost his job and medical insurance
just before his wife suffered a cerebral aneurysm. As a result, the President continued,
available in hard copy or on-line at: http://www.gpo.gov/nara/pubpaps/photoidx.html.
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Anderson was forced to declare bankruptcy because he could not afford to pay for his
wife’s medical bills.
Fourth, Clinton spoke frequently about the fact that in his life time “there has
never been so much consensus that something has to be done” about the nation’s health
care system. In remarks to law enforcement organizations and reporters on April 15,
for instance, he referenced polls showing support for reform. As he noted, “the polls that
1 see in the press, the polls that many of you have commissioned, they say
overwhelmingly that the American people want the security of an affordable health care
system. He continued to make this case throughout the next few months. In early
September, for instance, he told a White House gathering “millions of Americans... want
us to take action.”
134
Speaking with reporters later that month, he once again spoke of a
unanimous consensus that the cost of continuing on our present course is greater than
the cost of change. I don t think that there has ever,” the President continued, “been
that much consensus before.” 135 In his Speech before Congress that evening, at a health
care rally the next day, at a televised Town Meeting in Florida later that evening, in his
radio addresses during late September and early October he continued to state that there
is “consensus”, the people, particularly Americans outside the capitol, are “demanding
change,” that there is a “large constituency” for reform, and Americans are “fed up” with
the current system.
136 As he noted in his September 25 Radio Address, the public’s
response to his call for health care reform “has been positive and dramatic, creating... an
133
See for instance, Clinton’s January 25, 1993, “Remarks and Exchange with Reporters on Health Care
Reform.” NARA public papers of the President, 1993: 1:13-14.
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See for instance, Clinton’s September 16, 1993, “Remarks in Response to Letters on Health Care
Reform,” NARA public papers of the President, 1993, 2:1500.
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See for instance, Clinton’s September 22, 1993, “Remarks and Exchange with Reporters on Health Care
Reform.” NARA public papers of the President, 1993, 2:1 155.
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irresistible momentum for reform.” Moreover, he urged Americans to take their calls for
reform to Congress. As he noted in his October 5 remarks, “we need you... to show up
and be heard in the Capitol to support the Members of Congress.” Days later he urged
Americans to “help us pass... get us a health care bill.” 137 He continued to request
assistance in lobbying members of Congress during many of his statements through the
end of the year.
These are all examples of the President’s efforts to use public support for health
care reform to legitimize his proposal. The content analysis found that more than forty
percent of his statements between January 1993 and January 1994 contained at least one
reference to majority support for reform. Moreover, almost seventy percent of his
statements in the two-month period beginning in mid-September, just before he unveiled
his proposal to the nation, contained at least one reference to public support for reform.
Despite the President’s repeated attempts, however, his efforts to use “the climate
of change to convince legislators and other elite’s to support his proposal ultimately
failed. Nevertheless, several Health care memos, statements of administration and
governmental officials, as well as an analysis of the President’s own statements during
his first year in office confirm that White House officials made a concerted effort to use
polls to legitimize their proposal.
Preliminary Conclusions: Legitimization
. These cases show that legitimization
can occur anytime an official favors a policy. As Table 6.24 shows, in addition to the
official’s policy stance, the direction of opinion is also a key variable. If the public
136
See for instance, various statements by the president on health care reform between September 22 and
November 3, 1993. NARA public papers of the President, 1993, 2:1555-1887.
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See for instance, Clinton’s October 8, 1993, statement. NARA public papers of the President, 1993,
2:1715.
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opposes or is divided on the policy, as in the case of NAFTA, legitimization can occur if
there is some measure of elite support that the official determines it would be beneficial
to publicize. In both the cases of gays in the military and NAFTA the public opposed the
measure. While it was theoretically possible for Clinton to engage in elite legitimization
in both instances, he did so only in the case ofNAFTA. The decision not to engage in
elite legitimization in the case of gays in the military makes sense given that support for
the president’s plan stemmed primarily from gay and lesbian activists and others within
the left wing of the Democratic party. Since polls show that the majority was not
supportive of extending protections to gays and lesbians as a group, it would have made
little sense for Clinton to trumpet the support of gay and lesbian activists. This shows that
even when elite legitimization is possible, it is not always politically wise. When an
official favors and the public opposes or is divided on a policy, the official has to make a
determination as to whether publicizing the nature and level of elite support will help his
cause.
Legitimization can also occur when the public favors a policy action, such as in
the case of health care reform. In these instances public legitimization occurs only if the
official attempts to publicize majority support in an effort to preempt a decline in
approval, counteract political rivals, or persuade others in positions of power to act in
favor of the measure.
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Table 6 .24 :
r - oiauce necessary to
Direction of Public Opinion
Pro/Favor Mixed
Policy
Legitimize
Con/Oppose
Pn/icy
Officials’
Pro/Favor Public
Legitimization
[PL] & Crafted
Talk [CT]*
are possible
Ex. Health care
Reform (PL)
Parameter
Setting [PS],
CT, &
Elite Legitimi-
zation [EL]*
are possible
Ex. NAFTA (EL)
Ex. Gays in the
military138 (CT)
Ex. NEPs (PS)
PS*, CT, &
EL are
possible
Ex. Gays
in the military
(CT)
Ex. Bosnia
(CT)
Stance
On Policy
Not Pandering [P]
is possible
Ex. Tax deduction
Ex. Victims rights
amendment' 39
PS is possible
Ex. VAT
PS is possible
Ex. Oppos-*
ition
*DC pT „nA CT
Con/Oppose P & CT*
are possible
Ex. Victims rts. (P)
CT* is possible CT is
possible*
j — r—— u 10 iiiipuiiam iu Keep m riuna mat aue to the
limited number of cases examined, the case analysis found evidence of PS, CT and EL only in those
instances indicated. The concluding chapter includes both a discussion of those instances in which certain
types of use are hypothesized to be possible, but the limited number of cases examined in this study does
not support the finding. It concludes that in these instances, additional case analysis is necessary.
While Table 6.24 shows there are two situations in which elite legitimization may
occur and one in which public legitimization may occur, this does not mean that these are
the only options available to officials. As the table demonstrates, in each of these
instances officials can also ignore opinion or use polls in other ways.
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The gays in the military case is placed in two boxes because the data can be read to suggest either that
opinion on this issue was divided or that there was slightly more opposition than support for gays in the
military.
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The victims’ rights amendment case is placed in two boxes because while there is some evidence to
suggest the president initially opposed the amendment, he remained officially uncommitted until the Rose
Garden ceremony.
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Just as in the case of crafted talk, when officials engage in legitimization, public
opinion is essentially rendered powerless. Opinion is powerless to the extent that unlike
certain cases of parameter setting and all instances of pandering, it has no impact on the
substance of policy. In cases of elite and public legitimization, opinion is instead used as
a tool to aid an official pursuing a favored policy. Whether public opinion and the
officials policy stance happen to coalesce, as in the case of health care reform, or not, as
in the case of NAFTA, matters little because the majority view has no substantive impact.
The implications of this finding should not be overlooked. Since its inception,
polling has often been seen as a tool of democracy, a means by which the public can
communicate its beliefs, attitudes, wishes, and desires to officials, particularly between
elections and on specific issues. Lord James Bryce, George Gallup and other early
proponents of survey research argued that as a result polls would help create a more
responsive democracy. This argument is faulty because officials can use polls in a
variety of ways, some of which by definition preclude substantive responsiveness to the
majority will. When polls are used to craft talk and legitimize, for instance, they are not
by definition being substantively responsive to the majority. Rather in these cases
officials use polls as a tool to aid in the pursuit of favored policies, regardless of the
direction of opinion.
This is important because it raises questions such as whether the public should
rely on polling as a means of communicating with governmental officials or as a means
by which to impact policy and decision-making. If the public hopes to impact policy
outcomes, they are better off relying on other means by which to do so (i.e. becoming
active in a political party, joining an interest group, lobbying, protesting, and so on).
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E. E. Schattschneider writes “[t]he most legitimate question to be asked in a
democracy is: -how can people get control of the government?” 140 This study shows that
for all polling has to offer, the technique is not a reliable means by which to “get control”
of the government. Registering opinion in a poll offers no assurance that it will be heard,
adhered to, or translated into governmental policy because officials have a variety of
options when it comes to using poll data and only a small number involve substantive
responsiveness.
Whereas the legitimization model initially combined both elite and public
legitimization, the case studies show that they are best considered separately.
Consequently, Tables 6.25 and 6.26 depict elite and public legitimization respectively.
Table 6.25: Revised Model - Elite Legitimization
Problem/
Issue comes
on to agenda
-» Potential policy
option/solution
is favored by
the official
-> Acquire subjective/ ->
opinion/attitude
data
Interpret data if the public is official seeks to increase
/determine levels opposed to support by publicizing
of support or split on the elite support for the
for the policy policy initiative
Table 6.26: Revised Model - Public Legitimization
Problem/ ->
Issue comes
on to agenda
Potential policy
option/solution
is favored by
the official
-> Acquire subjective/
opinion/attitude
data
Interpret data -> if public supports/ -> official publicizes majority
/determine levels favors the policy support in an effort to
of support persuade elite’s to support
for the policy the policy, counteract
political opposition, etc...
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E.E. Schattschneider, The Strugglefor Party Government (College Park: University of Maryland, 1948),
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De-legitimizinu
Case #9: Medicare Cuts
. In order for de-legitimization to occur, an official must
oppose a plan proposed by others in positions of power. If the public or other elites
oppose the initiative as well the official can showcase this in an effort to de-rail his
opponents proposal. A situation that was ripe for Clinton to use polls in this way
occurred in 1995 when Congressional Republican’s attempted to cut Medicare.
One of the Republican’s goals after gaining control of Congress in 1994 was to
balance the budget in seven years. 141 In order to do this they had to raise taxes or cut
spending in a number of areas, including Medicare, one of the most sacrosanct federal
programs. Under the leadership of House Speaker Newt Gingrich, Republicans in the
House opted for a plan that cut Medicare by more than $270 billion and reduced its
projected annual growth by more than one-third. 142 Senate Republicans pursued a plan
that, while less drastic, nevertheless included Medicare cuts of more than $250 billion. 143
Republican leaders understood the public opposed the cuts and the proposal was
controversial.
144
As Jason DeParle writes, “in seeking to reduce spending.
. . by $270
billion, he [Gingrich] ignored the advice of party leaders, who urged him to wait until
after the 1996 election. Republican Party Chairman Haley Barbour, for instance,
warned Congressional Republicans that, “the program is too popular with the elderly.
141
It was the House Republicans who first broached the topic of balancing the budget within seven years.
House Republican budget aides have since acknowledged that the “seven year” time frame was “arbitrary
.
. . an accident of a 1993 plan to reach balance by century’s end.” Despite this, both Senate Majority Leader
Bob Dole and President Clinton each eventually proposed his own plan designed to balance the budget
within the same time period. Jason DeParle, “Rant, Listen, Exploit, Leam, Scare, Help, Manipulate, Lead,”
New York Times Magazine, January 28, 1996.
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the elderly pay attention and vote.” 140 Later he told reporters that he “viewed Medicare
as his party s Achilles heel.’ and as a result he had “urged Gingrich and the others to
‘take it off the table’” 147 Barbour was not alone. Bob Blendon, a health care policy and
public opinion expert, and Tom Scully, a former Bush administration official, both
warned Republicans about the difficulty of pursuing such drastic cuts. As Scully noted,
“there is no policy that can get them to two hundred and fifty billion dollars in Medicare
cuts that doesn’t kill them in the next election.” 148 Even Gingrich later acknowledged
that he “thought” about the fact that the proposed cuts in Medicare “could kill us. .
.
everyday.” 149
As Table 6.27 shows, their concerns were well founded. Surveys taken in 1995
showed that the vast majority of American’s strongly opposed cutting Medicare in order
to balance the budget or achieve deficit reduction. Despite variations in questions
wording, between sixty and eighty percent of respondents consistently expressed
opposition to Medicare cuts.
147
Barbour also added that ‘“They [Republican leaders] all understood that I was right politically. Hell that
ain’t rocket science’. . . . But they rejected his advice. ‘To a man, they said, if you wait two years, the
degree of change required is so much more difficult and drastic than if we start now that it’ll end up being
much worse.’” Michael Weisskopf and David Maraniss, “Republican Leaders Win Battle by Defining
Terms of Combat; Medicare Pitch Became Preserve and Protect,” Washington Post, October 29, 1995.
148 Quoted in Johnson and Broder, The System, 574.
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Table 6.27
_
:—Percentage of Public Who Favor Cutting Medicare: 1995
Date
1/95
1/19/95
2/24/95
2/26/95
4/21/95
5/10/95
5/10/95
5/11/95
5/31/95
6/2/95
6/8/95
7/20/95
7/20/95
9/16/95
9/28/95
9/28/95
10/22/95
10/27/95
Favor
17
9
19
12
29
16
15
37
24
32
21
25
38
16
26
16
27
22
Oppose Don’t Know Pollster
83
88
78
86
62
81
85
59
74
58
78
70
60
80
71
83
67
73
1
3
3
2
9
3
1
4
2
10
2
5
2
5
2
1
6
5
ABC/WP3
LATb
Gallup 0
ISI/RCd
Hart/Teeter0
Yankelovich f
ABC/Wpa
Gallup8
Harris
h
NBC/WSJ'
Harrisj
Gallupk
WP 1
Hart/Teeterm
ABC/WP"
ABC/WP3
CBS/NYT0
NBC/WSJP
In order to reduce the federal budget deficit, should the government cut spending on
. . . Medicare, which
is the government health insurance program for the elderly, or not?
’ (As you may know, there is much discussion in Washington about which programs should be cut back in
order to reduce the federal budget deficit.) Do you think the government should cut back spending ... for
Medicare, the health insurance program for the elderly?
As you know, the President (Bill Clinton) and the Congress will be trying to cut federal programs in order
to reduce the budget deficit. For each of the following programs, please tell me whether you think it is more
important to reduce the federal budget deficit, or more important to prevent that program from being
significantly cut . .
.
Medicare—the federal health program for the elderly
(There is talk in Washington about cutting back certain programs to reduce the federal budget deficit. I'm
going to read you a list ot areas where possible cuts could be made.) Should the federal government cut
back spending ... on Medicare, which is the government health insurance program for the elderly?
Which of these would you prefer-reducing spending on Medicare by two hundred billion dollars over the
next seven years, with all the savings going to deficit reduction, or maintaining Medicare spending at its
current level, even if that means the budget deficit is not reduced?
I'm going to read you a list of programs that some people have suggested be cut to balance the budget by
the year 2002. For each, please tell me if it is more important to make significant cuts in that program to
balance the budget or whether you think it is more important to prevent that program from being
significantly cut .
.
. Medicare—the federal health care program for the elderly.
a
Now I have some questions about Medicare—the government health care plan for the elderly. As members
of Congress try to decide which programs should be cut to balance the budget, which of these statements
best describes how you think Medicare should be treated: It is only fair that Medicare should be considered
for possible cuts along with other government programs that people count on, or Medicare is a special
program that should not be cut even if it increases the deficit?
A number of spending reductions have been proposed in order to balance the federal budget and avoid raising taxes.)
Would you favor or oppose making major spending reductions in . . . Medicare?
1 Which of these would you prefer-reducing spending on Medicare by two hundred billion dollars over the
next seven years, with all the savings going to deficit reduction, or maintaining Medicare spending at its
current level, even if that means the budget deficit is not reduced?
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kWould you say you favor big cuts in future Medicare spending, moderate cuts or small cuts9
As you know the President and Congress are trying to cut federal programs in order to reduce the federalbudget deficit. When it comes to Medicare-the federal health care program for the elderly-do you think it
is more important to reduce the budget deficit, or more important to prevent Medicare from being
significantly cut?
1 (A number of spending reductions have been proposed in order to balance the federal budget and avoid
raising taxes. Would you tavor or oppose making major spending reductions in each of the following
federal programs?)
. . . Medicare.
(Here are reasons that some people give for reducing planned spending on Medicare. For each one please
tell me if you favor or oppose reducing Medicare spending for this reason.) Do you favor or oppose
’
reducing Medicare spending ... to help pay for tax cuts?
" Which of the following statements comes closer to your view: A. Under no circumstances should
Medicare services to the elderly be cut back, (or) B. Because of the financial crunch, Medicare services to
the elderly, like other programs, should be cut back.
If you had to choose, would you prefer balancing the federal budget or preventing Medicare from being
significantly cut?
p Let me read you two different plans for balancing the budget. Plan A balances the budget in seven years
and includes larger cuts in spending on Medicare and education. Plan B takes ten years or more to balance
the budget, and cuts less from Medicare and education. Which plan do you prefer?
In the face of such strong opposition, Congressional Republican’s pursued a
public relations campaign designed to mollify these concerns. Their strategy included
requesting that the White House “act responsibly with them to save the health care
system” and join them in the creation of a bipartisan commission to devise necessary
changes in the Medicare system. 150 When these tactics failed, they tried to call attention
to a report by the Trustees of the Medicare Fund warning that unless drastic changes were
made, the fund would soon be bankrupt. 151
In addition, they relied on the advice of pollsters and consultants such as Frank
Luntz, Linda DiVall, and Bill Mclnturff who suggested new ways to communicate with
the public about Medicare. 152 An article by Sidney Blumenthal published in the New
Yorker in September 1995 quoted an eight-page memo by Luntz to Republican leaders
entitled “Everything You Ever Wanted to Know About Communicating Medicare.” 153
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The memo stated that the elderly would never accept the plan unless they were
“convinced the system’s going broke... Ifwe can’t prove that Medicare is going
bankrupt, we’ll never be able to sell our solutions.” 154 The memo also contained a
discussion of proper language to use when speaking about the plan. Based on his
research, Luntz urged Republican’s to use the term “save” as opposed to “improve,”
“affluence-test” as opposed to “means-test,” and “slow growth” as opposed to “cut.” 155
As early as March 1995, Gingrich “convened a strategy session to discuss how
Republicans should talk about restructuring the Medicare system. It marked the
beginning of a long campaign... during which [he] commanded a vast communications
army, using polls, focus groups, [and] image-makers.” 156 During the March meeting, for
instance, DiVail told Republican’s “do not say changing Medicare.
.
.
[because] at a focus
group in Cincinnati on March 6, when seniors were asked what words they preferred, one
man offered preserve
. Later she warned them to also avoid terms such as “cut, cap, and
freeze... and to emphasize the magnitude of the task.” 157 As Bal Harbour wrote in late
September 1995, for months, Republican’s have employed a vocabulary concocted (and
intensely focus-group-tested) by” Luntz and other conservative pollsters. 158
Despite their strategy, the Republican’s controversial plan gave Clinton an
opening with which to paint the cuts as “draconian” and “extreme.” 159 The question here,
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however, is whether Clinton attempted to use majority opposition to de-legitimize the
proposal as well.
In order to address this question, all of the President’s public statements on
Medicare between January 1, 1995, and January 1, 1996, were analyzed. Throughout that
time period, Clinton made sixty-eight public statements regarding Medicare. In coding
the statements, any reference to public or majority opposition to the cuts was treated as an
example of de-legitimization.
Given high levels of public opposition and the fact that the President opposed the
cuts as well, this is a case in which Clinton could have used opinion in this manner.
Nevertheless, the content analysis finds little evidence that Clinton used opinion in this
way. Johnson and Broder write that throughout this period Democrats “pointed
gleefully.
. . to polls showing that most of the public — and an overwhelming majority of
seniors - thought preserving Medicare more important than balancing the budget within a
specific time period.” While Democrats in Congress and other White House officials
may have made these types of statements, the President did not.
Only eight or twelve percent of Clinton’s statements contained rhetoric which
could be categorized as representing an attempt to de-legitimize. Even then, the
references were vague, and contained no direct mention of polls or majority opinion.
Instead the eight statements focus on the fact that the Republican plan is inconsistent with
GOP,” Washington Post, September 7,1995;-Robert Pear, “G.O.P.’s Plan to Cut Medicare Faces a Veto,
Clinton Promises,” New York Times, September 16, 1995; Louis Harris and Eric Pianin, “Parties Swap Fire
in Fight on Medicare: Details of Plans Remain Hidden,” Washington Post, July 25, 1995; See also April 1,
1996, Memo to the President by Dick Morris, Behind the Oval Office, 511. See also Clinton’s remarks
during a teleconference with Democratic governors in Little Rock, Arkansas, on June 23, 1995, in which he
calls the Republican plan “extreme.” Similarly, on July 24, 1995, and September 15, 1995, Clinton
publicly refers to the plan as “extreme” and warns of “draconian consequences.” The president’s remarks
are available in hard copy and on-line in the public papers of the president as compiled by the National
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American’s values, interests, and desires, and the fact that elites oppose the cuts. In
addition, Clinton asked members of the public to contact Congressmen and women
directly to voice their concerns. 160
Three of these eight statements were made during July. Four others were made
between late September and mid-October, just before the House voted to cut Medicare by
$270 billion. Over the next two months, when Congressional Republicans were
threatening to shut down the federal government, Clinton made seventeen more
statements about Medicare. Despite polls showing a majority of Americans strongly
opposed the cuts, the President never referenced opinion either directly or indirectly in
any of his public pronouncements. 161
Given the fact that the Clinton administration collected a great deal of poll data on
Medicare, the failure to find evidence of de-legitimization raises an important question:
how did the White House opinion in this case, if at all? 162
The record shows that the administration did use polls, although not in the way
theorized. Instead it appears that the President used polls in two ways. First, just as in
the cases of Bosnia and DADT, the President used polls to craft rhetoric and determine
how to frame an attack on the Republican cuts. As Morris writes in a memo dated
Archives and Records Administration (NARA). See for instance,
http://www.gpo.gov/nara/pubpaps/photoidx.html.
160
These eight statements are available in the public papers of the president as compiled by the NARA.
The dates of the eight statements made in 1995 are: January 26; July 24; July 25; July 29; September 23;
September 30; October 12; and October 13.
161
Because the case focused on the president’s public statements, it is possible that other members of his
administration could have used opinion in this manner. At least as far as the president is concerned,
however, there is little if any evidence to support the contention that he himself engaged in de-
legitimization in this case of Medicare cuts.
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Michael Frisby, for instance, finds that “polling data were . . . collected almost every night to help the
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August 3, the goal ’ was to “move the Republican’s to the right,” “to raise the heat to
such levels that Republicans abandon their plan, demand a quick resolution, a
reconciliation on the President’s terms, lower their political heat... [or] split and blame
each other.” 163
In a September 25 memo, for instance, the president’s consultants write that the
strategy for the key period ahead” is to “get the message right.” 164 In the summer of
1995, for example, the presidents newest pollsters Doug Penn and Mark Schoen tested
two statements: “Republicans want to cut Medicare so they can pay for a $245 billion tax
cut for the wealthy” and “Republicans want to cut Medicare.” After finding that the
second statement tested much better, they urged the President to drop the “class warfare
tag line” from his speeches. 165 When subsequent internal polling showed that the
President s efforts were starting to pay off and fifty-two percent of the public agreed that
“we are more likely to protect Medicare and insure that it exists for future generations”
Clinton’s consultants applauded him for staying on message and concluded, “we are
winning the rhetoric on Medicare.” 166
In this case polls were also used in another way that had not been previously
considered. A small contingent of White House aides, particularly pollsters, used the
data to urge the president to adopt a more combative stance and to abandon his initial
inclination to compromise.
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Internal White House memos show the administration’s strategy in the post-1994
election period was to pursue a “centrist agenda,” to cooperate with Republicans on
issues that enjoyed majority support in order to “neutralize” those issues and force the
GOP to run on... issues that would ghettoize its appeal and keep marginal or swing
voters away.” 167 Consequently, if polls had shown that the Republican’s Medicare plan
was popular, the President’s aides would have, in accordance with their stated strategy,
urged him to reach an agreement, much as they did in the case of welfare reform. Where
the public supported welfare reform, it was strongly opposed to the Medicare cuts.
Clinton’s aides used these findings to convince Clinton not to strike a deal on Medicare
and to attack the Republicans on this issue.
In early 1995, for instance, Clinton pollster Dick Morris conducted a survey that
at 259 questions “was by far the longest poll” he “had ever done.” According to Morris
the results of the poll were “followed.
. . throughout the year in battling over the
Republican budget proposals” and “the strategy that emerged from the poll results was to
embrace parts of the Republican initiative and reject others.” 168 The aspects of the GOP
plan the White House decided to embrace were those which enjoyed the highest levels of
public support, including working to “eliminate the deficit, require work for welfare, cut
taxes, and reduce the federal bureaucracy.” At the same time, however, White House
advisors urged the President to “reject emphatically and inflexibly” those aspects of the
plan which the majority opposed, particularly “efforts to cut Medicare benefits.” In a
167
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memo to the President, Morris noted, “Medicare cuts are your single biggest weapon
against the Republicans. They are hated by the public, old and young.” 169
Whde White House advisors were convinced that the President should reject
‘ emphatically and inflexibly” the GOP’s Medicare cuts, Clinton was not. Despite public
opposition to the plan, the president was at first uncomfortable about having a showdown
with Republican s on this issue and instead leaned towards compromise. Michael Frisby,
for instance finds that the President was initially “hesitant to make a stand against the
GOP plan to slow the growth of Medicare for fear that [he] would look beholden to
special interest groups. Data collected by White House pollsters and shared with the
President during strategy meetings in mid-1995, however, showed that this was “not a
special interest issue” and there was “solid opposition to the Republican Medicare
cuts.” The data helped convince the President to “open fire” and “hammer the
Republicans” on this issue. 172 The first memo by Clinton’s pollsters stating, “the
Republican position on Medicare cuts [is] their key weakness” and it is “time to open
fire” is dated August 3, 1995.
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Fifty-nine percent of the President’s strongest attacks on
the Republican cuts came in the five months after that meeting. In ensuing memos, the
president’s pollsters continued argue that he should depict “the GOP Medicare cuts in
harsh terms” and lay “the blame squarely on Gingrich and Dole.” 174 Moreover, the
memo’s showered the President with data designed to show the “effectiveness” of this
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Consequently, while Clinton did use polls, he did not use them in the way
hypothesized. Instead of citing majority opinion publicly in an effort to de-legitimize his
opponent’s plan, polls were used to craft rhetoric, convince the President to go on the
offensive and dissuade him from compromising.
Case #10: Environmental De-regulation - Clean Water Art Another case that
was ripe for de-legitimization was the Republican’s efforts in 1995 to weaken several
environmental protection laws, including the Clean Water Act. The Republicans’ 1994
Contract With America did not mention the word “environment.” Instead it contained
what some have referred to as a “stealth environmental policy” couched in “standard
regulatory reform rhetoric.” 176 As Elizabeth Drew writes,
[Newt] Gingrich had cleverly, and largely successfully, sought to avoid
splitting the Republicans along environmental lines - rousing the Teddy
Roosevelt Republicans to opposition... by casting the debate in terms of
relief from regulatory burdens, rather than the attacks on environmental
and safety protections that they were. Deliberately, the Republicans didn’t
use the word “environmental.” 177
One of the items in the Contract, for instance, was the “Job Creation and Wage
Enhancement Act. While seemingly benign, the Act included several provisions such as
Risk Assessment/Cost Benefit Analysis,” “Protection Against Federal Regulatory
Abuse,” “Unfounded Mandate Reform,” “Private Property,” and the “Regulatory Impact
Analysis,” which once codified would either dilute, repeal, or rollback an array of
environmental protection laws. As Drew writes, “this innocuous sounding legislation”
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was “one of several attempts on the part of House Republicans to eviscerate the
environmental laws.” 179
The unfounded mandate provision, for example, was seen by many as a direct
attack on environmental legislation such as the Clean Air and Water Acts, both of which
required states to clean up their own pollution. Representative John Dingell summarized
the concern of many opponents when he noted, “it is not too much to expect the states to
clean up their mess without being paid by the federal government.” 180 Despite the
concerns of environmentalists, however, the unfunded mandates bill passed the House
and Senate in late January-early February of 1995.
Over the next two months, the House passed four additional regulatory reform
bills, each of which threatened various environmental protection laws. One bill, for
instance, instituted a moratorium on all new regulations. While the other three attempted
to codify various portions of the Job Creation Act, including the cost/benefit and private
property provisions. One editorial described these and other pieces of legislation as part
of “Congress’s blitzkrieg on the nation’s environmental laws.” 181
As opposed to focusing on all of these bills, this case concentrates on just one of
the GOP’s efforts to alter environmental legislation. In particular this case examines how
the Clinton administration used polls to respond to the GOP’s attempts to rewrite the
Clean Water Act of 1972.
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After heated debate, on May 16, the House approved legislation designed to
curtail the Clean Water Act by a vote of 240-185. 182 The New York Times referred to
H R- 961 as the beginning of the “second phase” in the Republican’s “campaign to
destroy the network of laws developed over 25 years to protect the nation’s environment.
Until last week they had attacked by stealth and indirection, using the promise of
‘regulatory reform’ to weaken enforcement of these laws. Phase two is more direct but
just as bad. The editorial attacked the bill’s chief author and sponsor, Transportation
and Infrastructure Chairman Bud Schuster of Pennsylvania, for attempting to “gut” the
Act and for his failure to recognize that “three-fourths of Americans” oppose the
proposal. Schuster responded by arguing that the bill “was necessary so as to remove
control of the nation’s water protection laws from ‘environmental extremists.’” 184
The bill, which passed despite the objections of thirty moderate Republicans,
made improvements in water quality contingent on a cost/benefit analysis. It also relaxed
national water standards, provided exemption for certain industries, and made a provision
requiring states and cities control storm-water pollution voluntary. The most
controversial component of the bill, however, was that it redefined wetlands, thus
removing almost half of the nation’s wetlands from federal protection and opening them
to developers.
As in the case of Medicare reform, the public was strongly opposed to any effort
to curtail the Clean Water Act. Polls show that as early as the mid-1960s nine out of ten
Americans said they favored governmental involvement in “controlling water pollution.”
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Throughout the next two decades, the level of support for increasing governmental action
in this area never dropped below 77 percent. 185 As Table 6.28 shows, from the early
1980s through the mid-1990s, public support for the Clean Water Act remained strong
and stable. Despite variations in question wording, between 85 and 95 percent of
American s consistently said they supported maintaining or strengthening the law, while
only 3 to 13 percent favored diluting or repealing it altogether.
185
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Table 6.28:
Date
Percentage of Public who Support Maintaining or Strengthening the
Clean Water Act: 1981-19Q6
Favor
Maintaining or
Strengthening
Act
5/6/81
6/82
7/82
10/82
12/82
12/82
12/82
7/83
11/83
11/83
11/83
7/85
2/29/96
93
94
85
94
88
86
93
89
87
86
95
87
85
Favor
Diluting or
Eliminating
Act
Don’t Know Pollster
4 3 Harris3
3 3 Harris3
9 7 Cambridgeb
3 3 Harris3
10 2 Harris0
12 2 Harrisd
3 5 Harris0
4 8 Cambridgeb
11 2 Harris0
11 3 Harrisd
3 3 Harris0
3 9 Cambridge15
13 2 Belden/Russonello 1
.
- ' *v aici vjivcii uie costs involved m
cleaning up the environment, do you think Congress should make the Clean Water Act stricter than it is
now, keep it about the same, or make it less strict?
b The US (United States) Congress is also debating what to do with the Clean Water Act-another piece of
legislation passed about 10 years ago to help stop water pollution and improve the quality of the country's
water. In your opinion, what should be done with this legislation? Should it be eliminated, kept but made
less strict, kept just as it is, or should it be kept and made even more strict than it currently is?
c Now I'm going to ask you about some specific changes that are being considered in the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts. For each, tell me whether you favor or oppose the change.) Relax federal standards
on pollution of lakes and rivers by toxic substances from factories.
d Now I'm going to ask you about some specific changes that are being considered in the Clean Air and
Clean Water Acts. For each, tell me whether you favor or oppose the change.) Relax federal standards
on disposal of hazardous wastes.
The Clean Water Act and the Clean Air Act, which are now ten/eleven years old, set up national air and
water quality standards and require cities, towns, and industries to meet these standards. This next year
Congress will reconsider the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts. Given the costs involved in cleaning up the
environment, do you think Congress should make the
. . . Clean Water Act
.
.
.
stricter than it is now, keep
it about the same, or make it less strict?
Which of these comes closer to your view: Viewpoint A says we need to reduce the hundreds of
regulations in the Clean Water Act because they have become too restrictive and expensive for business
and private citizens, Viewpoint B says the regulations should be maintained because clean water is worth
the cost, and the regulations have had positive effects on water quality.
White House officials not only opposed the Republican’s plan, but based on the
amount of internal polling conducted, it is clear that they were aware of majority
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opposition to the bill as well. 186 Given the direction of opinion and the President’s policy
stance, this is a case in which polls could be used to de-legitimize. In order to find
evidence of de-legitimization, the President’s public statements regarding the Clean
Water Act were analyzed.
During 1995, Clinton made just two public statements regarding the GOP’s
efforts to rewrite the law. The first occurred on April 21 during the president’s remarks
in observance of the 25 th Anniversary of Earth Day. While he criticized the Republicans
in Congress for attempting to pass a bill that would “hold up regulations for more than
two years” he did not refer to public opposition to the proposal. A month later, almost
two weeks after the House passed the bill, the President once again addressed the issue
during remarks at Pierce Mill in Rock Creek Park. In a speech in which he denounced
the bill as an attempt to “twenty-five years” of environmental legislation and accused
House Republican’s of colluding with special interests to produce a “dirty water act,” the
President never once referred to polls or majority opinion directly. The only vague
reference to opinion, came in a remark he made concerning the fact that “for a long
time. . . Americans have stood as one saying no to things like dirty water and yes to giving
our children an environment as unspoiled as their hopes and dreams.” 187
As in the previous case, there is little evidence to support the model of de-
legitimization. The failure to find evidence of de-legitimization, particularly given the
amount of time and money the White House invested in polling on this issue, raises an
important question: how were polls used in this case?
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The evidence shows that while polls were used, they were not in the way
hypothesized. As in the previous case, it appears that polls were used to convince the
President to adopt a more combative stance and to refine his rhetoric.
The way in which Clinton responded on the Clean Air Act is similar to the way he
responded to almost all the 104 th Congress’s environmental de-regulation efforts,
including, but not limited to, their attempts to reform the Superfund toxic-waste cleanup
act, rewrite the Clean Air Act, cut the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), open the
Artie National Wildlife Refuge to oil drilling, and limit protections for endangered
species.
In early-mid 1995 the Clinton White House began taking a more aggressive
stance against Republican efforts to rollback and repeal an array of environmental laws.
As Kathleen McGinty, Head of the White House Environmental Policy Office confirmed
i
in July 1995, “there absolutely has been a more assertive posture,” although she added
the change in strategy “does not reflect a change in policy.” 188 McGinty went on to argue
that the Clinton administration’s more forceful posture resulted primarily from the fact
that their “policy was now under tremendous assault” by the Republican Congress. 189
White House memos show, however, that there is another factor that explains the
shift in the administration’s strategy. As early as January 1995, internal White House
polls examining an array of Republican proposals found strong public opposition to the
GOP’s efforts to roll back environmental regulations, such as the Clean Water Act. 190 In
a January 19, 1995, meeting Morris referred to this data in his attempts to convince the
President to strongly “reject” all Republican efforts to “weaken environmental protection
188
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laws. Earlier Morris had also shared the results of his last private job with Clinton, a
poll he had conducted for the Virginia Environmental Endowment. The survey showed
that “even in Virginia, a conservative Southern state with a Republican Governor, where
most voters express admirations for the anti-regulatory provisions of the House
Republicans Contract with America, the public ‘makes a clear exception where
environmental regulation is involved.’” 192 In particular, the poll found that conservative
women were upset by the GOP’s environmental de-regulation plans. At a meeting
several months later, Clinton referred to this poll directly. Vice President A1 Gore later
acknowledged that the survey “was a key piece of evidence” in the administration’s
decision to attack the GOP’s proposals. 193
The impact of the polling on Clinton’s decision to attack the Republican’s
proposals is further evidenced by the fact that his May 30 speech denouncing the House’s
action on Clean Water was primarily given at the urging of his pollsters and over the
objections of other key advisors. As Drew writes, beginning in late 1994, “Morris and
[Bill] Curry [Clinton advisor and Morris associate who came to the White House after the
1994 election] had been arguing that the White House was ‘giving away’ the
environmental issue by not aggressively confronting the Republicans on their efforts to
weaken the laws.” While “other White House aides still believed that the environmental
issue wasn’t all that politically important” Morris and Curry had polling data on their
side.
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environment as a key issue on which the President should attack the Republicans
.
195
As
Morris writes when, “Penn and Schoen polled heavily to determine voters views” they
found that loosening of “environmental protection” laws was one of the issues that “most
upset voters .”
196
Polls were used not only to identify environmental protection as a key issue on
which to attack the GOP, but also to determine how best to frame the assault. At
Morris s urging, for instance, Clinton reframed his rhetoric to incorporate words like
severe, radical, extremist, and “pawns of polluting big businesses” when
discussing the Republican s efforts. Polls showing that the majority viewed the
Republican’s environmental policies as “extremist” and an effort to “destroy American
values” became part of the administration’s “mission” statement and were used to
determine how to attack the GOP’s position
.
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Preliminary Conclusion: De-Legitimization
. The model of de-legitimization
hypothesized that when an official opposes a policy that either the public or elites oppose,
he would publicize this in an effort to reinforce opinion and dissuade elites from pursuing
their plan.
These cases were not well suited to uncovering evidence of elite de-legitimization
because in both instances the public strongly opposed the proposals. In order to find
evidence of elite de-legitimization it is necessary to examine cases in which the public
supports or is divided on a proposal that both the official and other elites oppose. The
official would then have to publicize elite opposition in an effort to change or move
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public opinion. Because no cases meeting this criterion were evident in the Clinton
administration, it was not possible to find evidence of elite de-legitimization.
Both cases did present situations in which the Clinton administration could have
used majority opposition to engage in public de-legitimization. There was, however,
little evidence to support the model. The failure to find evidence of public de-
legitimization should not be interpreted to mean that officials never use polls in this
manner. Officials may use polls to de-legitimize, but in these cases there was little
evidence to support this type of use.
Instead in both instances opinion was used to persuade the President to adopt a
more combative stance and to craft rhetoric. In the case of Medicare cuts strong
opposition also helped convince an initially reluctant Clinton to forgo attempts to
cooperate with Congressional Republicans.
The fact that polls were used in these ways in both of these cases was unexpected.
Moreover, the use of polls to develop an offensive strategy and convince the President of
its merits represents a type of use that was not initially considered. In order to account for
this, a new model entitled, “Offensive Strategy” is depicted in Table 6.29.
Table 6.29: Offensive Strategy
Problem/ ->
Issue comes
on to agenda
Potential policy ->
option/solution
proposed by
other elites
Acquire subjective ->
opinion/attitude or
descriptive data
Interpret data -> If polls show public -> Official is urged to and/or
and officials initial adopts a more combative
policy stance coalesce stance; may also abandon
in opposition to the attempts at compromise or
proposal or bargaining
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As in the case of crafted talk and legitimization, when polls are used in this way
opinion has little substantive impact. Instead, it is used to reinforce an officials
commitment to his policy stance, convince him to adopt a more combative stance, and
perhaps, as in the case of Medicare, to dissuade him from bargaining.
While in both of these cases public opinion and the official’s initial stance
coalesced in opposition to the proposals, it is possible that polls may be used for strategic
purposes in other situations as well. While none of the cases examined found evidence of
this, given the limited number of cases considered, it is important to note that subsequent
research should consider the possibility that strategic design use may also be present in
different circumstances as well.
Given that there was no evidence of strategic use in other situations, Table 6.30
shows the direction of opinion and the official’s initial policy stance necessary for
“offensive strategy” use.
257
Table 6.30: Direction of Opinion and Officials Policy Stance Necessary to Use
Polls for Offensive Strategy
Direction of Public Oninion
Pro/Favor Mixed
Policy
Con/Oppose
Policy
Officials’
Pro/Favor Public
Legitimization
[PL], & CT*
are possible
Ex. Health care
Reform
Parameter
Setting [PS],
CT, & Elite
Legitimization
[EL]*, are
possible
Ex. NAFTA
(EL)
Ex. Gays in the
military
,l99
(CT)
Ex. NEPs (PS)
PS*, CT, &
EL are
possible Ex.
Gays in the
military ’
200
(CT)
Ex. Bosnia
(CT)
Initial
Policy Stance
Not
committed
Pandering [P]
is possible
Ex. Tax deduction
Ex. Victims rights
amendment200
PS is
possible
Ex. VAT
PS* is
possible
Con/Oppose P&CT*
are possible
Ex. Victims
Rts amendment **
CT* is
possible**
CT* &
Offensive
Strategy [OS]
are possible**
Ex. Environ.
De-reg.
Ex. Medicare
cuts
**PS, CT & EL are included here only as a possibilities. It is important to keep in mind that due to the
limited number of cases examined, the case analysis found evidence of PS, CT and EL only in those
instances indicated. The concluding chapter includes both a discussion of those “cells” or instances in
which certain types of use are hypothesized to be theoretically possible, but the limited number of cases
examined in this study does not support the finding. It concludes that in these instances, additional case
analysis is necessary.
**The study does not contain enough cases to completely rule out the possibility that polls may also be
used to engage in Public De-Legitimization (PDL). Based on the cases examined, it is possible only to
conclude that there was no evidence of PDL in these two instances. Moreover, none of the cases identified
met the criterion necessary to determine whether officials use polls to engage in Elite De-legitimization
(EDL).
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The gays in the military case is placed in both boxes because the data can be read to suggest either that
opinion on this issue was divided or that there was slightly more opposition than support for gays in the
military.
200 The victims’ rights amendment case is placed in both boxes because while there is some evidence to
suggest the president initially opposed the amendment, he remained officially uncommitted until the Rose
Garden ceremony.
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Conclusion
The cases show that there is support for two of the three models tested in this
chapter. The evidence regarding rhetorical use was stronger in the case of Bosnia
because Clinton’s use of polls to sell his policy was both evident in his rhetoric and
confirmed by an administration insider. Unexpectedly, there was also evidence of
rhetorical use in both the cases of Medicare and the Clean Water Act.
The official’s rhetoric is key to finding evidence of legitimization as well. In both
the cases of NAFTA and health care reform, an analysis of Clinton’s rhetoric showed that
he tried to use polls to engage in elite and public legitimization. Health care reform
proved to be the stronger of the two cases because once again administration officials and
White House memo’s confirmed that there was a concerted effort to use polls in this way.
The model of de-legitimization was more problematic. After examining Clinton’s
public statements regarding Medicare cuts and environmental de-regulation it became
clear that he seldom referenced opinion directly, if at all. Nevertheless, in both cases he
used polls to craft rhetoric and his aides used opinion data to convince the President to
adopt a more combative stance. As a result, a new model entitled “Offensive Strategy”
was developed to reflect this type of use.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
The question at the heart of this study is how do public officials use the
enormous amounts of survey research data at their disposal? To address this
question, five models of poll use were constructed and applied to several cases of
policy and decision-making during the Clinton administration. Table 7.1 lists the
models and cases examined.
Table 7.1 Cases Selected for Analysis by Type of Use: 1993-2000
Parameter Setting
1. Value-Added tax
2. Federal funding of needle exchange programs
Pandering
3. Tax deduction for college tuition
4. Constitutional amendment protecting victim’s rights
Rhetorical
5. Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Pursue, Don’t Harass
6. Bosnia/former-Yugoslavia
Legitimizing
7. North American Free Trade Agreement
8. Health care reform
De-legitimizing
9. Medicare cuts
10. Environmental de-regulation - Clean Water Act
The primary goal of the study was to determine whether Clinton
administration officials used polls to set parameters, pander, craft rhetoric, legitimize,
and de-legitimize. The case studies showed that there was evidence of all but one
type of use. The case analysis also provided insights that are of use in the debate
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between the competing schools ot thought on the nature and extent of governmental
responsiveness.
The major findings of the cases analysis are detailed below, along with a
discussion of their implications and suggestions for future research.
Major Findings
Models of Use . One of the primary goals of the study was to determine
whether there was support for the hypothesis that officials use polls in a variety of
ways. The case analysis focused on whether the Clinton administration used polls in
accordance with five models: pandering, rhetorical, parameter setting, legitimizing,
and de-legitimizing. The case studies show that there is evidence to support the
contention that the Clinton administration used polls in at least four of the ways
hypothesized.
Table 7.2 depicts the use of polls to pander to opinion. The clearest case of
using polls to follow opinion was the tax deduction for college tuition. After the 1994
mid-term election Clinton wanted to put forward a tax deduction plan to challenge the
Republicans, but he was uncertain as to which of a number of potential proposals to
pursue. The college tuition tax deduction was not even considered until fairly late in
the process. The fact that polls showed it enjoyed overwhelming public support, along
with the Clinton’s interest in promoting education, played key roles in his decision to
include it as a major component of his “Middle Class Bill of Rights.”
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Table 7.2: Pandering
Problem/ A Potential policy A Acquire subjective A
Bsue option or options opinion/attitude data
comes on are formulated; that indicates the level of
the agenda official(s) either public support for
oppose or are the policy option or
uncommitted to options
the policy/ies
under consideration
Interpret data A
(determine level
of support for
the policy option or
options)
Official pursues policy A Official attempts to
if a majority implement policy,
(51-60% or more) may or may not be
favors it. Opinion is successful in that
seldom the only
determining
factor in this decision,
but rather just one of
several variables.
attempt
Several cases elicited evidence of rhetorical use as depicted in Table 7.3. The
clearest case of using polls to craft talk is Bosnia. The President tried unsuccessfully
to use polls showing that the public is likely to support the use of troops for
humanitarian and peace keeping missions to market his decision to the American
people. In this case, Clinton’s in-house pollster Dick Morris confirmed that the
President understood that the public was split, and somewhat more opposed to the use
of troops in the region and that the President’s rhetoric was shaped almost directly by
the data.
Clinton advisor George Stephanopolos suggests that this case was not unique
in the foreign policy arena. According to Stephanopolos, White House officials
engaged in a similar campaign to win support for the use of troops in Haiti. On the
domestic policy side, there was also a great deal of evidence of rhetorical use in the
cases of DADT, Medicare, health care, and environmental de-regulation.
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Table 7.3:
Problem/
Issue comes
on to agenda
Interpret data
Crafted Talk
-> Potential policy ->
options/solutions
formulated/
considered
Use findings to ->
help craft rhetoric
surrounding
policy or set of
policy options in
order to change
opinion in the
desired direction,
strengthen support,
or opposition
Acquire subjective
opinion/attitude or
descriptive data
->
Depending on the officials
success marketing his policy,
opinion may or may not
move in the desired direction
The fact that officials use polls to pander and craft rhetoric is not surprising
given that scholars have long hypothesized that these are the primary ways in which
polls are used. More important is the finding that officials use polls in other ways as
well. In addition to pandering and crafted talk, the study examined three other types
of use: parameter setting, legitimizing, and de-legitimizing (public and elite). The
case studies found varying degrees of support for these models.
In the case of parameter setting, the value-added tax (VAT) is the clearest
example examined. The evidence showed that, in this instance, Clinton used polls to
determine that the VAT was, as Stanley Greenberg noted, “not a concept that the
public was ready for.” Consequently, this is a case in which Clinton used polls much
as the model in Table 7.4 indicates - to determine what not to do.
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Table 7.4: Parameter Setting
Problem/
Issue
comes on
the agenda
Potential policy
option or options
are formulated;
official(s) either
favor or are
uncommitted to
the pohcy/ies
under consideration
Acquire subjective
opinion/attitude data
that indicates the level of
public opposition to
the policy option or
options
A
Official does not
pursue policy (in
part or whole)
if a substantial
minority (40%
or more) or a
majority opposes
it. Opinion is seldom
the only determining
factor in this decision,
but rather one of several
variables.
A Official attempts to
set parameters of
action, may or may
not be successful
in that attempt
Interpret data ->
(determine level
of opposition to
the policy option or
options)
Two types of legitimization were considered, elite (Table 7.5) and public
(Table 7.6). In the case ofNAFTA Clinton and other White House officials
frequently trumpeted elite support for the measure. The goal was not only to win
public support for the treaty, but also to use this as leverage in persuading Congress to
adopt the measure.
Table 7.5: Elite Legitimization
Problem/
Issue comes
on to agenda
Potential policy
option/solution
is favored by
the official
-> Acquire subjective/ ->
opinion/attitude
data
Interpret data A if the public is A official seeks to increase
/determine levels opposed to support by publicizing
of support or split on the elite support for the
for the policy policy initiative
policy
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In the case of health care reform, Clinton attempted to publicize majority
dissatisfaction with the current system and support for an overhaul as a means of
convincing reluctant members of Congress and other elites to go along with his
proposal. While he was not ultimately successful in this endeavor, Clinton’s rhetoric,
memoranda, and the statements from White House officials all confirm that the
President tried to use opinion in this manner.
Table 7.6: Public Legitimization
Problem/ A
Issue comes
on to agenda
Potential policy
option/solution
is favored by
the official
A Acquire subjective/ A
opinion/attitude
data
Interpret data -> if public supports/ A official publicizes majority
/determine levels favors the policy support in an effort to
of support persuade elite’s to support
for the policy the policy, counteract political
policy opposition, etc...
The model that did not hold up under analysis was de-legitimization.
Medicare and the Clean Water Act are similar in that in both cases the public and the
President’s initial policy stance coalesced in opposition to the measures. While these
situations were ripe for public de-legitimization, in both cases Clinton acted contrary
to expectation and did not tout widespread opposition to the measures.
Memo’s and records of White House meetings confirm that the administration
polled extensively on these issues. Instead of publicly de-legitimizing the proposals,
however, this knowledge was used to craft rhetoric and convince the President to go
on the offensive. In the case of Medicare, polls also played a role in convincing the
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President to abandon his initial inclination to bargain and compromise with
Republicans.
As a result of these findings, a new model of use depicted in Table 7.7 was
developed. This model differs from the others in that it focuses on the use of polls for
strategic purposes. In these cases, polls are used to develop an offensive strategy and,
as in the case of Medicare cuts and Environmental de-regulation, to convince the
official of the merits of the strategy.
Table 7.7: Offensive Strategy
Problem/ Potential policy Acquire subjective ->
Issue comes option/solution opinion/attitude or
on to agenda proposed by descriptive data
other elites
Interpret data If polls show public A Official is urged to and/or
and officials initial adopts a more combative
policy stance coalesce stance; may also abandon
in opposition to the attempts at compromise or
proposal or bargaining
While in these cases opinion and the President’s policy stance coalesced in opposition
to the proposals, it is theoretically possible that polls can also be used for strategic
purposes in other situations as well. There may, for instance, be cases in which polls
are used to help develop defensive or other type of strategy.
The finding that politicians use polls in a variety of ways is important for two
reasons. First it challenges the widespread assumption that the sole reason officials
poll is so they can tailor their policy decisions to survey results. While officials do use
polls to pander to opinion this is not the only or most important way in which they are
used. Second, the political science literature on poll use is divided between those
who based on high degrees of correspondence between opinion and policy outcomes
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have long assumed that politicians use polls to pander and those who have argued
instead polls are used to craft rhetoric or not at all. This study challenges both of
these conclusions, arguing instead that polls are used in several other ways as well.
The findings demonstrate that there is a need to broaden our conception of poll use to
include not only pandering and rhetorical use, but also other ways in which officials
use polls. Defining poll use broadly to account for all the ways in which opinion is
used is an essential first step in the process of measuring and understanding how
opinion intersects with and impacts policy and decision-making.
Independent and Intervening Variables
. Two variables were hypothesized to
be related to opinion use: the direction of opinion and the officials’ initial policy
stance. Each variable contains three categories: favor, mixed/not committed, and
oppose. The study hypothesized that they way polls are used depends on the nature
of the relationship between the categories of these variables. In cases where the
public favors and the official initially oppose a policy initiative, for instance, two
types of use were hypothesized to be possible, crafted talk and pandering. Table 7.8
shows how the categories of each these variables were hypothesized to be related to
each type of use.
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Table 7.8: Direction of Opinion and Officials Policy Stance Hypothesized to
be Related to Each Type of Use
Direction of Public Opinion
Pro/
Favor
Mixed Con/
Oppose
Officials’
Pro/Favor Public
Legitimization
[PL], & Crafted
Talk [CT] are
possible
Parameter
Setting [PS],
CT, & Elite
Legitimization
[EL] are
possible
PS, CT
& EL are
possible
Initial
Policy Stance
Not
committed
Pandering [P]
is possible
PS is
possible
PS is
possible
Con/Oppose Pandering,
CT & Elite
De-legitimization
[EDL] are
possible
CT &
EDL are
possible
CT &
Public De-
legitim-
ization
[PDL] are
possible
The case analysis found support for the contention that the relationship
between the categories of these variables is essential to determining how opinion is
used. Three modifications to the information summarized in Table 7.8 are, however,
necessary.
First, while public de-legitimization was hypothesized to occur in one instance
and elite de-legitimization in two, there was no evidence that Clinton used polls in
these ways. This should not be construed to suggest that officials do not use opinion
to de-legitimize, rather that the cases examined did not lend support for these types of
use. It is possible that additional case analysis may find support for one or both of
these models.
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Second, in cases where both the public and official opposed a policy initiative,
a new type of use, labeled “offensive strategy” was found.
Third, while there was evidence of five types of use, not all were present in
each of the circumstances initially hypothesized and depicted in Table 7.8. If the
public and official initially favor a policy initiative, for instance, it was hypothesized
that two types of use were possible, public legitimization and crafted talk. The case
analysis found only evidence of public legitimization in this instance. This is true in
at least four other instances as well.
To clarify this point, Table 7.9 shows the types of use that were found and
how they relate to the categories of each variable.
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Table 7.9: Types of Use Evidence Supports When the Categories of Each
Variable (Direction of Opinion and Officials Policy Stance
Necessary) are Related in a Particular Manner
Direction of Public Oninirm
Pro/
Favor
Mixed Con/
Oppose
Officials’
Pro/Favor Public
Legitimization
[PL]
Ex. Health care
Reform (PL)
Parameter
Setting [PS],
Crafted Talk [CT],
& Elite
Legitimization [EL]
Ex. NAFTA (EL)
Ex. DADT (CT)*
Ex. NEPs (PS)
CT
Ex. DADT
(CT)*
Ex. Bosnia
(CT)
Initial
Policy Stance
Not
committed
Pandering [P] PS
Ex. Tax deduction /P) Fr VA T /PC)
Ex. Victims rights
amendment (P)**
Con/Oppose P
Ex. Victims rts.
amendment (P)**
CT &
Offensive
Strategy
[OS]
Ex. Envir.
CT&OS)
Ex.
Medicare
Cuts (CT
&OS)
*DADT was placed in two boxes because the data can be read to suggest either that opinion on this
issue was divided or that there was slightly more opposition than support for gays in the military. This
does not change, however, the findings regarding how opinion was used.
** This case was placed in two boxes because the President’s initial policy stance could be read in two
ways. There is some evidence to suggest he initially opposed the amendment, although he remained
officially uncommitted until the Rose Garden ceremony. This does not change the findings regarding
how opinion was used.
As Table 7.9 shows, each type of use is possible only in a limited number of
circumstances. Pandering, for instance, is possible only in two sets of circumstances,
whereas by comparison crafted talk is possible in three. This holds true for each of the
models considered.
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The table (7.9) also shows that in some instances, officials have more than one
option when it comes to using polls. Consequently, while both variables proved
useful in narrowing the range of options, they were not determinative. As a result, one
question for future research is given the direction of opinion and officials initial
policy stance, what intervening variables are related to if, when, and how officials use
opinion?
Potential intervening variables include, but are not limited to: the salience,
coherence, intensity, and distribution of opinion, timing, the nature, extent, and
character of elite opinion, and the role of interest groups. Future research might
consider whether, for instance, officials are more likely to set parameters rather than
craft rhetoric in cases in which opinion is highly salient, coherent, and/or intense? Or
whether officials are more likely to pander early their term or when they are facing
re-election? Toward the end of his presidency Clinton acknowledged that if the issue
of gays in the military rose later in his term, he would have handled it much
differently. As opposed to trying to convince the public of the merits of the
compromise, he would have either put the issue off or abandoned it altogether. This
type of research may also help explain why in the cases of Bosnia and DADT, for
instance, Clinton used polls to craft rhetoric as opposed to set parameters or engage in
elite legitimization?
Another question that is ripe for future research is whether the categories of
the variables are related to other types of use as initially hypothesized. As Table 7.9
shows, the limited number of case studies made it possible to find evidence of types
of use under certain conditions. Future research might also consider whether other
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types of use are present in the circumstances initially hypothesized and depicted in
Table 7.10. Are polls used to craft talk in cases where both the public and official
initially favor a policy initiative? Similarly, are they used to set parameters and
legitimize in cases where the public opposes and the official initially supports a
policy initiative or to engage in public de-legitimization when both the public and
official oppose a policy initiative?
Table 7.10: Future Research Necessary to Determine Whether the Categories
of Each Variable (Direction of Opinion and Officials Policy
Stance) are Related to Additional Types of Use
‘
Officials’
Pro/Favor
Pro/
Favor
Direction of Public Ooinion
Mixed Con/
Oonose
Crafted Talk
[CT]
Parameter
Setting [PS]
& Elite
Legitimization
[EL]
Initial Not PS
Policv Stance committed
CT& CT & EDL Public De-
Con/Oppose Elite De- Legitimization
Legitimization [PDL]
[EDL]
Evidence . In order to find evidence of each type of use, it is important to
determine whether the official’s policy stance, rhetoric, or strategy changed and
whether these changes were a result of polling data. While it is possible to determine
whether and how an official’s policy stance, rhetoric, or strategy changed,
determining whether these changes were a result of polling proved more difficult.
One key piece of evidence is the statements made by administration officials. While
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this type of evidence is available in the historical record, it could be further
strengthened by interviews. Provided the interviews are structured around a clear
conceptualization of poll use, intensive elite interviewing may be an even more
crucial component of future research in this area than previously recognized.
Opportunities for Use Vary by Type. The fact that officials use polls a
variety of ways, does not mean that all types of use are employed with the same
regularity. As Table 7.9 shows, there are more opportunities to use opinion to craft
rhetoric than to pander or set parameters.
Given the limited number of cases considered in this study, it was not possible
to determine the modal type of use. The fact that some types of use can, as Table 7.8
shows, theoretically be employed in a greater number of situations suggests a need for
further research. If, for instance, crafted talk is found to be the most common way in
which opinion is used, this would suggest that officials are more likely to use opinion
in ways that are tactical, but not substantively responsive to the majority will. If
parameter setting or pandering were found to be the modal types of use, however, this
would suggest that officials are more likely to use polls in ways that are substantively
responsive to the majority will. Consequently, one of the key questions that should
be considered in subsequent research is what is the modal type of use?
Regularity and Predictability of Poll Use . Contrary to what some scholars
have suggested, this study shows that it is possible to determine within a fairly narrow
range, how an official is likely to use polls in the policy arena. When both the public
and official oppose a policy option, for instance, the only possibilities are offensive
strategy and crafted rhetoric. Likewise, when the public opposes and the official is
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not committed to a particular policy option, the official can either set parameters or
ignore opinion altogether (non-use).
It is not only possible to predict how officials may use opinion but also what
type of advice aides who rely on polls are likely to give their clients. This suggests
that the use of polls is not as mysterious as sometimes suggested. In the case of
Bosnia, for instance, Morris and Greenberg had little choice but to advise Clinton to
either ignore opinion at his own peril, set parameters of action, craft rhetoric, or
engage in elite legitimization. While theoretically possible, ignoring opinion is
seldom an attractive option for officials operating in a representative democracy and
subject to periodic election. Similarly, in this instance, parameter setting was not a
realistic alternative unless Clinton was willing either to abandon his decision to send
troops altogether or limit it in some measurable way (i.e. support airlifts to the region,
but not send in ground troops). Since this was unlikely, not to mention unworkable, in
the wake of the Dayton Peace Accords, the only remaining options were either to
craft rhetoric or engage in elite legitimization. Because polls showed that trumpeting
elite support for the decision to send troops to the region was unlikely to have any
real impact on public support, the only realistic and remaining alternative was for
Clinton to do what he indeed did - try to manufacture consent by appealing to the
public to support his decision on humanitarian grounds.
What emerges from this and nearly every other case analyzed is that, when it
comes to using opinion, officials have some options. After examining the realities of
the situation, however, it becomes clear that there are seldom many viable alternatives
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at their disposal. By the same token, aides, pollsters, and consultants who use polls
are often constrained in terms of the type of advice they can give their clients
The Impotence of Opinion
. The case analysis yielded two findings
regarding the power of opinion, its nature, and operation. First, opinion is at times
rendered powerless or impotent. Second, in those cases in which opinion does
exercise power, it does not always operate in the way assumed.
If we adopt Dennis Wrong’s modified version of Bertrand Russell’s definition
of power as “the capacity of some persons to produce intended and foreseen effects
on others” it becomes clear that in at least some instances opinion is rendered
powerless in the policy-making arena because it has little or no impact on the
substance of policy-making. Building on Wrong’s definition, opinion can be said to
exercise power in the policy arena when it has a measurable impact or effect on an
official’s actions or thinking as it relates to the substance of the policy under
consideration. Consequently, opinion can be said to exercise power only in cases in
which officials pander or set parameters because in these instances it has the
“intended and foreseen effect” — an impact on the substance of policy.
Opinion is rendered powerless, however, when the majority has little impact
or influence on the official’s actions or thinking as it relates to the substance of the
policy under consideration. When an official uses polls to craft rhetoric, legitimize or
for strategic purposes, he does not follow, but uses poll information tactically to
manipulate, change or reinforce opinion. Consequently, opinion is rendered
1
Dennis Wrong, Power: Its Forms, Bases, and Uses (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), 2; Bertrand
Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1938), 25.
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powerless to the extent that it does not have the “intended or foreseen effect” of
impacting the substance ot policy and decision-making.
The fact that whenever polls are used to craft rhetoric, legitimize or strategize,
opinion is rendered powerless suggests that the power of opinion is not as great as
sometimes assumed.
It also shows that whether opinion exercises power depends on if and how
officials use it. The fact that the public voices its opinion in a poll is no guarantee
that it will be translated into governmental action. The extent to which opinion has an
impact depends on if and how officials use this information. This supports Key’s
contention that in order to understand the interplay between opinion and democratic
policy-making it is necessary to focus on the elite element of the opinion system.
“Public opinion counts for a great deal in the end because democratic elites take it
seriously.”
2
Given this, if the public wants to play a greater role in governmental decision-
making, they are advised to seek other means by which to communicate with elites.
Opinion polls do have an impact on the substance of policy in certain situations, but
whether this occurs depends on if and how officials use this information. When
looked at in this way, polls are a tool by which the public can communicate with
officials and officials in turn can choose to respond or not respond to their desires.
More importantly, they are also a tool official’s can use to make tactical decisions and
try to manipulate or change opinion. Consequently, when compared with other
means by which the public can influence policy and decision-making, polls do not
2 Serow et al., ed. American Polity
,
385.
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prove to be as vital and dependable a linking mechanism as the earliest proponents of
survey research promised.
Finally, the public s dissatisfaction with their influence on governmental
decision-making is unlikely to be alleviated by reforms that focus on the collection,
transmission, and dissemination of polling data. Mollyann Brodie, Lisa Ferraro
Parmelee, April Brackett, Drew Altman, Jacobs, Shapiro, are just some of the
researchers who have suggested that these types of reforms may help alleviate some
of the publics concerns about polling, how it is used, and how it impacts decision-
making. They have suggested, among other things, educating the public and reporters
about “good and bad polls” and the limitations of polling, instituting new codes of
conduct for political activists, journalists, and media pollsters, setting up “poll
watches,” and minimizing contact between pollsters and political figures . 3 While
these reforms are well intentioned, they will have little impact on how officials use
polls or how much power opinion exercises in the policy arena.
Those seeking greater influence over governmental policy making would
benefit far more from an understanding of the myriad of ways in which this
information is used, the situations under which it is used in various ways, and the fact
that opinion exercises power only when it is used to pander and set parameters. This
may give those seeking greater influence in policy-making the incentive needed to
search out other more productive means by which to influence governmental
decision-making.
3
Brodie et al., “Polling and Democracy,” 14; Jacobs and Shapiro, “The Crisis in Polling,” 1-5, at
http://www.polisci.umn.edu/ljacobs/rollcall.html (accessed May 11, 1999).
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To focus on reforming how poll data are collected, transmitted, and
disseminated is counter-productive to the extent it leaves the false impression that
greater substantive responsiveness to the majority will may result. Even if these types
of reforms are instituted, officials will continue to use polls as they have in the past
and opinion will have no greater or lesser impact on the substance of policy than it
did previously.
The Power of Opinion. It is also important for those seeking greater public
influence in the policy arena to recognize that in those instances in which opinion has
an impact on the substance of policy, it does not always operate in the way assumed.
Public opinion has long been hypothesized to have a positive impact on policy
outcomes. Much like the discredited “magic bullet” or “direct effects” theory in
communications, polls have been hypothesized to have a direct and positive impact
on policy outcomes
.
4
If the data indicate that the majority supports a policy, for
instance, the official will adhere to their wishes . 5 The case studies show, however,
that while opinion can operate in this maimer, particularly when officials use polls to
pander, this is not the only or most important way in which opinion exercises power.
In other cases, opinion sets parameters of action. In these cases, its power is
negative to the extent that it operates as a veto point, deterring or stopping officials
from pursuing a particular course of action. Consequently, one of the primary means
by which opinion exercises power is when the public voices its disapproval for a
4
Doris Graber refers to this as the “hypodermic needle effect” whereby information is theoretically
“injected unaltered into the minds of the audience.” As she writes, “Early models that depicted a
straight stimulus-response relationship have been disproven.” Mass Media and American Politics
,
3
rd
ed. (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1989), 164.
5
See for instance, Gallup and Rae, The Pulse ofDemocracy.
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policy. In these instances opinion acts as a check on the substance of policy to the
extent that it channels the calculations of policy makers.
The fact that opinion operates not only positively to persuade policy makers to
follow a particular course of action, but also negatively to dissuade them from
pursuing a course of action, coincides with the broader research on power that for the
most part has not been applied to studies of opinion. It has long been suggested that
the exercise of power is not only positive (i.e., the ability to persuade or force
someone to act) but also, and perhaps more importantly in some contexts, negative
(i.e. the ability to check or stop someone from acting). The negative exercise of
power is evident, for instance, in the president’s ability to stop Congress from acting
by vetoing measures. It is also evident in the many “veto points” depicted on any
basic flow chart of the United States Congress. In a similar way, the fact that opinion
acts as a check, dissuading policy makers from acting means that the power of
opinion is not only positive, but also, and perhaps more importantly if parameter
setting is found to be more common than pandering, negative as well.
In addition to whether parameter setting is more common than pandering, two
other questions arise from this finding. First, under what circumstances is an official
likely to be dissuaded from acting? How strong, for instance, does opposition have to
be to compel an official not to act? One of the unexpected findings in this study was
that in at least two cases, the VAT and NEPs Clinton used polls to set parameters
when a substantial minority voiced opposition to the proposals.
Second, are officials more likely to set parameters when they are uncommitted
to a proposal? How does, for instance, an official’s initial policy stance impact the
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likelihood of using opinion to set parameters? Under what circumstances is public
opposition likely to compel an official not to act?
Responsiveness, Use, and Contingency
. For some time, three contradictory
schools of thought have dominated the literature on governmental responsiveness.
The most well known is the large effects school which argues that opinion has a
substantial impact on policy outcomes. Research showing support for this notion is
generally consistent with normative theories of democratic responsiveness.
High degrees of correspondence or congruence between opinion and policy
outcomes cannot, however, rule out another possibility, namely elite manipulation of
opinion. The fact that opinion and policy outcomes coincide may not be a result of
responsiveness on the part of governmental officials, but an attempt to manipulate or
change opinion to support a favored policy option. This possibility is reflected in the
small effects school, which argues that far from responding to opinion officials try to
change, manipulate, or shape opinion to bolster support for favored policies.
If the large and small effects schools “represent the two major poles in the
debate over the opinion-policy link,” the middle-ground is occupied by the so-called
contingency ’ school. The notion that the link between opinion and policy may best
be understood as contingent on several factors was first broached by Key who in
Public Opinion and American Democracy writes,
The anxieties of students about their inability to gauge the effects
of opinion rest on an implicit assumption that opinion is, or in some
way ought to be positively directive of government action. Our
analyses suggest that the relationship between government and public
opinion must be pictured in varied ways . 7
6
It can also not rule out a third possibility, non-use or ignoring opinion.
7
Key, Public Opinion, 97.
280
Building on this notion, researchers within this area have investigated
variation in the opinion-policy nexus with the understanding that the views of the
masses may or may not matter depending on a number of factors. Researchers have
focused primarily on issues, institutional factors, policy domains, and the nature of
opinion as the primary determining factors. What has gone largely unexamined is
that responsiveness may also be contingent on if and how officials use polls.
This study finds a great deal of support for the notion that the nature and
degree of responsiveness is contingent in part on how officials use polls. Building on
the models of use considered, it becomes clear that at times officials use polls to
pander and set parameters. When they do, they are by definition being substantively
responsive to the majority will, and opinion has a direct and substantial impact on
policy-making. As noted previously this impact can be positive when polls are used
to pander or negative when they are used to set parameters of action. Officials can,
however, use polls in other ways as well. In addition to pandering and parameter
setting, they may also use polls to craft rhetoric, legitimize or develop an offensive
strategy. In these instances, opinion is used tactically and has little impact on the
substance of policy. Instead of responding to the popular will, in these instances
officials use knowledge gained from polls to simulate responsiveness and try to
change, manipulate, or reinforce opinion in the desired direction.
The analysis shows that there is more evidence to support the notion that the
impact of opinion on policy is neither substantial nor negligible, but varied and
contingent: at times opinion may have a large impact on the substance of policy and
at times it may have no impact whatsoever. The nature and degree of the impact
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depends in part on how officials use opinion. It is important to note that the
contention here is not that poll use is the sole determining variable, rather that it is
one of several factors that impacts the nature and degree of responsiveness.
Moreover, it is a factor that while long recognized as important, has not received the
attention in the political science literature that it deserves.
Polls and Representative Government
In the late 1940’s E.E. Schattschneider wrote, “the most legitimate question to
be asked in a democracy is: - how can people get control of the government?” At the
time survey research was still in its infancy, and pollsters such as George Gallup and
Saul Rae were trumpeting it as “the most useful instrument of democracy ever
devised, because it was an objective, non-partisan means by which majority opinion
could be translated into governmental policy. 8
The notion that the public should have more say in policy and decision-
making is not without controversy. Alexander Hamilton is just one of several
prominent thinkers who has argued that the general public is not equipped to play a
substantial role in policy-making. 9
Leaving aside this normative issue, it is important to recognize that Americans
are increasingly dissatisfied with their government and the level of influence they
have in the policy arena. The National Election Survey (NES), for instance, finds that
8
Gallup, “Polls and the Political Process - Past, Present, and Future,” 544; Gallup and Rae. The Pulse
ofDemocracy ; Hennessy, Public Opinion, 149-50; Foreword to Fenton, In Your Opinion, x n, 5;
Jacobs and Shapiro, Politicians Don 't Pander, 337.
9
Lippmann and Schattschneider echoed Hamilton’s concerns and made similar arguments in the early-
mid-twentieth century.
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public trust in government has decreased dramatically in the last thirty years. 10
Whereas in the mid-1960’s more than three-quarters of Americans said they “trust the
government to do what is right,” by the 1990’s that number fell to 21 percent. While
it has leveled off somewhat, it remains fairly low. 1
1
In a recent study on the origins
and consequences of public trust, Virginia Chanley, Thomas Rudolph, and Wendy
Rahn write,
[p]ubic evaluations of the U.S. federal government have grown
increasingly negative in recent decades. Survey data indicate
that public trust in government in the early 1990s reached a new
nadir for the era of survey research. 12
More than just suffering from a general malaise however, Americans seem
genuinely dissatisfied with the level of influence they have over their government, hi
the last thirty years, the majority of those surveyed said that government officials
don t care what people think, ’ that the people “don’t have a say in what the
government does, ” and that “government is run for the benefit of a few big interests”
10
“Vox Populi, The Voice of the Public: Expecting More Say: A Study of American Public Attitudes
on the Role of the Public in Government Decisions: Executive Summary,” Center on Policy Attitudes
(COPA). Available in hard copy or on-line at: http://www.vox-populi.org/digest/ems_exec_sum.html
(accessed July 2, 2001).
1
1
This data comes from the National Election Study (NES). This question is variable VCF0604 in the
NES Cumulative Data File dataset. The “Trust the Federal Government” question was first asked in
1958 and has been repeated only every two years since. It reads “How much of the time do you think
you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right - just about always, most of the time or
only some of the time?” The data are accessible in the NES’s Cumulative Data File dataset or on-line
at: http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_l.htm (accessed October 12, 2003).
12
Virginia A. Chanley, Thomas J. Rudolph, and Wendy M. Rahn also focus on the dangers of
increasing distrust. As they write, “[Pjublic cynicism is understood to have consequences. . . . Some
level of skepticism about the actions of government officials is undoubtedly healthy in a representative
democracy. As citizens withdraw support for government and become less willing to comply with
governmental decisions, however, the legitimacy of a democratic regime may be called into question
“The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in Government: A Time Series Analysis,” Public
Opinion Quarterly
,
64, no. 3 (Fall 2000): 239-40.
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as opposed to the benefit of “all .” 13 A recent study by the Center on Policy Attitudes
(COPA), for instance, finds that,
[m]ost Americans feel that they are marginalized from the
decisionmaking process, that elected officials neither pay
attention to nor understand the public and that most of the
decisions the government makes are not the decisions the
majority of Americans would make... an overwhelming
majority feels the majority public should have much more
influence over government decisions
.
14
The study concludes that, “an overwhelming majority believes that the government is
falling short.
. . and that the antidote to this shortfall is for the values and sensibilities
of the public to have more influence .” 15
This raises an important question: is increased reliance on polls likely to ease
public dissatisfaction with government and make the public feel its role in policy-
making is sufficient? Is the increased use of surveys likely to aid or undermine those
who seek to increase governmental responsiveness to the popular will? The findings
This data comes from the National Election Study (NES). These questions are variables VCF0609,
VCF0613, and VCF0605 respectively in the NES Cumulative Data File dataset. The first two
questions have been asked every two years since 1952. The third question has been asked every two
years since 1964. The text of the first question has changed slightly since it was first asked. It now
reads, “Public officials don’t care much what people like me think. Agree, Disagree, Neither.” The
second question reads, “People like me don’t have any say about what the government does. Agree,
Disagree, Neither.” The final question reads, “Would you say that the government is pretty much run
by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” It is
important to note that in 2002 there was a substantial decrease in the percentage of respondents who
said they agree with the first two questions, as well as a substantial decrease in the number of
Americans who reported that government is run for the benefit of a “few big interests.” While the
origins of this shift are unclear, it may be a reaction to the events of September 11, 2001. This,
however, is still mere speculation and other oddities in the data are apparent. For instance, in the first
question there was a dramatic increase in the percentage of respondents answering “neither.” The data
are accessible in the NES’s Cumulative Data File dataset or on-line at:
http://www.umich.edu/~nes/nesguide (accessed October 12, 2003).
14
“Vox Populi,” COPA. These findings are similar to those of another recent study on public attitudes
towards polling by Kaiser/Public Perspective. See Brodie et af, “Polling and Democracy,” as well as
other articles in the series by Witt, “People Who Count,” Bill Mclnturff, and Fori Weigel, “Servants of
the People: Political Feadership and the Public Voice,” Public Perspective (July/August 2001): 32-35.
15
“Vox Populi,” COPA.
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of this study suggest that the answer to both of these questions is, “no,” or more
accurately, “not necessarily.”
There is a long history of debate regarding whether polls facilitate or
undermine representative democracy. In the early days of political polling, Gallup
and other proponents of this technology promised that it would lead to a more
responsive government. While others, from Walter Lippmann to Jacobs and Shapiro,
have taken exception to this argument.
When this question is considered in the context of how polls are used it
becomes clear there is no simple answer to this question because at times they are
used to respond to the substantive desires of the majority and at times they are not. In
the cases of the VAT and NEPs, for instance, Clinton was responsive to the majority
will. In other cases, such as in the cases of Bosnia and gays in the military, however,
he was not. Clinton is not alone. A more recent and well-known case that illustrates
this point was the impeachment and trial of President Clinton. In this case, Congress
pursued a course of action that was opposed by a significant majority of Americans.
Many congressional Republicans and some Democrats proceeded with this despite
polls showing overwhelming opposition to it. This does not mean that they were
unaware of opinion or that they simply ignored it. There is a strong case to be made
that, instead, they used polls in the same way Clinton did in the cases ofDADT and
Bosnia (i.e., to manufacture consent and move public opinion to support their
position). While polls show that they were not successful in this endeavor, they
nevertheless pursued this course of action because their options were limited. They
could ignore opinion, set parameters in whole or part, engage in elite legitimization,
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or craft rhetoric. Since ignoring opinion and abandoning this course of action were
not palatable options for many in Congress, they opted to try to change or manipulate
opinion by engaging in elite legitimization and crafting rhetoric
.
16
The case of impeachment illustrates what so many of the other cases in this
study show, democratic officials will act contrary to opinion despite surveys showing
that their actions are unpopular. Polls aid in this endeavor because they provide the
information necessary to help them try to change or manipulate opinion. This finding
should not be interpreted to suggest that officials are likely to be successful in these
endeavors. This study offers no insight into this question, although it is certainly one
that is ripe for future research. Instead the case studies show that at times officials
use polls to aid them in pursuing unpopular courses of action. Ironically, this is
something that the earliest proponents of survey research failed to consider.
This does not mean, however, that Gallup, Rae, and Roper were wholly
wrong. Polls can at times be used to respond to the majority will. The mere
existence of polls is no guarantee that this will occur or that officials will act in
accordance with the popular will. To this extent polls have not turned out to be the
democratic panacea the early proponents of this technology suggested.
When elite use of opinion is considered, it becomes clear that polls do not
necessarily facilitate representative democracy. This does not mean, however, that
they consistently undermine it either. Rather, given the many ways in which polls can
be used, they are not a wholly reliable means by which the “people can get control of
their government.” The public is better off relying on other more dependable linking
16
For a summary of some of this data, see for instance, “Vox Populi: Appendix A: The Case of the
Impeachment Process.”
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mechanisms such as responsible political parties, interest groups, or direct appeals to
governmental officials. As a linking mechanism polls fall short not just because they
are a passive way of communicating, but because officials can choose to either ignore
them or use them in a variety of ways, not all of which result in substantive
responsiveness.
In order to understand the link between opinion and policy-making it is
essential that political scientists examine not only on the degree of correspondence
between opinion and policy-making, but also as Key suggested, the elite element of
the opinion system. How officials use opinion is a primary issue that deserves serious
consideration if we have any hope of moving beyond the arguments of substantial and
negligible impact that have dominated debate in this area for some time.
When poll use is considered it becomes clear that the impact of opinion on
policy defies simple classification into these two polar opposite arguments. This
study confirms that officials use polls in a variety of ways. Future research should
examine important and related questions such as: what intervening variables impact
how and when opinion is used in various ways, what is the modal type of use, are
certain types of use more “successful” than others, and under what circumstances are
officials likely to use polls in ways that result in substantive, simulated, or non-
responsiveness?
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